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ABSTRACT
This thesis seeks to examine to what extent certain Buddhist 
theories of causation are comparable with the causal theories of 
some British empiricist philosophers.
The thesis starts with an introduction. Its first chapter 
critically analyses Hume's causal theory, while the second points 
out that its similarity with the causal theories of Buddhist logicians 
such as Santaraksita and Kamalasila. Both Hume and these logicians 
criticised the concepts of causal efficacy and production, and 
analysed causal connections merely as relations of unvarying sequence.
The third chapter critically analyses Mill's causal theory (and, 
to a certain extent, that of Berkeley), indicating that 'cause' is 
a collective name for a complex set of conditions. The fourth chapter 
points out that the Buddhist 'Theravada' and 'Sarvastivada' schools 
anticipated Mill's theory of the multiplicity of conditions. Moreover, 
the 'Sarvastivadins' introduced concepts similar to that of Mill's 
'negative conditions'. We also tried to compare cund contrast Russell's 
theory of 'functional interdependence' with Buddhist causal theories.
In addition, we suggested that by different devices the Buddhist 
philosophers and Mill saved themselves from the inconguity of 
admitting any arbitrary sequence as a causal sequence. Chapter V 
tries to prove that the Buddhist formula of the 'twelve-membered dependent
Origination' contains the incipient attempts of analysing causation 3
only in terms of 'necessary and sufficeint conditions. Chapter VI 
shows that the concepts of causation and production are co-extensive.
Thus there is a dilemma of explaining causation without production.
Realization of this probably led the 'Hadhyamika' philosophers to deny 
causation from the Absolue standpoint. Chapter VII points out that 
the absence, in Buddhist philosophy, of any distinction - corresponding to that 
made by some recent Western philosophers - between reasons for actions 
and causes does not invalidate our comparative study. The appendix to 
chapter I reiterates Hume's thesis, viz., that causes and effects are not 
related by logically necessary connections, pointing out that its 
validity is not disapproved by the recent theories of some philosophers, 
e.g., Elanshard and Kneale.
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INTRODUCTION
From the very traceable beginning of the history of ideas 
man has been engaged - in one way or another - in causal 
speculations. The world around him was full of things and 
events which appeared mysterious to him, and he wanted to know 
what caused them. More serious thinkers even indulged in speculations 
about what caused the world ' itself. Even today philosophers 
are trying to solve many difficult problems about causation.
Thus the concept of causation has gone through a long evolutionary 
process - starting from relatively primitive conceptions, to sub­
sequent criticisms and modifications, and finally to the emergence 
of the present sophisticated notions of cause. But although 
there is a very long history of causal theorising,some of these 
causal theories stand out among the rest. Their outstanding 
character is due to their conspicuous break with the tradition.
In the present thesis we shall consider two such streams of 
causal theorising, one coming from the Occident, the other from 
the Orient. Our main purpose in considering them here is to 
point out the remarkable similarity that exists between these 
two sets.
The relevant Western theories were introduced by empiricist 
philosophers like Berkeley, Hume and Mill.^ The Eastern
1. Hume inherited the main spirit of Berkeley's causal theory, viz. 
natural phenomena do not have any 'power' to cause anything.
(See Berkeley's Principles of Human Knowledge, Secg.XXV and XXVI). 
Both Hume's causal theory and that of Mill in fact differ in
( ( 0 (\\\ rwct'A on n&vL }
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conceptions were developed by various Buddhist schools of 
thought. Both these sets insist that the pivotal point of 
causation is not the concept of ’power* or 'efficacy* a cause 
possesses, ^ but rather that of the appearance of something 
under certain conditions. Hume and the Buddhist logicians like, 
Sa3^tarakaita and Kamalasila agree in particular in their 
emphasis that causal relations can be analysed in terms of the 
constant conjunctions of certain things or events with certain 
others. Mill and the 'Therava^da' and 'Sarvastivada' schools of 
Buddhism on the other hand share especially the belief that a thing 
is never caused by one thing alone, but always by a multiplicity 
of conditions. The main point to notice with regard to these two 
sets of causal theories is that they both emphasized that the 
concepts of causal efficacy and production are not indispensable 
for giving causal explanations.
In this connection, someone may object that Buddhist 
discussions of causation abound in words apparently meaning 
'producer', 'production'. Thus, he may say, the proposition that 
the concepts of causal efficacy and production were not essential
(....continued from previous page.)
many respects from Berkeley's According to the latter, natural 
phenomena are 'causes improperly so called'. The only true cause 
is God. (See chapter III, p./Hand footnotes in this connection).
1. Russell also criticised the notion of 'causal operation' in his 
article, 'On the Notion of a Cause' (published in Mysticism and 
Logic, pp. 132-151). He suggested the replacement of the concept 
of causation by that of 'functional interdependence'. Yet, as 
we shall show in chapter IV (pp207-2/J?), his theory of 'functional 
independence' has very little similarity with Buddhist causal 
theories.
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for Buddhist causal explanations, Seems to have no validity.
Our first comment with regard to such an objection is, that although 
some Buddhist schools have used words apparently meaning 'producer', 
'production', they might have actually meant (see chapter V, pp.2,17,2643 
by a proposition like 'X produces Y' merely 'X is always followed 
by Y'. Secodnly, some philosophers, e.g. Santaraksita and 
Kamalasila relentlessly exposed the difficulties connected with 
the concept of causal efficacy. Moreover, the 'Theravada' and
'Sarvastivada' philosophers undoubtedly referred to (see Chapter IV,
See eypcciolly pp. l20“Cl.
pp.l4 4 conditions ('paccayas' or 'pratyayas') while apparently
talking about a cause. Discussions of problems like these form
part of the present thesis.
In saying that both the empiricist and the Buddhist theories 
of causation have remarkable similarity, we are not by any means 
suggesting that the two sets are identical in all respects. If 
they had no difference, we could not really compare them.
In tie first place, the Buddhist theories of causation are 
predominantly concerned with mental events and their conditions, 
because of the overriding importance of mental attitudes in the 
Buddhist system. As contrasted with this, the empiricist theories 
of causation are mostly concerned with the causes of physical things 
and happenings. There are other distinguishing features of the 
two sets of theories. In his discussion of causal relations Hume 
was to a large extent preoccupied with showing that the cause
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does not have an internal logical connection with its effect.
To all intents and purposes, no corresponding discussion can be
found in Buddhist causal theories, A dominant feature of Mill's
causal theory is his insistence that the cause is the invariable
and unconditional antecendent of the effect. By this emphasis
he saves the empiricists from the inconguity of admitting any
unvarying sequence as a causal sequence; although such a sequence
is, according to them, one of the main features of a cause. Since
causes have to be unconditionally related to their effects, any
regularly occurring antecedent phenomena would not qualify as the
causes of their subsequent phenomena. Santaraksita and Kamalasila
also characterised a cause as a regular antecedent. They too had
to have recourse to a device in order to avoid admitting any
constantly preceding phenomenon as the cause of the succeeding
one. Yet, as we shall show later,^ their device was different
from insisting on the unconditionality of the causal sequence.
Neither is there anything in Buddhist causal theories corresponding
2
to Mill’s theory of the 'plurality of causes'. Mill pointed 
out that the same ©v'ent may be caused on different occasions by 
different causes. An accident may sometimes be caused by the
1. See chapter 1^, pp.2,06-,^07.
2. Although the 'Theravada' and 'Sarvastivada' philosophers 
recognised that the word 'cause' is a collective name for a 
multiplicity of conditions.
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driver's ignoring the traffic signals, and at other times by
his attempt to overtake another car. Such a possibility of
t
the plurality of causes does not seem to have a^acted the 
attention of Buddhist philosophers.
Leaving aside the points ef disagreement between the two 
sets of theories, the question arises, what accounts for this 
remarkable similarity between them? In my opinion, one of the 
causes is the fact that they both are based on one and the same 
first premise, viz., 'there are no unitary, enduring entities 
called substances'.
For several reasons Buddhist philosophers unanimously 
rejected the concept of enduring and immutable substances, physical 
and mental. And in the absence of substances or things over and 
above changing qualities, it is no longer possible to speak of 
'the efficacy of causes', or of ’agents' producing something. It 
is Paul who starts the engine of his car. It is the alarm-clock 
that wakes me up. If instead of these things therevere only a 
bundle of fleeting qualities, it would have been i^ossible to 
say that someone (or something) is an'agent' that brings about 
certain changes. Accordingly, Buddhist philosophers in general 
had to analyse a cause as a sum total of conditions under which 
another thing called the effect appears Santaraksita and 
Kamalasila in particular argued that since all things, mental and
physical, are in the ultimate analysis streams of 'space-time
17
point — instants' (i.e. 'dharmas'), nothing has the time to 
produce something else. According to them, what is conventionally 
known as production is in reality the unvarying sequence of 
some momentary entities when certain other momentary entities 
precede them.^
Philosophers of the empiricist tradition like Berkeley, Hume,
Mill and Russell also denied causal operations and production.
Hume is famous for his relentless criticism of mental substances
or selves. Since Berkeley had already criticised the notion of
2
physical substances, Hume directed his criticisms mainly against
psycical substances or selves. About the self he remarks that he
is never aware of anything else apart from some fleeting
sensations, feelings'etc. In his case, as we shall show ^ in
4
our first chapter, one of the factors that prompted him to deny
causal operation was undoubtedly his denial of substances. Now
the objective reality of substances was denied also by Mill and
Russell. One may well wonder whether it is just a coincidence
and
that both the Buddhist philosophers on the on^and/(apart from 
Hume) and Berkeley, Mill and Russell too denied substances and
1. One should not think that such a statement contradicts 
Kamalasila's comment that 'among all the jewels of Buddhist 
philosophy its theory of causation is the chief jewel.* (See TSP, 
p. 10 and I, p. 119* Santaraksita and Kamalasila did not 
reject the concept of causation as such. They only argued that 
the notions of efficacy or production are not essential for 
causal explanations.
2. Berkeley believed in the reality of selves inspite of his criticism 
of the idea of physical substances. See his Principles of Human 
Knowledge, secs. LXVIII, LXXXparticular,for his criticism of the 
notion of physical substances.
(..continued on next page....)
3* See chapter I, pp.69-72 . 4. The other factor was probably his/
1 8
at the same time devised causal theories entirely bereft of the 
concepts of production and efficacy! Mill does not give any 
elaborate refutation of the concept of substance. About physical 
objects he remarks, "all we know of objects is the sensations which 
they give us, and the order of occurrences of those sensations". ^
He further remarks, "But of the nature of either body or mind, 
further than the feelings which the fermer excites, and which the 
latter experiences, we do not, according to the best existing 
doctrine, know anything; and if anything, logic has nothing to do
2
with it, or with the manner in which the knowledge is acquired."
According to Russell, substances are not 'permanent bits of matter',
but only 'strings of brief events.' ^ He agrees with the
physicist's analysis of common-sense 'things' into electrons and 
4
protons, and argues that even electrons and protons are in reality 
merely groups of events connected by causal laws. In his own words,
"we have a series of events connected together by causal laws; these 
may be taken to ^  the electron, since anything further is a rash 
inference which is theoretically useless." ^
He added, "what is peculiar about a string of events which
(continued from previous page.)
/ theory of 'psychological atomism'. See chapter I, pp.&6-67.
1* vol. I, p. 65. Italics as in the original.
2. SL, vol. I, p. 69.
3o The Analysis of Matter, pp. 243, 246.
4. The Analysis of Matter, p. 244.
5. The Analysis of Matter, pp. 244-245, Italics as in the original.
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physics takes as belonging to one electron is a character which 
is present approximately in the common-sense ’thing’, a 
character which I should define as the existence of a first order 
differential law connecting successive events along a linear route."  ^
It is quite likely then that the special empiricist method of 
explaining causal processes without bringing in the concept of 
causal operation is directly derived from the first premise,
’there are no unitary and abiding substances’* In the absence of 
substantial entities we cannot have any notion of an agent endowed 
with a special power by virtue of which it produces something*
It is possible that the similarity between the two sets
of theories is the result of one system of thought influencing
2
the other? An article written recently by Professor Jacobson 
of South Carolina University may shed some light on this question.
He is of the opinion that Hume was influenced by some Chinese 
philosophical ideas, which represented a synthesis of Indian 
Euddhist philosophy and classical Chinese philosophy. If this 
were true, then it is quite possible that Hume’s ideas of 
causation were influenced by Buddhist ideas; and this might have
1. The Analysis of Matter, p. 245*
2* See ’The Possibility of Oriental Influence in Hume’s Philosophy’ 
by Professor Nolan Pliny Jacobson, published in Philosophy 
East and West, January I969, vol. XIX, no. I, pp. 17-57»
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resulted in the creation of a subsequent trend of philosophical 
speculations about causation which resembled Buddhist causal 
theories to a large extent*
Professor Jacobson starts by pointing out some remarkable 
points of similarity between Hume’s philosophical ideas and 
Buddhist philsophical speculations in general* The first point 
of resemblance , as has already been suggested, is their conception 
of the Self* Commenting on the Buddhist conception of the 2elf 
De La Vallee Poussin remarks, "According to the Buddhists no 
Self, that is, no unitary, permanent feeling or thinking entity, 
comes into the field of enquiry.,* That these states of 
consciousness depend upon a Self, are the product of a Self, or 
arise in a Self, is only a surmise, since there is no conscious­
ness of a Self outside these states of consciousness.• ^ One 
cannot but note the extraordinary similarity of this comment 
with Hume's famous statement, "For my part, when I enter most 
intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some 
particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, 
love or hatred, pain or pleasure* I never can catch myself at any 
time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the
1* De La Vallee Poussin, The Way to Nirvana, pp. 38-39»
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Perception." ^ Both the Buddhist philosophers and Hume
relentlessly admonish us of the danger of extending our
speculative thinking beyond the limits of what is grasped by our
senses. Jacobson also draws our attention to the way both the
Buddhist philosophers and Hume claim that our calling something
a producer-cause is essentially based on our conventional way of
thinking and our cultural habit. ^ Both the Buddhist philosophers
and Hume, according to Jacobson, are the major turning points of
the history of ideas by virtue of reversing the roles previously
ascribed to the rational and passionate sides of man's nature, by
claiming that reason is, and ought to be, the slave of passion. ^
They all show that desire or craving is the fundamental determinant 
4
of conduct. Our ends or aims are determined solely by our desires
and reasoning or knowledge has no direct influence on them.
Knowledge has, according to Hume, only the limited capacity of 
indicating the means whereby desires may be satisfied.^
lo Hume, Treatise, p. 252. Incidentally, Jacobson gives inaccurate
reference from the Treatise. See Jacobson, op, cit., p. l8.
2. Jacobson, op. cit., p. 20.
3o Jacobson, op. cit., p. 23. See also Hume, Treatise, p. 415.
4. Hume meant this to be an argument against the rationalist 
philosophers according to whom passions are, or at any rate ought 
to be, the salves of reason. They believed that rational actions 
are determined by reasoning and knowledge, as opposed to actions 
determined by passions.
5. According to the Buddhists knowledge cannot excite passions in us.
On the contrary, passions can give rise to the delusive conceptions 
of the things desired. See chapters II, p. 86; V, pp.232,247^26'$).
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How to account for these remarkable similarities? Professor
Jacobson suggests that this resemblance is due to the influence
of Chinese Buddhist ideas on Hume's philosophical thinking. Hume
might have been exposed to the flood of Chinese Buddhist ideas
mainly in two ways. In the first place, Oriental influence was
such a major feature of the intellectual climate of eighteenth
century Europe, ^ and particularly France, where Hume came to write
his Treatise, that Hume's exposure to the major philosophical
ideas of the Orient (China in particular) seems to be unavoidable.
Secondly, Hume was greatly influenced by the philosophical ideas of 
' 2
Pierre Bayle '' who, in his turn, was a friend of, and worked in 
close co-operation with, Leibniz, "a major vehicle for bringing 
Taoist, Confucian, and Buddhist ideas in the intellectual climate 
of Europe." ^ In Jacobson's view Eayle was well acquainted with 
Buddhist ideas. He points out that Bayle wrote in his Historical
1. As pointed out by Jacobson, the following major intellectual
figures were influenced by Oriental ideas in Europe in the 
seventeenth and especially the eighteenth century: (i) Bayle,
Malebranche, Fenelon, Montesquieu, Voltaire, and Quesnay in 
France; (ii) Leibniz and Christian Wolff in Germany; (iii) Lord 
Shaftesbury (Anthony Ashley Cooper) and Alexander Pope in England. 
All of them were in more or less close communication with each 
other.
2. Hume avidly read and followed Bayle sometimes with almost verbal 
consistency. Yet he acknowledged his debt to Bayle very rarely. 
See N.K, Smith's The Philosophy of David Hume, pp. 43. n.2, 284* 
n. 3, 514-515.
3. Jacobson, op. cit., p. 29. Donald Lach writes about Leibniz, "The 
Influence of Leibniz upon his contemporaries was just as important 
in the field of Chinese studies as it was in general philsophy 
and Mathematics." (see Lach, Leibniz and China, published in the 
Journal of the History of Ideas, vol. VI, October, 1945. See also 
Jacobson, op. cit., p. 33, n.49j Joseph Needham suggests that 
Leibniz was influenced by Chinese Neo-confucian philosophical
(rontinu.eA ' J)
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and Critical Dictionary about the *real nothingness' of Buddhism
as 'that which has no properties of sensible matter'.^ Moreover,
in his formulation of skepticism Bayle was influenced by the ideas
of Pyrrho who founded skepticism in Greece after visiting India
with Alexander. According to Jacobson, Bayle's doctrine of
skepticism "confers freedom upon man in the Hindu-Buddhist style
by disentanglement from knowledge-claims regarding the true
2
constitution of things." Jacobson is of the opinion that Hume 
was probably influenced even in his ethical ideas by the great 
Chinese thinker Mencius. He says that Hume's doctrine of universal 
sympathy probably originates in Mencius. Mencius's doctrine of 
sympathy probably had a strong influence on Adam Smith's ethical 
thinking, ^ and Hume in his turn was influenced by Adam Smith. It 
is not unlikely, Jacobson suggests, that Hume himself had access to 
some books concerning the Orient collected by Jesuit missionaries 
(who had been to the Far East and Burma) in their college, La Flèche. 
This college is the place where Hume wrote hi^amows Treatise, and.
(...continued from previous page.)
y ideas about 'correlativism' in his formulation of the doctrine
of'pre-established harmony'. See J, Needham, Science and
Civilization in China, II, p. 292.
1. Jacobson, op. cit. p. 35®
2. Jacobson, op. cit., p. 26.
3. See L.A. Maverick's China; A Model for Eurore, p. 32 in this 
connection.
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according to Mossner, spent three years, 1734-1737, reading French 
works which "seem so astonishing for a foreigner to have consulted." ^
But the question is, if Hume was really influenced by
oriental and Buddhist ideas, could he have failed to mention some
2
oriental sources of his ideas? Yet Jacobson points out that
the practice of acknowledging the indebtedness to other sources is
exclusively a twentieth-century custom. No such custom existed
in Hume's time. One evidence of this is the fact we have already
mentioned, viz. that Hume followed Bayle almost blindly ^ in many
places, yet he mentions him only once in the Enquiries (p. 155, n.l),
and only once in the Treaties, (p. 243, n.l). "The fact that Hume
does not mention Eayle by name, and gives no reference to the
Zeno article, "Kemp Smith says in one connection, "and follows him
with almost verbal consistency, is but one illustration of how
different from our own was the practice in this regard at the time
k
when Hume was writing."
If all this is true, then it is quite likely that the
1. E.G. Mossner, The Life of David Hume, p. 27»
2o See Jacobson, op. cit., p. 27*
3" See R.H. Popkin, 'Eayle and Hume', Communicaciones Libres
Memorias del XIV Congresso Intemacional de Filosofia, Mexico, 
1963), IX, pp. 307-318. See especially, p. 318.
4. N.K. Smith, op. cit., • p.224n.3'See alsopp. 514-515»
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influence of Buddhist philosophy led Hume to formulate a 
particular causal theory, which created a model for subsequent 
empiricist causal theorising.
Now granted that the Buddhist causal theories resembled the 
empiricist theories, the question may be asked what is the point 
of showing this resemblance? V/hat is th^urpose of the comparative 
study we have undertaken? Comparative studies may have different 
objectives. Sometimes we may be engaged in showing the similarity 
between two systems of thought in order to suggest the possible 
influence of one system on the other. At other times we tend to 
compare different systems with the hope of solving some 
conceptual problems. Now although we do agree with Professot 
Jacobson's view that Hume was probably influenced by Chinese Buddhist 
ideas, our main purpose in trying to compare the two sets of causal 
theories is not to suggest any such influence* We have referred here 
to Jacobson’s view mainly because we think that it is extrimely 
interesting to reproduce a few points about the opinion of renowned 
scholars about the possibility of Oriental influence on Western 
philosophy. We did not pursue an examination of the question 
whether Hume was influenced by Oriental ideas in the present thesis, 
because we think that a whole thesis can be written on the possibility 
of Oriental influence on the Western philosophy of the seventeenth 
and the eighteenth centuries. There is in fact a wide range of 
literature about the influence of Oriental (especially Chinese)
2 6
ideas on Leibniz and other philosophers. ^ Cur prime concern
in the present thesis has been an attempt to analyse philosophically 
the Ideas involved in the theories of causation developed by 
British empiricist philosophers like Hume, Kill on the one hand, 
and Buddhist philosophers on the other. Such a philsophical 
analysis may even h^lp people to understand the plausibility of 
Oriental influence suggested by authors like Jacobson in terras 
of more specific philosophical notions. But we are trying to 
compare the Buddhist and the empiricist causal theories mainly 
because we hope that such a comparison will facilitate a proper 
understanding of the two sets of theories We hope that our 
comparison will primarily help people acquainted with Western 
philosophical ideas to have a proper grasp of the kind of ideas 
that are involved in Buddhist causal theories.
Like any other Indian philosophical doctrines Buddhist causal 
theories abound in technical terminology. Western readers are 
naturally unfamiliar with such a highly specialised terminology. 
Transistors of Indien philosophical treaties are sometimes harpy 
in merely rendering verbal translations, which fail to convey the 
full philosophical import of the specialised doctrines. Under
1. See for example Helmnth voi^llasenapp’s 'Kant und die Heliyionen 
des Cstens; for the influence of Oriental ideas on Leibniz see 
especially pp. 99# 102, 131» 133# 176(n). See also Raymond
Schwabb'6 la Renaissnnce Orlertalesfor the influc.nce which Oriental 
culture exerveu on western philosophers and scholars in the 
l8th & 19th centuries.
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such circumstances, an analytic,’and philosophical comparison 
with parallel theories in the West may-render the Buddhist 
causal theories more intelligible to people versed in Western 
philosophy. Study of the behaviour of apes helps man to under­
stand the complexity of human psychology. Knowledge and under­
standing are frequently based on the method of connecting the 
unfamiliar with what is already familiar. We hope that a 
comparison of similar Buddhist and Western philosophical 
doctrines may even help people familiar with Buddhist ideas to 
have some insight into some parallel developments in the West.
We believe that the present study of the two sets of causal 
theories will also free us from a possible misconception, viz., 
that it is possible to give a valid explanation of causation while 
at the same time denying production. ^
For several reasons I have been compelled, much to my regret, 
to limit my field of investigation to a certain extent. Because of 
my ignorance of the languages, I could not incorporâte-apart from
2 y.
Such works as the translation of the Abhidhermakosa by
1. See chapter VI.
2. Even though we are aware of the fact that great scholars may 
be subject to criticisms on the part of other scholars, or 
even though they^hemselves may feel inclined to revise their 
own works at a later stage, we may safely accept the highly 
critical translations by great scholars like De La Vallée Poussin 
as the source material for our knowledge of Indian and Buddhist 
philosophical developments.
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De La Vallee Poussin from Chinese and Tibetan sources - any relevant
material from Chinese and Tibetan texts in my thesis. Neither
could I deal with the problem of the 'freedom of the will and
determinism' in this context, inspite of the close connection
of this problem with the concept of causation. Both Hume and
the Buddhist philosophers discussed this problem at some length.^
But the discussion of this topic will easily form the subject-
matter of one whole thesis. ^ We are therefore forced to leave this
topic out of the present thesis. For the same reason I could
not afford an extensive discussion of the famous Indian, and
especially Buddhist, doctrine of 'karma' in this thesis. ^
Action and its retribution are subject to the law of moral
causation. Yet a discussion that could do full justice to this
doctrine is not possible within the space-limits of the 
L
present thesis. A great deal has been written on various other 
aspects of Buddhist causal theories. We did not make any use
1. For Hume see his section, 'on liberty and Necessity' (Enquiry,
sec. VIII; Treatise Ek. II, part iii, secs, i and ii). For 
the Buddhist conception of the freedom of the will see for 
example Stcherbatsky's vol. I, pp. 131 -13^»
2. For an account of the extensive literature this topic has given 
rise to in Western philosophy the Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
vol. II, pp. 372-373 can be consulted. The Encyclopedia provides 
an enormous Bibliography under the headings 'Ethical Determinism', 
'Logical Determinism', 'Theological Determinism', 'Physical 
Determinism', and 'Psychological Determinism'. The Bibliography 
is too long to quote here.
3« For a brief discussion of the 'Theravada* and 'Sarvastiva^da' 
theories of 'karma' see chapters IV and V, pp.
4. Professor Ninian Smart has produced the following list of
references on this topic in the Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol. IV,
(Continued on next page...)
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of such a literature in our present thesis, because other 
scholars have already made exhaustive use of such materials.
We start our thesis with a critical analysis of Hume's 
theory of causation. In the second chapter we first introduce the 
theory of causation propounded by two Buddhist logicians,
Santaraksita and Kamalaslla. We then proceed to point out the 
striking similarity of this theory with that of Hume. Both 
Hume and these two philosophers strongly criticised concepts 
liKe causal power, production and agency. In their analysis, causal 
connections are reduced merely to relations of unvarying sequence.
I have incidently tried to show that both Hume and these Buddhist 
philosophers failed in their attempts to give us satisfactory 
accounts of causation in the absence of the concept of causal 
efficacy.
Although Kill agrees with the view of Hume that a cause is 
merely followed by, and does not in reality produce its effect, his 
causal theory is an improvement uron that of Hume in ceratin 
respects. Firstly, he points out that a cause is necessarily 
dependent upon a set of positive and'negative conditions' which are
(Continued from previous page)
Dasgupta, S.N., A History of Indian Philosophy, vol. I, 
chapter IV,
Paranjoti, V., Saiva Siddhahta, second edition, London, 1954, 
PP» 5Sf. __
Parrinder, Geoffrey, Upanishads, Gita and Bible, London, 1962, 
chapter IX.
Tucci, Guiseppe, Storia della Filosofia Indien, Bari, 1957, 
part II, chapter X.
Zimmer, H., Philosophies of India, New York, 1957, chapter IV, 
section 7»
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as essential for the effect as the cause itself. Secondly, he 
insists that a sequence of events is not a causal sequence unless 
the antecedents of it are unconditionally followed by the 
consequents.
In the fourth chapter we critically consider the theories
of the multiplicity of causal conditions (i.e. 'pratyayas'/
'paccayas') introduced by the 'Theravada* and 'Sarvastivada'
schools of Buddhism. They both agree with Mill that philosophically
speaking a cause really stands for a complex set of conditions.
With tie help of their concepts of 'dominating-conditions' and
'general-causes' (see chapterJV , pp.|77-7?9 the 'Sarvastivadins'
even introduced the notion of 'negative conditions' which plays
a major role in Kill's causal theory. Mill's view that a cause
is "the sum total of the conditions, positive and negative
together;... which being realised the consequent invariably follows,"
can thus be said to be fully anticipated by the 'Sarvastivada'
school. We incidentally try to show, contrary to Stcherbatsky's
2
opinion, that although Russell also rejected the concept of 
causal power, his theory of 'functional interdependence' (see 
chapter IV, pp.207-/2) has very little similarity with Buddhist 
causal theories.
1. See SL, Vol. I, p. 383* See also chapter III, pp. I-?9"J30,
2. See BL, I, pp. 119-14$. See especially pp. 131, 142, l4$, l44.
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The Buddhist causal theory of 'dependent origination' has 
a 'special aspect' which explains how an individual is afflicted 
with suffering in his present life  ^as a result of the actions 
committed in his previous life under the influence of 'ignorance' 
and 'craving'. In its final formulation, this is known as the 
theory of the 'twelve-merabered dependent origination'. In the 
fif^th chapter we argue that the rudiments,of the doctrine of denying 
causal operation and explaining causation solely in terms of 
conditions can also be traced in the theory of the 'twelve-membered 
dependent origination'. The relationship between these 'twelve 
causes' (i.e. 'members') can properly be analysed in terms of 
'necessary and sufficient conditions' and 'that which they 
condition'.
The sixth chapter is devoted to showing the futility of any 
attempt to explain causation while at the same time denying causal 
power and production. In this context, we suggest that it is 
probably the realization of this futility which led the 'Madhyamika'
('Sûnyavada') school of Buddhism to deny causation itself from the 
standpoint of the Absolute.
Very recently some British and American analytical philosophers
1. For slight differences of opinion on this matter see chapter V, 
PP-220,T1.3b222,Tl.l.
3 2
have tried to prove that there is a fundamental distinction 
between the psychological reasons for actions and causes. No such 
distinction is in fact made in Buddhist philosophy. In the 
seventh chapter we point out that the absence of this distinction 
in Buddhist philosophy need not frustrate out attempt to compare 
Buddhist theories of causation with those of certain British 
empiricist philosophers. The distinction between reasons for 
actions and causes is not a fundamental one, and empiricist 
philosophers like Berkeley, Hume and Mill did not even make any 
implicit reference to it.
Towards the end of the thesis we have added an appendix to the 
chapter on Hume (ch. I). There we have tried to argue that Hume's 
posotion that causes do not have any logically necessary connection 
with their effects remain unaltered even today in spite of some 
fresh attempts by certain recent philosophers like Blanshard and 
Kneale ^ to prove that there are logically necessary relations between 
them.
1. Kneale's presentation of this problem is couched in slightly 
different terms. See Appendix, pp.253'%^%'
CHAPTER I 
HUI,IE*S THEORY OF CAUSATION
Section 1
Exposition of Huine*s Theory
If we look at the world around us we come across a 
surprising number of regular (and ostensibly irregular) events. 
These observed regularities can be (and have been) used success­
fully to predict future events and to gain control over nature. 
There must be a reason why the juice extracted from a certain 
kind of herb (e.g. quinine) always brings dovm the temperature of 
a sick man. Could it be because that juice has some qualities 
which causes the dropping of the temperature in a sick man? If 
you once find out that this is so, you can use that knowledge in 
both predicting the future course of events and regulating nature 
to yeild some desired results.
Although the concept of -cause has been the object 
of philosophical enquiry for centuries, yet we find that there are 
numerous problems regarding causality which do not yield to any 
easy solution. We are indebted to David Hume both for his 
brilliant solution of some problems connected with causality and 
for his painstalling, even if sometimes not altogether correct, 
analysis of other causal problems.
Hume sets about examining the idea of cause by 
searching for the * impression* or * impressions' from which it is
3 3
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derived. The concept of cause, he notices, is extremely 
important in so far as our reasonings concerning matters of 
fact are founded on the relation of cause and effect.
"Let us therefore cast our eyes", Hume says,
"on any two objects,which v/e call cause and effect, in
order to find that impression which produces an idea of
2
such prodigious consequence". It is obvious to him that 
no quality in any object can originate the idea of cause in 
our mind if only because "there is nothing existent either 
externally or internally, which is not to be considered 
either as a cause or an effect: tho* 'tis plain there is no
one quality which universally belongs to all beings."^ He 
decides that the idea of causation must therefore be derived 
from some relation among objects. Accordingly he decides 
to endeavour to discover that relation. How there are 
mainly three such relations discoverable among causes and 
effects - viz., (l) their spatial and temporal contiguity; 
(2) the temporal priority of causes to effects; and (3) the
k
necessary connexion between causes and effects. He not 
only gives, at one place, what purports to be an argument
1. Hume actually takes a 'cause* to be either an object 
or an event.
2. Treatise, p.75*
3. Ibid.
Uo Throughout this chapter we have deliberately spelt the 
word ’connection* as ‘connexion* for the sake of conformity 
with Hume’s spelling of it in the Treatise and the Enquiry.
against considering the relation of spatial contiguity as being 
an essential element in causal situations^, but also realizes 
the relative worthlessness of the first two relations in a
Discussing the relation of spatial contiguity of causes and 
effects Hume says, "Though distant objects may sometimes 
seem productive... they are., found upon examination, to 
be linked by a chain of causes, which are contiguous among 
themselves and to the distant... We may therefore consider 
the relation of contiguity as essential to that of 
causation,... till we can find a more proper occasion to 
clear up this matter, by examining what objects are or are  ^  ^ ,
not susceptible of juxtaposition and conjunction".(Italics^ origiTiai # 
Treatise, p.7b)« The "proper occasion" is referred to by 
Hume in the foot-note of Part IV, Sec.3. There he says on 
p.236, "A moral reflection cannot be placed on the right or 
on the left hand of a passion; nor can a smell or sound be 
cither a circular or a square figure". Both passions, 
volitions, etc. on the one hand, and sound and smell on 
the other, enter into causal relationships. In the Treatise,
Book II, Part III, Sec. Ill, where Hume declares that reason 
is the slave of passion, he describes our passions as those 
which move us to action. It is not the reasoning alone, but 
the desires and aversions excited by reason*s conclusions, 
which move us to action. About sounds and smells, which, he 
thirks, cannot possess any shape or position, he writes, in 
Part IV, Sec.V, "Though an extended object be Incapable of a 
conjunction in place with another that exists without any 
place or extension,* yet they are susceptible of many other 
relations. Thus the taste and smell of any fruit are 
inseparable from its other qualities of colour and tangibi­
lity; and whichever of them be the cause or effect, it is 
certain they are always co-existent", (p.237)* It does not, 
therefore, seem to be Hume's final opinion, that spatial 
contiguity is an essential part of the idea of causation.
But we must make a final observation* Hume has indeed 
succeeded in showing that in certain cases it makes no sense 
to claim that the cause and its effect must be spatially 
contiguous. Tet he has not given us any clue to determine 
whether he thinks that there are any exceptions to the 
contiguity principle among those terms of a causal relation 
where one can sensibly speak of a spatial contiguity.
*Hume is not quite right.in claiming that sound and smell do 
- not belong to any place. VHiat he rightly claims is that 
they do not possess any shape.
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causal situation as compared with the last one. "An object may 
be contiguous and prior to another, without being considered as 
its cause." But then "There is a necessary connexion to be 
taken into consideration; and tliat relation is of much greater 
importance....
Accordingly, he proceeds in his enquiry - what is 
the impression, or impressions, from which this idea of necessity 
may be derived?
Unfortunately, his immediate reaction to the
enquiry is that "There are no ideas, which occur in metaphysics,
more obscure and uncertain, than those of power, force, energy or
„2
necessary connexion."
According to his official method of clarifying 
obscure ideas by referring to the "impression or original 
sentiments, from which the ideas are copied", he says, "to be 
fully acquainted, therefore, with the idea, of power or necessary 
connexion, let us examine its impression".^ But, surprisingly 
enough, Hume declares that 'UHien we look about us towards 
external objects, and consider the operation of causes, we are 
never able, in a single instance, to discover an;)'' power or
1. Treatise, p.77* Italics as in the original.
2. Enquiry, p. 61-62.
3* Enquiry, p. 63.
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necessary connexion; any quality, which, hinds the effect to the 
cause, and renders the one an infallible consequence of the 
other". ^
How before we proceed to explain the statement 
mentioned above, it is necessary to draw attention to the follow­
ing observations. Firstly, we must bear it in mind tliat Hume 
is here, as well as in many passages, equating terms like 
'power' and 'force' with what is now known as 'logically necessary 
connexion' (even though in Hume's time the concept of logical 
necessity was not fully developed). The following quotation 
from the Treatise gives evidence of such an equation. "There 
is no object which implies the existence of any other.o..Such an 
inference would imply the absolute contradiction and impossibility 
of conceiving any thing different. But as all distinct ideas
are separable, 'tis evident that there can be no impossibility of 
2
that kind". Although there may be a relation between the 
concepts of force and necessity , yet their equation cannot be 
held to be self-evident. Secondly, Hume is here using the 
phrase 'necessary connexion* in a number of related, yet different 
senses. A connexion between two objects is necessary, according 
to Hume, either when it is possible to know the connexion without 
depending on experience; or when neither of the objects could be
1. Enquiry, p.6$
2o Treatise, p.86. Italics ours.
3 8
conceived to exist without the other; or when each one of them 
implies the other.
It is in the light of such observations that we
are to understand Hume's remarks like "From the first appearance
of an object, we never can conjecture what effect will result
from it. But were the power or energy of any cause discoverable
by the mind, we could foresee the effect, even without
experience  ^ "o.othe inference we draw from cause to effect
is not deriv'd.... from such a penetration into their essences as
2may discover the dependence of the one upon the other".
The main point that Hume is trying to arrive at by 
the arguments employed above is that since all causal propositions 
are contingent statements about matters of fact, we could deny 
them all without fear of contradicting ourselves. Although false, 
it is nevertheless not self-contradictory to say that *Xs do not 
cause Ys'. Ho causal statement is like an a priori truth of 
logic, whose falsity is inconceivable^. Since our knowledge of 
causes and effects is derived from experience we cannot infer 
effects from causes with apodeictic certainty^.
1. Enquiry, p.6$. Italics as in the original.
2. Treatise, p.86.
3. Enquiry, p.l64«
4. Ibid.
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In order to appreciate the full value of Hume's 
arguments against 'necessary connexion'  ^ 'power', 'force' it 
seems worthwhile to look hack at a very old theory strongly 
believed by many philosophers. According to this theory things 
behaved in the way they did because of their possessing a 
certain property called 'productive power'.^ This ^productive 
power* was supposed to be hidden from our view. How although
this notion of hidden power had already been the target of
oc eighteenth
2
philosophical criticism in the seventeenth/centui&s, yet it 
remained a favourite notion of those philosophers who 
endeavoured to seek a kind of certain knowledge of the future.
For in order to know that a certain medicine will cure, we need 
only to ascertain that it possesses the hidden power of curing 
us. If we could somehow visualise this occult power we could 
be sure that the medicine would cure us and hence could predict 
the future with as much certainty as we know the present state 
of affairs.
This doctrine of hidden power is also connected 
with the theory that the 'real essence' of material substances 
is unknown to us. Since the natural operations of bodies and 
their interactions on one another emanate from such *real 
essences', our want of precise knowledge of these 'real essences'
t. 'David Hume', Basson, p.68.
2. Criticised by Locke and Neirton.gBe. Basson, gavid Hume, p68.
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alno keeps us in an incurable ignorance about hou these bodies 
bring about changes in others. If ,ae could manage to have a 
glimpse of those 'real essences' of things, .re should probably 
be able to find out the ressens why they behaved in their osn 
peculiar ways, statements describing the behavioural properties 
of those things uonld then an^ear as necess:.ry propositions.” 
Hume makes seveaal points -gainst such a theory of occult powers,
Cf. John Locke, 'hssay*, Bk. IV, Ch. 3, a. 160. "I doubt not but, 
if we couT d discover the fiyure, sise, tertur’e, -;nd motion of the 
minute constituent ’arts of any 2 bodies, we should knou without 
tri-1 sever-,'. 1. of their operations one u^on another, as :rc do now 
the properties of a s.guare or a triangle. Did are know the mech­
anical • .ffect-at Ions of the ;u-('tides o.f rhubarb, hemlock, opium, and 
- man, as a watch maker -Joes those of a watch, whereby it performs 
its opera tiens, ... .-re shouIJ be ahl'~ to tell be fo'^ eh and th-t 
rhubarb wil] purge, hemlock kill, and opium make a man sleep ..." 
(ltd icn -:s in the origin' ! ).
Locke in fact dietIngaiished bet’ween taro senses of 'real 
essence'. He rejected the Aristotelean notion of 're-1 essences' 
meaning natural kinds. But he accented :s genuine the 'real 
essences' of individual substances or the insensible corpuscles of 
individur1 substances. Yet the'e is no contradiction in saying 
tint Locke denied any 'hidden po’rer' or substances -nd .at the. same 
time recognised 're^l essences' which are unknown. The reason is 
that Locke v:an of the opinion that it is only in practice imposs­
ible to know the inner atomic structure of things. He acknowledged 
that ■'•rith better scientific ecui2)ment we would rpobably come to 
know the corpuscular constituents of things which account for their 
particular beh-:viour-.-l properties. Hith present scientific advances 
we can, in fact, explain the particular behaviour of a particular 
thing from a study of its atomic structure. Thus oven though he 
denied that there is no 'hidden po rer' of things, he could have still 
claimed that the structural properties of things which explain their 
behaviour are hidden from us (because, probably, of our lack of 
proper instruments of investigation).
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Tho first roir.t that Hume makes is that ,:e never have
any experience of such a thing as power in the things around us; "we
never have any impression that contains any power or eificay".
'• .i. If we ... ascribe a power or necessary connexion to those
objects, this is what we can never observe in them". " ... no
existence certainly and demonstratively implies a power in any otha?
object".'^ " ... nothing is more evident that that the human mind
can't lorm such an idea of two objects, as to conceive any connexion
oetwixt them, or comprehend distinctly that poi-Tcr or efficacy by
whicn they are united."^
What weight do these criticisms have against Locke's dis­
cussion of 'real essences'Y Locke would have wanted to sey that 
there is vj-gssar necessary connexion between, for example, my
seeing some object as red and the atomic structure of the thing being 
of such a nature that it absorbs all the other rays from the sun and 
reflects only one. he would have claimed that although we do not 
unikrst-''-d why that particular structure of the object makes us
perceive it as red, there is a reason why this is so, because God can 
reveal it to us. (See Essay, Bk. IV, ch. 3» sec. l6. Sec. 28 suggests 
that God decides the connexion between perception and the atomic structure)o 
The connexion between the perception and the atomic structure is thus 
(only in this sense) in principle understandable though not discoverable.
But Hume would have said that there is no reason why X*s having a particular 
composition makes us see it as red. (Talk of the 'atomic structure* of 
objects and the 'rays' of the sun, etc., does not imply the perception of 
the * colour red*. The concept of colour is of a different
1. Treatise, p. l6l.
2. Ibid., pp. 168-169#
3# Ibid., p. 90.
4. Ibid., p. 161.
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logical order from the concepts of the atomic or sub-atomic structure 
and that of the sun-rays). Hume would say that we can only claim that 
it a 1w-y 1 so har -ens th-1 whenever our eyes come in contact with part­
icular wavelengths of light, we see something as red. He can only claim 
that it so happens, hut not^why.
Now, before moving on the Hume's next point, it seems nec­
essary to note here once again the curious way in which Hume is assimilat­
ing a host of different concepts like productive power , connexion and 
necessary connexion .
In many causal situations there are obvious physical connections 
like that between the pulling of the strings of a puppet and the conseq­
uent movement of the puppet. Hut Hume would not be compelled to acknow­
ledge that link either- as an instance of 'productive power' or as a 
'logically neces ary connexion'. There are also the most obvious manif­
estations of the physical strength and energy that men possess in cases 
where, for example, they pull heavjr weights from the ground. Hut these 
would not rualify either as instances of powers in Hume's opinion, as 
they are neither connexions like bridges nor 'logical connectives' like 
'implication*.' What he interprets the advocates of, 'efficacious power' 
to be demanding to exist in causes is a sort of ' quality' irhicli, even 
though it inheres in one su ustance, somehow also refers, necessarily, lo 
another substance. This reminds us, to a certain extent, of the disast­
rous effects of the wrong identification of a relation withes quality 
which Julius Heinoorg iias sho..n in his bo k, * Abetrac oion, Relation, 
and Induction' B u t  one mgy well wonder whether those philosophers who 
believed in the 'power' of things to be the source of interactions meant 
'power* itself to be an 'interaction', a kind of relation. He can eluc­
idate our point with the help of an example. One billiard ball strikes 
another and causes it to move. Thw momentum and velocity of the first 
billiard ball might have been cited by those philosophers as instances of 
'power* by virtue of which a relation, namely that o f  interaction,' is 
established between the first ball and the second.
1. See the article, 'The Concept of Relation' pp 61-112. Passim.
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Apart from the ambiguity in Hume's use of words like 
'power' and 'necessary connexion', It is also not very clear from 
his writing whether what he means is that we do not see anything 
over and above the objects related by causal relationships and 
particular states of them. We see only salt and water and the 
dissolution of salt but nothing else which could be expressed by 
saying that water 'made* the salt to dissolve (the sense conveyed 
by most transitive verbs). If this is what Hume means, then it 
could very well be said that 'force' or 'power' is a functional 
concept and it is impossible to give an ostensive definition of it. 
Objects in which such functions are fulfilled may have no 
ostensible properties in common. We may search in vain for some 
qualities which all food has in common by virtue of which it 
nourishes.^
How some people use tbahelp cf this concept of 
causal power or ' energy in propounding their theory that similar 
causes produce similar effects. They not only claim that this 
cause produces this effect, but they also tend to believe that 
similar causes will always bring about similar results in the 
future because of their possessing similar 'energies'. But, as 
we have agreed that 'powers' do not lie in the sensible qualities 
of the cause, how do we know that future causes, which are
1. Cf. David Hume, Basson, p.135*
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recognisable, only by their sensible qualities, have similar 
'powers'? Even if you somehow do prove that using this chemical 
compound in this soil helped the growth of this apple tree, how 
do you know that all such applications of this chemical compound 
would have the 'power' in future to help the growth of similar 
trees^ (where you only perceive the resemblance of sensible 
qualities, but no 'power' as such)? And unless you know that, 
appeal to the concept of power only would be of no use £o\r <x 
causal enquiry.
Obviously, those who claim that similar causes
bring about similar effects would then try to have recourse to
the principle of the uniformity of nature. But Hume says that
there can be no demonstrative argument to prove that unobserved
instances will resemble observed instances. "We can at least
2
conceive a change in the course of nature". which sufficiently 
proves that such a change is not logically impossible or self­
contradictory. Capacity to form a clear idea of anything is an 
undeniable evidence of its logical possibility, and proves that 
it is not self-contradictory. So the proposition that 'similar 
causes always produce similar effects' is not analytic, since it 
states a matter of fact about the universe which might conceivably 
be otherwise.
1. Treatise, p.91.
2. Treatise, p.89.
4 5
Even if, for the sake of argument, we admit that such 
powers do exist in causes, it would be a thoroughly useless concept, 
in our causal enquiries. Even ordinary men constantly use such 
terms as 'cause’ and 'effect* in their daily life. Yet they do not 
have to penetrate into the essence of 'causes'^ in order to find out 
some such secret 'power'. They do not need to go to a scientist to 
determine whether this plant is dying because of the attack of 
insects. It is by experience only that they infer that this plant 
is going to die as it has been attacked by insects. They remember 
that every case of insect-attack on plants in the past has been 
followed by the subsequent death of those plants. "Without any 
further ceremony" they call the insect-attacks 'causes' and the 
subsequent dying of plants 'effects' and 'infer' the dying from a 
new case of insect-attack that they come across.
Besides, the notion of 'secret' power leads to some
sort of conceptual absurdity. If we do not ever come across any
such power in the world around us how can we form ary concept of
power at all? The word 'power* would not have any meaning at
2
allI "We do not understand our own meaning in talking so". Such 
an 'unobservable power' "will be of little consequence in the 
world"^. We will not be able to test individual cases with it in 
order to determine whether they are instances of causation.
1. Treatise, p.86.
2. Treatise, p.168. 
3» Treatise, p.168.
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But it may be argued that although external objects 
do not serve as mines from which such metals as 'power* may be 
extracted, yet the mind might well serve as such a mine. After 
all, we are every day confronted with the force that our 'will' 
exerts in controlling the movement of the bodily organs and our 
thinking and imagination.
an
Hume disposes of ^argument like this in the follow­
ing way. Firstly, both the command of the will over body and 
thought are extremely 'mysterious'. How does the most refined 
thought actuate the grossest matter?^ Whether any such mastery 
of the will over the idea is a reality or not, Hume says, he 
cannot conceive at all how the will commands the idea. Instead 
of denying any such command, he thus simply makes a weaker claim, 
"The manner in which this operation", i.e. 'the-will commanding
2
the idea' "is performed... is entirely beyond our comprehension".
The influence of the will, both over the organs, 
and over thoughts, is limited. We cannot move certain organs of 
our body like the liver and the heart by our will. We are 
masters of our thoughts and sentiments at*certain moments, and at 
other times we are not. It is only by experiments and obser­
vations that we know the limits of the will. But were we 
conscious of a 'power' or 'secret connexion' which binds them
1. Enquiry, p.6$,
2. Enquiry, p.68.
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together and renders them inseparable we would have known the 
limits a priori.
"We learn from anatomy, that the immediate effect"
of successful volition is not, as we think, our limbs themselves
2
but "certain muscles, and nerves, and animal spirits" and so on . 
But how could we make mistakes in this if what we knew was 
'power’ or a 'necessary connexion' which invariably implied the 
thing which is its effect?
As regards the theory of the "universal energy and 
operation of the Supreme Being, the theory of the occasionalists", 
Hume comments, "are we not equally ignorant of the manner or force 
by which... even the supreme mind operates either on itself or on 
body?"^ After all, our idea of the divine power is built with 
the help of the materials we get in our reflections on our own 
faculties!
These arguments mentioned above form one more 
example of the fact that from the mere appearance of just one of 
the terms of the causal relation, you cannot logically infer the
1. Enquiry, p.66.
2. Enquiry, p.66.
3. Enquiry, p.72.
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other^•
It could be argued that the resistance which we some­
times feel external objects to put forward against us and the 
consequent exertion of our own force or power in conquering that 
resistance give rise to the idea of force. Hume's answer is that 
we attribute power to a vast number of objects v/here we cannot even 
imagine the subsistence of any resistance or exertion. Besides, 
even if, per impossiblle,those objects do make any endeavour, since 
this sentiment of endeavour has no logical connexion with any event, 
it will not qualify as an instance of 'power’ which 'implies' an 
effect.
The question then is, does it follow from all that 
has been said, that we have no idea of 'force* or 'necessity*?
Hume of course does not claim that words like 'power' and
1. ’’It is only experience which teaches us the nature and bounds 
of cause and effect, and enables us to infer the existence of 
one object from that of another." (Enquiry, p.164*)
The same principle which is at work behind the above state­
ment prompts Hume to deny that even the proposition, ’every 
event has a cause' is a logically necessary proposition. It 
is only by experience that we learn that any particular 
event is a cause or an effect. The contradictory of any 
proposition of this sort is conceivable and hence logically 
possible. Just as there may be bachelors though every 
husband must have a wife; so there may be uncaused events 
though every effect must have a cause. (Flew,HumeV PhiIcoophy of BeUeç .yJiQ.tbe 
must also bear in mind that what Hume meant to refute was not 
the contingent truth but only the putative logical necessi^y^ 
of the proposition 'every event must have a cause'. (Flew,Jp.'f12)^
4 9
'necessity* are meaningless. Let us try to follow then Hume's 
alternative explanation of the origin of the concept of power •
The account Hume has given in the Treatise^ is 
very interesting. He says that his search for the origin of 
the idea in the sphere where he expected to find it, had failed. 
Accordingly he dealt with two other questions in the hope of 
finding the origin of the idea in the answers to them. These 
questions are : "for what reason (do) we pronounce it necessary 
that everything whose existence has a beginning has a cause?" 
and "why.do we conclude thr.t, such particular causes must necessarily 
have such particular effects?"
Neither of these propositions has, according to 
2
Hume, intuitive certainty. He says that all the arguments by
which philosophers have tried to prove the necessity of the 
proposition 'every event has a cause' beg the question^. Our 
belief in it, therefore, must arise from experience. But 
instead of examining directly how experience gives rise to it, 
he prefers to sinlc the question in the second question, since the 
answer to the second, he believes, will also serve as an answer 
to it. The connexion between the two questions is probably 
shown in Book I, Part III, Section XII of the Treatise^. There 
he says that the unscientific man admits of a certain amount of
1. I have followed Macnabb to a large extent here. See Macrabb, David Hume.
2. See foot-note 1, p.16.
3» Cf. Macnabb, op. cit., p.55, Treatise, pp. 80-81.
4. Cf. Macnabb, op. cit., p.56.
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laxity in the operation of causes. He probably believes that 
causes might sometimes fail to function even without any impediment.
But the philosopher or scientist believes in the complexity of 
natural operations, which, they think, might elude ordinary obser­
vation. They admit the possibility of counteracting causes as the 
explanation of the apparent causal irregularities. This possibility 
might be converted into a certainty by the observation that whenever 
an exact scrutiny can be made into cases of apparent causal 
irregularity, counteracting causes can always be discovered. From 
this the scientists probably make the ^maxim* that every causal 
connection is necessary. There is no need to point out that this 
is arguing for the universality of causation.
Let us therefore try to find the answer to the question: 
why do we think certain specific events to be causally connected, and 
what is the nature of the inference we make from the cause to the 
effect? Just what is there about a flame, that makes us infer that 
it will burn? The answer, according to Hume, does not consist in 
this that we see an implication between fire and heat and make a 
causal inference. It is experience of the constant conjunction 
between flame and heat in the past that makes us call the one 'cause* 
and the other effect and infer the one in the presence of the other. 
How, **.... *tis plain, that from the simple consideration of one, or 
both these objects, we never shall perceive the tie, by which they 
are united",^ But suppose, we come across several instances in
1. Treatise, p.l62.
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which the same objects or events are always conjoined together.
We then immediately begin to infer the one from the other. So,
in order to understand the idea of power, we must consider our
experience of the multiplicity of conjunctions of similar
objects or events. Again, "this repetition of similar objects
in similar situations, produces nothing new...in these objects".”*
"Yet the observation of this resemblance produces a new
2
impression in the mind". After the observation of the con­
junction of a multiplicity of similar objects, "we immediately 
feel a determination of the mind to pass from one object to its 
usual attendant".^ "This determination is the only effect^ of 
the resemblance; and therefore must be the same with power or 
efficacy".^
Let us elucidate this. We have seen so far that 
Hume refused to admit 'logically necessary connexion* as being 
essential to causation. He probably did realize that in the 
final analysis the conditions about the spatial contiguity of
causes and effects and the temporal priority of causes can be
maintained only at the cost of a tremendous strain on the common 
usage of the terms, 'cause* and 'effect*. The most important 
condition a case of causation has to satisfy, however, is,
1. Treatise, p.l64«■ Italics as in the original.
2. Treatise, p.165. Italics as in the original,
j. Ibid.
4. Eüme pfesùwahly means by 'effect*, 'the constant conjunct*
5. Treatise, p.l65*
according to him, that of constant conjunction. Causes should 
always (constantly) he followed by (conjoined with) effects.
We express doubts about whether an event which is, by popular 
conception, supposed to be the cause of another event is really 
so, if in some cases it is not followed by its putative effect.^ 
Events 'X' and ’Y ’ are causally related only when X is unvary­
ingly followed by Y. Every occurrence of a member of the 
class of events X must be immediately followed by the occurrence
of a member of the class of events Y in its immediate spatial 
2
vicinity. It is this idea of unvarying sequence that is 
expressed by Hume's definition of a cause as "an object, followed 
by another, and where all the objects, similar to the first, are 
followed by objects, similar to the second".^ In the Treatise 
Hume wrote: "We may define a cause to be 'an object precedent 
and contiguous to another, and where all the objects resembling 
the former are plac'd in like relations of precedency and 
contiguity to those objects that resemble the latter".^ But 
then the question arises, if this is so, how do we form an idea 
of 'necessity' then? Hume's answer to such a question is 
roughly as follows.
1. Lucas, 'Causation', Analytic?.! Fh 11 osophy, First series, p.32.
2. Robinson, 'Hume's Two Definitions of Cause', I962, p.169.
3. Enquiry, p.?6. Italics as in the original.
4» Treatise, p.1?0.
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The origin of the idea of a ‘necessary connexion- 
can be explained in terms of certain habits of expectation.
Men become accustomed to finding certain changes constantly 
conjoined with certain others. For example, we are habituated 
to finding certain experiences, such as that of throwing a 
piece of paper into the flames, followed by the experience of 
its burning. These associations, thus established in our 
minds, are followed by a 'habitual expectation of certain 
impending events upon the experiencing of others.' The idea of 
necessary connexion is, grounded, according to Hume, upon this 
habit of expectation or customary transition of the imagination. 
On perceiving X (cause), we feel compelled to think of or 
imagine immediately its usual associate Y (effect); and this 
felt compulsion, which is in the mind of the observer, we 
mistakenly think to lie in the objects themselves of which we 
are compelled to think.
We must, at this stage, pause in order to 
appreciate the value of the method Hume has here adopted. Hume
found that the concept of necessary connexion or power of a
cause is a very unclear concept. People speak frequently
about this and argue about this, without having a clear concep­
tion of what it is they are speaking about. Ho question has 
caused more dispute among both ancient and modern philosophers 
than this one concerning the efficacy of causes. "But before ‘ 
they entered upon these disputes, methinks it would not have
4been improper to have examined what idea we have of that
efficacy".”* How, the controversy is about whether there is any
'power* or 'necessary connexion' in cases of causation. For
settling that dispute we have to understand what 'power* or
'necessary connexion' means. Hume has noticed that previous
attempts to clarify the meaning of the word 'power' by defining
it formally have been unsuccessful in so far as they all
employed synonymous terms like 'energy', 'agency' in the
definitions. So, instead of searching for the idea in the
definitions, Hume suggests the new method of looking for it in
2
the impressions from which it is originally derived! Before 
asking whether only moving bodies, or only wills really have 
'power', which is a metaphysical question, let us ask just 
what it is about these things that makes us say they have 
power: What is the form of the experiences we have when we say
that 'X has power'? This sort of method reminds us, to a 
certain extent, of Wittgenstein, The following quotation from 
Pitcher's book will help us to see the similarity between the 
method just now observed and Wittgenstein's : "The semantic 
aspect of the use of words is one on which Wittgenstein places 
some importance. If we are troubled about the meaning of a 
word or group of words, he often urges us to look at the actual
1. Treatise, p.156.
2. Treatise, p.157*
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circumstances in which they are used. Here is an example: 'Let 
us see what use we make of such an expression as 'This face says 
something*, that is, what the situations are in which we use 
this expression, what sentences would precede or follow it*^ (of 
what kind of conversation it is a part)'*^
In any single instance of causation there is 
nothing that could suggest the idea of power or necessary 
connexion-. But when several uniform sequences of events are 
presented to us, we begin to "entertain the notion of cause and 
connexion".^ "After a repetition of similar instances, the 
mind is carried by habit, upon the appearance of one event, to 
expect its usual attendant, and to believe that it will exist".^ 
We therefore feel a connexion between one idea or impression and 
another. Our imagination moves^ from one idea or impression to 
another impression or idea invariably associated with it. This 
'transition* of our imagination is the impression from which we 
form the idea of power or necessary connexion . The mind 
has no rational control over such a 'transition* of the 
imagination. It is in a sense inescapable. We feel forced or 
'determined' to think of them together.
1. Pitcher quotes this passage from Wittgenstein's Blue and 
Brown Books, p.179«
2. The Philosophy of Wittgenstein, p.237«
3« Enquiry, p.78.
4. Enquiry, p.75". ItalicsOurs.This belief is, according to Hume's 
technical terminology, the same as an 'idea'.
5« This movement or 'transition' is the 'product' (i.e. in fact 
follows) the habit of seeing two objects or events always 
associated.
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In accordance with our experience that 'the 
appearance of a 'cause' always conveys the mind, ...to the idea of 
the effect', Hume gives a second definition of cause as "an object 
followed by another, and whose appearance always conveys the 
thought to that other".”* In the Treatise the corresponding 
definition runs as follows: "An object precedent and contiguous
to another, and so united with it in the imagination, that the 
idea of one determines the mind to form the idea of the other, and
2
the impression of the one to form a more lively idea of the other".
In the Treatise^ the above definition is described 
by Hume as a definition of causation as a natural relation.
(Although the corresponding definition in the Enquiry bears no 
such label). The former definition of causation in the Treatise 
which we have quoted on page 52' is, according to Hume, a definition 
of causation as a philosophical relation. These two definitions, 
according to him, present defferent views of the same subject from 
different points of view. Philosophical relations hold between 
things, loose and separate. Hatural relations obtain between 
ideas which become associated because of observing the objects of 
these ideas in a particular relation.^ The second definition is
1. Enquiry, p.77* Italics as in the original.
2. Treatise, p.172. Italics as in the original.
3. Treatise, p.170.
4« Flew, op. cit. p.120.
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is introduced in the Treatise probably as an attempt to explain 
why the first definition appears to be inadequate. The first 
definition undoubtedly gives an analysis of causation, in terms 
of uniformity of succession. But if regular succession is all 
that is involved in cases of causation, why do we feel as if we 
are ignoring one essential element of causation, viz. that of 
'necessary connexion', or the inevitability of the occurrence 
of the effect given the occurrence of the cause? This is 
explained by Hume by saying that people's feeling of inadequacy 
arises as a result of their confusing the feeling of being 
unavoidably led to think of something, with an inevitable 
relation between two extra-mental entities. We feel a com­
pulsion to think of the effect when we are confronted with a 
cause. We misinterpret it as compulsion on the part of the 
cause to produce the effect. We do so misinterpret it precisely 
because we feel compelled to exoect the effect when we have an 
impression of the cause. At least one reason for the introduct­
ion of the second definition in the Treatise therefore appears 
to be to explain why the uniformity view appears to many people 
to be unacceptable. It appears unacceptable because we mis­
interpret the 'feeling of compulsion'.
But although the purpose of the second definition 
of the Treatise is clear, yet the purpose of distinguishing it 
from the first definition of the Treatise by calling it a 
definition of causation as a natural relation is extremely unclear,
5 8
One purpose could be the following: Hume's real definition of
cause is the first one. He anticipated the general dissatis­
faction at considering the first of these definitions as 
exhaustive. So he tried to justify the first definition by 
saying that people's dissatisfaction is due to a misconception 
only. The second definition thus appears really to be only a 
justification of the first and not a definition by itself. 
Probably, by introducing the justification in the definition, 
he tried to malce the definition look more powerful. But he 
cannot obviously include the justification in the definition 
itself without being involved in difficulties. So he made it 
appear as if it were a definition, only looked at from a 
different point of view. Accordingly, the first definition 
defines causation as a 'philosophical relation' inasmuch as the 
terms of the relation are separate things; and the second one 
defines causation as a 'natural relation’ inasmuch as the 
terms of the relation are associated ideas (cf. "an object 
precedent and contiguous to another, and so united with it in 
the imagination.,.").
This wrong transfer of the 'feeling of com­
pulsion' to external objects occurs, Hume says, because of the 
fact that 'the mind has a great propensity to spread itself on 
external objects, and to conjoin with them any external 
impressions which they occasion, and which always make their
9appearance at the same time that these objects discover them­
selves to the senses".**
This case of projection or wrong application of 
attributes is a quite common phenomenon in our daily life. We 
say of a particular piece of music that it is gay or melancholic. 
What we actually mean is that the music is of a sort that normally
produces happy feelings or sad feelings when one listens to it.
2
We do not mean that inert sounds can be cheerful or gloomy.
It is undoubtedly true that Hume's theory of 
causation has certain unique merits. But we must at the same 
time acknowledge that both his interpretation of causation as 
unvarying sequence and his interpretation of 'necessary connexion' 
as the 'determination of thought' to pass from causes to effects 
and vice versa are open to criticisms. Let us first look at the 
criticisms of his interpretation of 'necessity'.
Critics have either complained that Hume has mis­
represented the origin of the idea of necessity or said that 
'necessity' has really crept in disguise into his account of the 
origin.
It could be said that words like 'determine' 
which Hume uses in his accounts of such an origin are themselves
1o Treatise, p.16%.
2. Of. Basson, op. cit., pp.76-77*
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suggestive of ’necessity'. But, if we look deeper into such 
accounts we shall see that what he means by saying that habit 
necessarily determines us to entertain a particular idea is 
that our idea of one object follows the presentation of an 
impression in our mind with the extraordinary promptness and 
naturalness which is characteristic of habitual actions*
Habit leads us, as it were, to a particular idea rather than 
another. This 'determination' does not imply any 'logically 
necessary connexion', because by saying that an idea 
'follows' an impression one merely expresses a 'contingent' 
relation between the idea and the impression. It may 
be false that this relation holds. But it is never­
theless not self-contradictory. In the case of 
'determination' it is custom which prevents us from thinking 
of the contradictory of the relation between two ideas.
Whereas in the case of 'logical necessity' it is 'inconceiva­
bility' or'self-contradiction* which makes it impossible to 
think of the contradictory of the relation between two ideas.”*
Whitehead has charged that Hume has only
substituted one 'necessary connexion' for another in his
account and there is, therefore, an infinite regress in his 
2
account. But a careful scrutiny in fact reveals that the
op.cit •
1. Macnabb, p.llj.
2. Process and Reality, p.196.
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•necessary connexion' between flame and heat is really explained 
in terms of a feeling accompanying the transition from the 
impression of flame to the idea of heat. The feeling of com­
pulsion is another name for the realisation of the 'customary 
transition of thought' from the impression of fire to the idea 
of heat. The feeling of compulsion is thus separate from the 
'necessary connexion' which is supposed to exist between two or 
more extra-mental objects or events.
Passmore charges Hume with inadequate represen­
tation of the idea of -necessary connexion . He says that 
Hume's main task is to explain what the sentence 'cause is 
necessarily connected with effect' means. He explains it as:
'a person necessarily thinks of an effect when he encounters a 
cause*. How, if 'necessarily thinks' means ' a person always 
thinks of an effect when he is confronted with a cause' then 
this is purely a statement of 'constant conjunction' and the 
words 'necessary connexion' either mean 'constant conjunction' 
or they become meaningless. If, on the other hand, we take 
'necessary connexion' to refer to 'something over and above* 
constant conjunction, then we are left in the dark about what 
that 'something over and above' signifies.”* Professor Flew 
has pointed out that the proposition Hume is trying to explain
1. Passmore, Hume's Intentions, p.76.
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by the words 'a person necessarily thirks of an effect when he 
encounters a cause* is not, as Passmore thinks, *a cause is 
necessarily connected with its effect*. Hume is here really 
concerned with the meaning of the proposition *X is the cause 
of Y*. The latter proposition means at least that *X is 
always conjoined with Y*. But it also means something more.
It is this 'something more* which Hume is trying to explain in 
terms of words like, "We feel a new sentiment or impression".”*
This impression is only the alleged consequence of habitual 
association and the generator cf the idea of necessary 
connexion , since he is not explaining that idea, contrary to 
what Passmore thinlcs, by the words 'a person necessarily thinlcs 
of an effect when he encounters a cause*.
Moreover, Hume is denying that there is anj; 
necessity that X should produce Y. (He is of course not bother­
ing to explain the trivial necessity involved in the proposition, 
*a cause produces its effect*.) So since there is, according to 
him, no necessity that X should produce Y, Hume is not even 
trying to explain that necessity.
However, Hume can certainly be charged with one 
defect. We agree with Professor Flew that the proposition, *X 
is the cause of Y* means, according to Hume, *X is constantly con­
joined with Y*, plus 'something more*. How if this Something*
1. Flew, op. cit., p.122. Italics as in the original.
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refers to *a new sentiment*, and if it is true that Hume claimed 
this * sentiment* to he the parent of the idea of necessary 
connexion , then Hume certainly giving an inadequate account 
of the origin of that idea. Professor Flew himself remarks a 
few pages later, "whatever sense might he found for necessity by 
referring the idea back to some putative impression of habitual 
association, it certainly could not then be construed as logical 
necessity"!^
Thus it cannot be doubted that Hume's account of 
the origin of the idea of 'necessary connexion does not perform 
the function that it is supposed to perform. The sort of 
'necessity* with which Hume was concerned in trying to explain 
the origin of the idea of necessary connexion is really 
'logical'; whereas the 'necessity* that we feel in our minds is 
just psychological> Thus the two 'necessities* cannot be 
identified. This leads to the question concerning the actual 
source of our idea of necessity with which we invest the 
cause-effect relationship. We can try to give such an account 
in the following way.
There are some universal propositions whose 
negation involves self-contradiction. Such are, for example, 
tautologies like 'all books have pages’. We might call them
1. Flew, op.cit., p. 124. Italics as in the original.
6 4
necessary universal propositions. It is possible to deduce 
subjunctive conditional statements”* from them.
How we sometimes employ some contingent 
universal generalizations in such a v/ay that they permit us to 
infer non-logical subjunctive conditionals from them; (A non- 
logical subjunctive conditional statement lilce * if their party 
machine were not superior they would not have won the election* 
is to be distinguished from a necessary subjunctive conditional 
like 'if anything were r^ ot a male it would not be a husband*. 
*X*c being a husband without being a male* is logically 
inconceivable. But although false, yet it is not self­
contradictory to think of *X*s winning the election without 
having a superior party machine'.). In this v/ay these non- 
logical generalizations resemble the necessary generalisations 
to some extent. How this manoeuvre carmot, cf course, of 
itself, transform either the non-logical universal statements 
or the corresponding subjunctive conditionals into necessary 
propositions. Yet, the manoeuvre involved cannot but by
itself endow these non-logical universal statements with a
2
factitious simulacrum of logical necessity . Professor Flew 
suggests that this simulacrum of logical necessity is projected 
out onto the world, where it may become a second source of the
1o A subjunctive conditional statement is a statement lilce,
'if something were (or were not) to have happened, something 
else would (or would not) have occurred'.
2. Flew, op. cit., p.1^6.
6 5
illusion that the authentic original is to he discovered there.”*
Section ii
Major Defects in Hume's Analysis of 'Causation* 
as 'Constant Conjunction*
We have seen the arguments Hume used to deny the
existence of any 'necessary connexion' between causes and effects.
How, the question is, whether Hume admitted the possibility of
2
any internal connexion at all between a cause and an effect, in 
spite of his denial of the possibility of any 'necessary 
connexion* between the two. The answer is clearly 'no*. There 
are two main reasons that are responsible for such a negative 
answer. The first reason is the wrong identification which Hume 
probably made of the evidence we have for, the statement, *A is 
the cause of B', with the meaning of, *A is the cause of B*^. 
Surely, all the evidence we might conceivably have for the above 
statement is experimental and observational. And experiment 
and observation only reveal the constant conjunction which con­
sists in all instances of A hitherto being followed by B. But 
this, even omitting 'hitherto', does not, by any means, 
exhaust the meaning of the proposition *A is the cause of B*.
1. Flew , op. cit., p.136.
2. Such that in the absence of the connexion the cause or the 
effect must be substantially altered.
3. Flew, op. cit., p. 133.
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The meaning of *A is the cause of B* refers, invariably, to a 
connection between A and B. That connexion could, in a way, 
be referred to by saying that subjunctive conditional state­
ments could always be deduced from causal statements. So the 
sort of connexion exemplified by subjunctive conditional 
statements must essentially be discovered from any causal 
situation whatsoever.”*
Another reason for this denial of any connexion
is, probably, Hume's theory of psychological atomism. He
believed that since experience can be analysed into particular
atomic units, therefore experience itself consists of nothing
but 'entirely loose and separate* bits of consciousness. And
it is nonsensical to speak of any 'internal* relation between
entities which are by nature separate. Accordingly, it is
quite possible to think of the objects or events that occasion
these experiences as being themselves loose and separate.
There is no connexion between them even when we call one of them
'cause* and another its 'effect*. This sort of distorted
picture of the mind could very easily lead to claims like, "All
events seem entirely loose and separate. One event follows
another, but we can never observe any tye between them. They
2
seem conjoined but never connected". But it is a mistake to
1. Flew, op. cit., p.1J)6,
2. Enquiry, p.74«
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think that because something can be analysed in terms of discrete 
elements, therefore, it is nothing but those elements. A 
geometrical proof can be analysed into separate verbal and nonr- 
verbal symbols. But it would be nonsensical to suggest that 
there is no connexion between its initial premises and its con­
clusion. We may analyse our experience into discrete elements. 
But the experience itself is flowing and continuous/*
Moreover, there are many causal statements where
the language of 'unvarying sequence' or 'constant conjunction'
simply fails. There are, what might be called 'historical
2
causal statements'. For example, no possible formulation of 
the statement, 'President Kennedy's death was caused by shots 
fired at him by Oswald' can allow the deduction of a statement 
of 'unvarying sequence' from it. The shooting and the sub­
sequent death of the president are events that occurred only 
once in the history of the universe. One cannot possibly say 
that these events are constantly conjoined.
One might try to overcome this difficulty by say­
ing that 'a' was the cause of *b*, provided that *a* was 
immediately followed by 'b*, and that things similar to *a* are 
always followed by things similar to *b'. But the question 
then arises, whether this similarity is exact or only one of
1. Flew, op. cit., p. 137»
2. See Collingwood, Metaphysics, pp. 286, 290,
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degree. It cannot be exact, because 100^ similarity is only 
another name for identity. Therefore, events exactly similar to 
the shooting and the subsequent death of the president are those 
identical events themselves. (Unless the universe is reduplicated 
in time or space). Neither can it be partial similarity, because 
a dramatisation of the shooting of the president need not be 
followed by a feigned (dramatised) death of the president.* 
The only way out of this dilemma seems to be to say that events 
similar to causes are followed by those similar to the relevant 
effects if and only if they are similar in some relevant respects. 
But this will only take us back to where we started, because these 
'relevant respects' seem only to be another name for 'causally 
relevant respects'.
Hume might have realized that statements of 
'constant conjunction' do not equal causal statements. So he 
probably wanted to avoid saying that causation is nothing but
2
'constant conjunction* by defining a cause at least in one place 
as "an object followed by another, and where all the objects 
similar to the first are followed by objects similar to the - 
second. Or, in other words, where if the first object had not 
been, the second never had existed". Yet the supplementary 
clause, which he treats as if it were equivalent to the main
1. Cf. the article, 'Causation' in 'The Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy
2. Enquiry, p.?6.
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clause, cannot really be equivalent to the main cluase. The
main clause is the statement of 'constant conjunction'; the 
subordinate states a subjunctive conditional statement.*
Lastly, it is not possible, contrary to what
the theory of constant conjunction attempts to do, to give any
valid account of causation while at the same time denying
'production'. The concept of production is so intimately
bound up with the concept of causation that in its absence the
whole superstructure of the concept of causation would seem to
2
tumble down. The notions of agency and production are 
fundamental factors constituting the concept of cause as it is 
used in the different brarches of study. R. G. Collingwood 
and Douglas Gasking^ have argued quite persuasively that causes 
are always elements by means of which one can bring about or 
prevent certain other conditions.
Denial of agency and production' is connected 
not only with denying, as Kume has done, internal connexions, 
but also, I think, with the denial of substances. Denial of
1. Flew, op. cit., pp. 130-131.
2. We do not have to argue, I hope, at length, to point out 
that the notions of agency and production are 
inseparably connected. Production is necessarily a 
process initiated by a producer . A producer , again, 
is an agent who brings about certain charges.
3. Collingivood, Metaphysics, pp. 285-340; Gasking, Mind 1953,
'Causation and Recipes'. For a similar discussion of the
essentially practical utility of causes as 'means' to pro­
duce some desired results see also 'The Philosophy of Science',
Toulmin, pp. 120-124.
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the intimate connexion between the agent and the object acted upon 
would, of course, destroy the concept of production . But if we 
have only some logical connexions, but no substantival entity, v/e 
would have no producers, no agents, and consequently no production 
either. An 'agent* is, by popular conception, 'one who, or that 
which, acts'. And this conception very often brings to our mind 
the picture of a substantival entity - even very much like a human 
being - using its energy in bringing about something. Thus a 
certain kind of mosquito, for example, is an agent which engages 
itself in certain activities that result in the bringing about of 
malaria in a certain man. If instead of substantival things there 
were orily a collection of fleeting qualities, it would have been 
difficult to say that someone or something is an 'agent' responsible 
for a certain action of bringing about. It is my friend Pamela, for 
example, who wakes me up every morning. Bow, we could not say that 
a collection of colours, shape, size and weight of a particular 
determination (i.e. such qualities as appropriately describe Pamela) 
wakes me (described similarly only with the help of qualities that 
properly describe me) up (or produces a state of wakefulness in me)j 
In fact, we have become so unalterably habituated to describing 
causal situations with the help of words denoting substances, that 
even if we just try to express a causal situation with the help of 
fleeting qualities only, we shall end up with contradictory state­
ments! The descriptions will correspond to absurd situations!
1. It could have been said that the presence of a collection of 
colours etc. is followed by a state of wakefulness in a certain 
other collection of colours etc. (i.e. those qualities which 
appropriately describe me). But this would not be equivalent to 
saying that the former collection produces a state of wakefulness.
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Thus, if we had no substantival entities, then we 
would no longer be able to use the language of a ’producer’ and 
the 'produced', Hume denied material as well as mental sub­
stances. With the denial of substantival entities the concept 
of agency and consequently the concept of productive force- 
dwindles into nothingness. We cannot, unfortunately, devote 
much time to the discussion of Hume's denial of substances. All 
we can do here is primarily to refer the reader to a few sources 
both in Hume's original writing as well as in some commentarial 
literature.* In the Treatise he writes; "’//e have therefore no
idea of substance, distinct from that of a collection of
2
particular qualities". His discussion about material substances 
is very brief. He probably thought that in view of what 
Berkeley had already said of the rejection of the idea of material 
substance, he need not give any elaborate reasons himself for 
rejecting this idea. His refutation of mental substances is 
comparatively more elaborate. He says in the Treatise, "The 
mind is a kind of theatre, where several perceptions successively 
make their appearance; pass, repass, glide away... The 
comparison of the theatre must mot mislead us. They are the 
successive perceptions only, that constitute the mind; nor have 
we the most distant notion of the place, where these scenes are
1. Macnabb. op. cit., p.139f.
2. Treatise, p.1o.
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represented..".
Since we shall argue at length against the pos­
sibility of explaining causation in the absence of the concept of 
production in chapter VI , we shall not spend any more time on 
this.
The theory of the denial of agency gives us the 
scope for comparing Hume's theory of causation with relevant 
Buddhist theories. In the next chapter we shall therefore try 
to compare Hume's theory of causation with that propounded by 
Sântarakçita and Kamalasila.
1. Treatise, p.253*
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CHAPTER II
POINTS OF COMPARISON BETWEEN HUME'S THEORY AITD TEE 
CAUSAL THEORY PROPOUNDED BY SÏI'ITAPAKSITA AND KAMALASILA
Section 1
1
Circumstances in which Santaraksita and Kamalasila 
Denied Causal Efficacy
One of the corner-stones of the entire structure of 
Buddhist philosophy is the emphatic denial of the concept of 
substance . The 'Upanisads' and the Brahmanical systems believed 
in permanent physical and spiritual substances immutable amidst 
their outer modifications. For several reasons Buddhist thinkers 
unanimously rejected such a concept of an enduring and immutable 
•substance . The reasons are as follows.
The Buddhists explained human 'suffering' as the 
2
result of wrong evaluation. We suffer as a result of our 
'craving'. We 'crave' because we erroneously believe ourselves to 
be real 'self-existing' beings confronted by an external world 
presenting us with 'self-existing' objects. If we could realize
1. Èantarakgita critically analysed the concepts of cause and
effect in his Tattvasanrraha. His pupil Kamalasila's 
commentary on this work is known as the Tattva-sangraha- 
panjika.
2. For this and some of the reasonings cited in this paragraph 
see Chapter V, pJZ46. Examples of wrong evaluation are: 
taking what is really transitory as eternal ('anitye nityam 
iti evam yadi griho'), what is really painful as pleasant
('duhldaatmake skandhapaficake ya|^ . sukham iti viparlto grahah') 
See IHCV, p.460.
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that the things we crave for are nothing *in themselves', we could 
release ourselves from the grip of incessant 'craving*. So they 
theorised that there are no objects existing 'in themselves* in 
the external world. And they reformulated this theory as: there 
are no 'substantival objects' in the external world. V!e also 
strive to achieve things for ourselves . If we could realise 
that what we thinlc of as 'our own selves' are in reality no 
'self-existing' beings, we could also liberate ourselves from the 
clutches of 'craving*. And they took a similar step further 
from the statement, 'there is nothing called ones own self in 
reality, to the conclusion, there are no 'selves' in reality i.e. 
there are no 'soul substances'. The Buddhists denied permanent 
psye*ical substances or souls also because they believed that the 
concept of a permanent unchanging soul is contradictory to the 
concept of moral progress or the principle of retribution. 
Spiritual life would be meaningless if we adhere to such a con­
cept of an eternal and unchanging soul . We would, if we 
adhere to such a concept of a soul , be neither the better nor 
the worse for our moral actions.
In the absence of the concepts of substances or 
'things over and above qualities the whole superstructure of 
the concepts of agents and production seems to tumble down.
It is Irena who switches on the radiator.' It is the alarm- 
clock that wakes me up! If instead of these things there were 
only a collection of fleeting qualities, it would have been
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impossible to say that someone or something is an * agent * v/ho 
brings about certain changes.^
But although the Buddhists deny 'agency*, it 
must be remembered that causal explanations play a very vital 
role in their philosophy. Accordingly, they had to devise a 
special theory of causation which would not need the concept of 
agent • It will therefore be interesting to have a look at the 
theories of causation proposed by Buddhist philosophers. We 
shall, in this chapter, examine in particular the theory pro­
pounded by Santarakçita and Kamalasila.
The Buddha's Great Discovery
One of the great discoveries the Buddha is sup­
posed to have made consists of the pattern according to which 
change takes place in things. Change is not haphazard or 
accidental. It takes place according to the law which is 
referred to by the Buddhists as the law of 'dependent 
origination' (Sanskrit, 'pratitya-samutpada', Pali, 'pa^icca- 
samuppada').
Thus according to the Buddha there is no 
accidental circumstance; everything in the world is causally 
conditioned. The significance of the discovery is such that, 
according to Buddhist texts, he who perceives the law of
1. See Chapter I, p.70.
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'dependent origination' sees the truth, and he who sees the truth 
perceives the Buddha.^
The general formula of causality is often stated 
in the following way.
(a) Pali version.
"Imasmim sati idam hoti, imasya uppada idam 
uppajo'ati. Imasmim asati idaiji na hoti, imassa nirodha idam 
nirujjhati.
(b) Sanskrit version.
"Imasya sati idam bhavati; imasya asato idam na 
bhavati;^ Imasyotpadad idam utpadyate; imasya norodhad idam 
niruddhati.
These may be generally rendered into English as: if 
this is present, that comes to be; from the arising of this that 
arises. If this is absent, that does not come to be; on the 
cessation of this, that ceases.
The full meaning and all the implications of these 
formulae cannot be clear if we do not keep in mind that they are
1. mr. I, 191; and IV, 120.
2. I, 262-264; II, 28, 70, 78, 96; Udana, p.2.
3. At MKV, p.9, we find a slightly different construction of the 
first part of the formula using the locative absolute: 'asmin 
sati idajp bhavati?
4. tlahavastu, II, 285, which seems to be the only complete state­
ment whereas in the other places only the first part of the 
formula is to be found.
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intended to repudiate and replace other theories of causation which 
existed at the time when Buddhist philosophy was being developed in 
India. I find myself obliged, therefore, even at the cost of a 
little digression from the main topic, to give a brief introduction 
to these rival theories.
Causal Theories Buddhism Intended to Refute ^
Buddhism rejected in particular two causal theories
that were dominant in India at the Buddha's time, the theory of
'parinama-vada' or 'sa'Mcarya-vada' of the 'Sankhya' school and the
theory of 'arambha-vada* or 'asatkarya-vada' or the 'Hyaya-Vaise-
silca' school. A third theory which Buddhism rejected (which was
not really all that popular in India) is the theory of 'yadrccha-
1
vada* of the materialists.
According to the theory of 'satkarya-vada’ the effect 
('karya') is supposed to exist ('sat') already, in an unmanifest 
form, in the material cause ('samavayi-karana' or *upadana-karana'). 
The example of the transformation (’parinama*) of milk into yogurt 
is often quoted by the’Sankhya’philosophers in their arguments 
seeking to prove the pre-existence of the effect in the material 
cause. Milk (material cause) itself changes into yogurt (the 
effect). The effect is not, in substance, different from the
1. I.e. the 'Carvakas'. See pp. SI -92.
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material cause,^
The 'Saikhya' philosopher observes that if the effect
is not already present in the material cause, why do people require,
for example, milk, and not something else when they wish to produce
yogurt? If the effect is absent in the material cause, why does a
potter have to depend on clay when he wishes to make a jar?
Causation or creation (of the universe), in the analysis of the
'sâîkhya'philosophers, is simply another name for the process of the
2
acquiring of a new appearance by a previously existing entity.
Now although the ' Saiikhya' and the 'Nyaya-Vaisesika' 
systems agree that the 'nimitta-karana' (signifying both the 
efficient and the 'instrumental* cause) and the 'asamaTvayi-karana * ^ 
are different from the effect, the ’Naiya^ikas' advocate the 
absolute difference of the 'effect* from the material cause 
(*samavayi-karana*). They say that the existence of the effect in 
the material cause prior to the actual production of the effect is 
Impossible. In fact, the jar, a previously non-existing (*asat*)
1. "Earanam eva karya-rupena parinamate iti ... dadhi karyantaram 
dugdhad bhinnam ca na bhavati iti.** Nyaya-kosa, p.735?
Bhimacarya Jhalkikar, ed. Vasudevshastri, Abhyankar, Bombay 
Sanskrit Series No. ZLIX, Poona, 1926.
2. See e.g. Siddhanta-lesa-sangraha, Appaya BÏksita, pp. 38-61 
in this connection.
3. It is difficult to give an English equivalent of this technical 
Sanskrit term. The conjunction of the threads (i.e. the fact 
of their being together) that is necessary for the production
of a piece of cloth is cited as an example of it. s^eToucher's Ls.
Compendium das Topiques_______ , pp. 103, 105 for free trans-
lations of the term * nimitta-kSrana'
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object is produced in the clay, or in the parts of a pot, (i.e. in 
its material cause). The cause and the effect are both real and 
different from each other.^ If v/e assume the (substantial) 
identity of the cause and the effect, how are we to explain the 
difference in the purposes served by the two entities, the cause 
and the effect? V/hy can we not bring water in a lump of clay 
rather than in a pitcher made of clay if we assume the identity of 
the cause and the effect? If the pre-existence of the effect in 
the cause is accepted, the 'NaiyayDias' would say, everybody should 
somehow be able to show the huge Indian fig tree ('nyagrodha') 
existing in an unmanifest form in the seed (the material cause).
There is no doubt that the 'Nyaya-vaisesika' philo­
sophers and the 'Sankhyists' are at cross purposes on this issue.
2
If an object is unmanifest (as the effect is, in the material 
cause, according to the 'Sanlchya' philosopher) how on earth can it 
be amenable to sense-perception even before it manifests itself as 
an effect (asthe ’ITyaya-Vaise§ika' philosophers believe it to be)? 
Moreover, identity of the substance of two objects does not by 
any means imply their identity in all respects. Why should the 
pot and the clay then, which have only the same material, serve 
identical purposes (as the 'Naiyayikas' would have it)? So the
1. Advanced Studies in Indian Logic and Metaphysics, pp. ?-8.
2. This and the following point refers to the arguments in the 
preceding paragraph.
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*Naiyayika*s* criticisms of the 'Sankhya* standpoint do not seem 
to have much force. The criticisms of the 'Nyaya-Vai^esika* 
standpoint by the philosophers of the 'Sariihya' school, seem also, 
on the other hand, to miss the point. Because, even if it be 
true that the atomic components of both the cause (i.e. clay) and 
the effect (i.e. the pitcher with a particular shape, size and 
serving a particular purpose) are the same, yet that does not 
prevent the philosophers of the 'lîyaya-Vaisesika* school from 
arguing that the effect in its particular form is not present in 
the material cause. Because the effect in its present concrete 
form (i.e. the pitcher having the particular shape, size, colour 
that it has, and serving the purpose that it in fact serves), 
cannot by any means be said to be already present (even in an un- 
manifest form) in its material cause, the clay. Philosophers of 
the 'Nyaya-Vaisejika' school can, therefore, explain why, for 
example, one always has recourse to milk alone when one wishes to 
malce yogurt in spite of the difference between milk and yogurt 
(each having its particular taste, consistency etc.) in all respects 
other than their atomic components.
The whole issue can perhaps be described, in terms 
of modern philosophical discourse, as the issue as to v/hether what 
we call a new 'production* is really only the end-product of a 
long process of development. The example of a rose-bud and the 
rose which blooms from it can be used here to illustrate our 
point. Is the blooming of the rose an absolutely new beginning? 
Does the rose come out of nothing or was it already present in an
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unmanifest form in the hud from which it is ultimately produced?
Clearly, everything depends on v/hat we mean by the words
'unmanifest form'. Let us assume that the 'unmanifest form of
the rose* means 'the bud'. Then of course, it would be nort-
sensical to say that the rose-bud (v.hich is what we mean by the
words 'unmanifest form of the rose') did not exist before the
rose, which blooms out of it. This may thus seem to be a case
against the 'Naiyayikas' who insist on the effect's not existing
before its actual appearance. Yet the 'Sanlchyists' cannot be
reason is that
supposed to have won their case by this point. The / although 
the rose-bud, the designate of the words 'the unmanifest form of 
the rose', must be granted to precede the rose, yet the pro­
position, 'the rose existed in the rose-bud' would not make much 
sense either; because the blooming of the rose must be supposed 
to take place at a certain tine on a certain day (although it may 
be difficult to pin-point the exact time of the blooming). So 
it would be nonsensical to claim that the rose, which came into 
existence, say on the 15th of June, between 5 and 6 o ’ clock in 
the morning, existed in the bud which existed, say from the 
15th of May to the 14th of June.
A third theory ('yadrccha-vada')^ advocated hap­
hazard production and denied all strict causal laws. The
1. See p*7l*
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Buddhist philosopher denied all these theories and said : Hot from 
one's own self, not from another self, nor without any (strict) 
causal laws. In reality they are not produced at all; they arise 
in functional^ dependence upon their causes. ('Ha svato, na parato,
napi ahetutah, pratitya tat samut pannara, notpannam tat
_ 2
svahhavata^.').
The Buddhist formula of causation which we have 
considered on page 76 beginning with the statement, 'If this is 
present, that comes to be, and if this is absent that does not 
come to be' seems to express the idea of 'constant conjunction'.
If fire should be the sole cause of heat, then if fire is there 
heat will always be conjoined with it; if fire is absent, no heat 
will follow.
This analysis of the notion of causation seems to 
be a natural consequence of denying 'agents'. If you deny that 
there are any switches the turning of which to the 'on' position 
produces heat in the room, and also that there is any one to turn 
the switch to the 'on' position, we should have to analyse the 
causal situations involved here in terms of the 'constant con­
junction' of certain events such as the being of the switches 
(described with the help of qualities that appropriately describe
1. For further comments see Chapter IV, jpp.20$
2. BL, vol. I, p.122.
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switches) in the *on' position with certain others such as the 
illumination of the room (described also with the help of relevant 
qualities). Although concepts like agent , production and 
efficacy have been implicitly denied in all schools of Buddhism, 
nowhere have they been so explicitly and emphatically denied as in 
the causal analysis of Santaral:sita and Kamalalila.
The above discussion will at once, I believe, remind
readers of the Humean analysis of causation as it has been presented
in chapter I.”* In An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding Bavid
Hume finally proposed to eliminate the idea of 'causal efficacy* or
'power* from the conception of causation altogether, maintaining
essentially that causes and effects are merely changes that we find
2
'constantly conjoined'. ïïe should not, according to Hume, explain 
changes in terms of causes having the power■ to produce them. We 
should, instead, simply note that certain changes are, in fact, 
found to be unvaryingly conjoined with others.
But before embarking on a programme of comparing the 
theory of causation advanced by Santraksita and Kamalalila with 
relevant Humean theory, it is necessary to complete the picture of 
the background in which Santraksita and Kamalalila rejected 
production , efficacy etc. with a few more details.
1. See Chapter I, pp. 36-^9
2. See Sections 4-7 of the Snnuiry.
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Four IToble Truths
I
Buddhism is centered around the problem of human 
suffering and the way to bring about the cessation of suffering. 
The doctrine ('dharma')^ taught by the Buddha can be summed up in 
what is known in Buddhist circles as the 'four noble truths', 
affirming that (1) life is permeated by suffering or dissatis­
faction (Sanskrit, 'du^ha',^ Pali 'dukkha') ; (2) the origin of
suffering lies in 'craving* or 'grasping' (Sanskrit, trsm, Pali 
'tanha'^); (3) the cessation of suffering is possible through
the cessation of 'craving' and (4) that there is a way to the
cl
latter which consists in the practice^a certain type of spiritual 
discipline.
Buddhism claims that all existence involves 
suffering, either actually or potentially. But although there 
is suffering in this world, yet it can be helped, because it is 
due to certain conditions. Popularly speaking, suffering is 
caused by 'desire' or 'craving', especially the desire for the
1. 'Bharma' also refers to the ultimate 'elements' constituting 
the phenomenal world. They are, so to speak, the 'noumena' 
whose 'manifestations* constitute the phenomena.
Stcherbatsky translates 'dharma' as 'mathematical point- 
instants' in Buddhist Logic. See vol. I, p. 142. The 
reason for such a translation is, that they are endowed with 
the minimum possible (theoretically) extension and duration. 
Hence the application of the epithet 'mathematical'. See 
CCB, p.37* See also pp.#6f below.
2. Stcherbatsky translates 'duhkha' as 'unrest'^jCCB, P.48 
especially n.3*
3» Etymologically 'trsna' means 'thirst'.
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continuance of pleasant experience; which is frustrated by the
objective circumstances putting impediments to such a continuity
of pleasant experience. Extinction of suffering is possible
through the extinction of its cause, 'desire*. 'Desire* in its
turn is due to our attaching wrong values to things of whose
essential nature we are completely ignorant. Heal knowledge
consists of our viewing things as being neither the source of
pleasure nor of pain. Painful and pleasant experiences are our
subjective reactions to things. Things in themselves are
neither pleasant nor unpleasant. Thus if we can get rid of our
wrong notions about things and come to know their essential 
1
nature we shall no longer crave for them nor suffer consequently. 
The conviction that 'knowledge* or 'prajna* (Pali 'paMa') can 
remove the root of suffering, ignorance ('avidya', Pali 'avijja'), 
is the beginning of spiritual discipline.
1. It is interesting to note, in this connection, remarks made 
by Edward Conze in his Buddhist Thought In India, p.65? "as 
one accustoms oneself to-disentangling sensory data from 
their often hidden emotional and personal associations, they 
are placed into an emotional void, and seem almost as they
are in themselves ___ nothing in them desirable or to be
sought after. He* seizes only on that which is really there." 
(italics as in the ■original). See also Conze's Buddiiist 
Meditations, p.79*
* Conze is probably referring to the Buddhist monk practising 
meditation.
2. According to some interpretations aging and death represent 
special forms of suffering. According to certain other 
interpretations life itself is suffering. For different 
forms of suffering consult Chapter V, pp.22^-2JZ7.
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No wonder that in a system like Buddhism the study of 
the concept of causation plays a very vital role. In 'Theravada* 
Buddhism there are two different forms of the theory of causation 
('pratitya-samutpada' « 'dependent origination'), known as a 
'special one* and a 'general one'.^
The 'special theory* can be taken as explaining how 
concepts such as merit , demerit , moral retribution , bondage , 
deliverence etc. are possible in the absence of the concept of a 
permanent self or ego . The 'general form* of the theory 
attempts to explain how all phenomena in general, including such 
psychological phenomena as sense-perceptions, ideas and volitions 
as well as all physical phenomena are possible without the existence 
of any permanent substances. Every individual fact, every 'point- 
instant* of reality is conditioned, according to this theory, by a 
sum total of causes and conditions.
The expression 'point-instant of reality* is the
English equivalent Stcherbatsky uses in discussing the nature of
2
what is technically known in Buddhist philosophy as 'dharmas'. 
According to the early Buddhist philosophers every such 'dharma'.
1. See vol. I, pp. 135-141» The 'special theory* refers to 
what we have termed, 'the theory of the twelve-raembered 
dependent origination* in chapter V .
2. See BL, vol. I, p.119» These 'dharmas* are also identified 
with 'ksanas' (moments). See CCB, pp. 37, 42. In CCB 
(e.g. p.37) Stcherbatsky refers to them as 'points in time- 
space*. Cf. p.13, %»1»
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(i.e. *point-instant’) arises in dependence upon a 'totality of 
causes and conditions' to which it necessarily succeeds.^
But we must stop at this stage and explain what is 
meant by the expression 'point-instant of reality' or 'dharma' 
here.
The Conception of 'Dharma' in Early Buddhism
2
V/e have already seen that the consensus of opinion 
on the part of the ancient Buddhist scholars is that substantial' 
entities - both physical and mental - are not ultimately real.
Buddhist philosophers replace the soul by a series 
of psychical states rigorously conditioned as to their nature by 
certain causal laws. Such a conception of series of psychical 
states and the laws governing them is sufficient to account for, 
according to them, spiritual progress and change, inasmuch as each 
succeeding state (good or bad) in such a series arises depending 
on the moral quality of the states preceding it.
Not only do the Buddhists deny spiritual substances 
and maintain that what we take as 'self* can be analysed without 
residue into several mental states, 'thought' and 'its concomitants' 
('citta' and 'caittas')^, but even physical substances are reduced
1. vol. I, p. 119.
2. See pp.73“7^above.
3» See chapter IV, p./d5'jN./ for an account of these terras.
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by them Into nemerous evanescent particular states.
Everything is thus analysed into streams of ultimate 
elements; and such an analysis gives rise to a pluralistic ontology, 
These elements are the only entities that are really there (as con­
trasted with the things of everyday experience). They are the 
'dharmas* (Pali 'dhammas'). Moreover, the presentations of the 
objects of our everyday experience are, Buddhist philosophers hold, 
shot through with misconceptions. Our greed, aggressiveness, etc., 
stemming from our 'ignorance*, distort our normal vision of these
objects. The actual facts distinct from the fabrications of our
2
imagination and false constructions are the 'dharmas*.
These 'point-instants' are classified in Buddhist 
works in many different ways. The classification that is common 
to all Buddhist schools is that into (i) the 'five constituents' 
('skandha')^ of a person; (ii) the 'twelve sources of perceptual
1. "Bhariyanti va yatha sabhavato." See Atthasalini, p.39» 
"Those states which are borne according to their own 
characteristics"» Cf. The Expositor, I, p. 50»
2. For a fuller exposition of the concept of 'dharma' see 
Stcherbatsky's CCB, passim, and Conze's BTI, pp. 98f»
3* Etymologically the word 'skandha' means 'heaps' or 'groups'. 
See BTI, p. 107» Hence the word 'panca-skandha' can also 
be translated as 'the five complexes' or the 'five 
aggregates'.
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(and intuitive) knowledge* ; and (iii) the *eighteen elements*.
The purpose of the division of 'dharmas* into the 
'five constituents' is to explain that the so-called 'person' is 
no unified substantial being, but only a mere conglomeration of 
separate constituents. "As the stars in a constellation do not 
really belong together, but it is we who have arranged them into 
an arbitrary unit," so also what is popularly known as a 'person' 
"is a mere conventional grouping of disparate elements all of 
which belong to one of the five groups known as the 'skandhas*
Of the five, only one, i.e. (i) 'form* or 'matter* ('rupa'^)
1. I.e. the 'twelve ayatanas*. See chapter V, pp.254'-237 for a
detailed discussion about the 'sources of perceptual (and 
intuitive) knowledge'.
2. I.e. the eighteen 'dhatus'. For the different meanings of
the word'dhatu* consult Edgerton's Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit 
Grammar and Dictionary, pp. 282-284. Among the five different 
meanings of the word 'dhatu* two are relevant to our thesis.
One of them, the sense with which we are concerned here, is,
according to Edgerton, that of "psycho-physical constituent
elements of the personality in relation to the outside world." 
(p. 283, italics as in the original). Another sense, relevant 
for our thesis is, 'sphere, region, world, state of existence.' 
In this sense the 'dhatus' are supposed to be three: (i) 'rupa- 
dhatu', 'arupya-dhatu' and dharma-dhatu'. V/e have referred to 
these three 'dhatus' in Chapter IV,p, 196,n.2,3,
3. m ,  p. 107.
4. For another different meaning of the word 'rupa' see p.96? n.i.
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constitutes the physical constituent of a person. The psychological 
aspects of a person's being is explained as consisting of (ii) 'feel­
ings' ('vedana'^), (iii) perception (and conception) ('samjna'),
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(iv) 'volitions' and other mental faculties ('samskara') and (v) 
'consciousness' ('vijnana') The 'five constituents' are described
ts
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in the Visuddhsmagga as those which 'define the limi  of the basis
of grasping after a self, and what belongs to a self.
The 'dharmas' have been classified into the 'twelve 
sources of perceptual (and intuitive) knowledge' from, as is obvious 
from the very name of the class, the epistemological point of view. 
The six 'internal' ('adhyatma') 'sources' correspond to the five 
sen£;e-organs and, what is known in Buddhist philosophy, as the 
'faculty of intellection', ('mano-indriya').^ The six 'external' 
('bahya') 'sources' are the corresponding objects of the five sense- 
organs and 'the faculty of intellection'. This classification is 
thus concerned with the origin of 'thought (or consciousness) and
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its concomitants' , and views them as happening because of the 'cor­
relation' of sense-organs and their corresponding objects.'
1. See chapter V, pp.230-33 for a detailed analysis of 'feeling'.
2. For the analysis of this term see chapter V, pp.240-2Vf.
3. For a detailed analysis of 'consciousness' see chapter V, 
Pp.23g'2V0.
4. Visuddhimagga, p. 478.
5. p. 107.
6. See chapter V, p.2Jf
7# See chapter IV, p.ISf^n.l,
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The class of the 'twelve sources' seems, at the outset, 
to overlap with that of the 'eighteen elements', inasmuch as the 
first twelve items of the 'eighteen elements' are a repetition of the 
items listed under the 'twelve sources'. The remaining six items 
comprise the particular kinds of knowledge (or 'consciousness')^ 
resulting from the correlation of the six 'internal sources' and 
their corresponding objects. Hence the question naturally troubles 
one: what is the view-poing from v/hich this classification is made?
Stcherbatsky suggests the following:
"Buddhist philosophy is an analysis of separate
elements ... which unite in the production of one stream ('santana')
of events. The unphilosophic mind of common people supposes this
stream to represent a personality or an individual ('pudgala').
Viewed as components of such a stream, the elements are called 
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'dhatus'. Just as different metals may be extracted out of a mine, 
just so does the stream of an individual life reveal elements of 
eighteen different kinds (dhatu'='gotra')^."4-
1. 'Vijnana'. See the analysis of 'vijnana' in ciiapter V, 
pp. 233-240.
2. The etymological meaning of the Sanskrit word 'dhatu' is metal.
3. Stcherbatsky refers here to I, p. 37. See also n.3 of that 
page 37 (of the M )  by Be La Vallee Poussin.
4. CCB, p.9.
0The difficulty with this suggestion, granting the 
fact it has faithfully followed the Ahhidharmakosa, is that the 
eighteen items listed under this class do not seem to exhaust the 
diverse aspects of an individual life. The aspects neglected 
correspond to the emotional and volitional aspects of a man, which 
is taken care of in the classification of the 'five constituents'.*'
Edward Conze has tried to analyse another view-point
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from which this classification could possibly have been made. In 
his opinion the purpose of this classification is to 'bring home' 
the truth of 'phenomenalism'. VZith the help of the example of a 
visual perception of an orange he has illustrated how the Buddhist 
philosophers wanted to say that the 'orange', as a datum of 
experience, should not be mistaken for the objective fact 'orange', 
as it is 'out there'.^ "No one can get at the object as it is by 
itself, but only at the 'orange' as modified and falsified by sub­
jective processes."^ The ulterior motive of this analysis by 
Buddhist thinkers is, in Conze's opinion, advising the 'mistaken 
man' to focus his attention on his subjective factors, if he wants
1. See pp.29-90.
2. See pp. 109-110.
3« If v/e properly analyse a visual perception of an orange, we 
would find, according to Buddhist views, no objective fact 
called 'orange', but merely the sense-organ, its corresponding 
object (which is only a sense-datum), and the perceptual know-
• ledge arising out of the 'correlation' between these two.
4. BTI, p. 109.
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to get rid of suffering. "The average worldling has got into the 
habit of thinking that his happiness depends on manipulating 
objects. Buddhism believes him to be wrong, and expects better 
results from focussing attention on the subjective factors which 
are usually ignored.
This analysis of the view^point fits well with the 
general programme of Buddhism of rejecting the concepts of substan­
tival individual beings and ph^ '-sical objects, and Egos, and egoism. 
The analysis into the class of the 'five constituents' is meant to 
explain away the concept of a 'person'. The analysis of the 
'twelve sources' should malce it clear to a person like me who is 
used to thinlcing in terms of 'myself only, that "It is wrong for
me to regard 'my' thoughts as free creations of 'my self, or 'con- 
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sciousness'." The analysis of the 'eighteen elements' is, on the 
other hand, supposed to convey to us the message that there is 
nothing like 'the object out there' in the physical world.
1. p. 110,
2. p. 110,
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Section il
Critical Examination of the Causal Theory Propounded 
by Santaralisita and ICamalasila
Having given a very brief account of the meaning of the 
word 'dharma', we can now come to analyse the theory of causation 
propounded by Santarak^ita and Kamalasila. Their theory of causation 
is a consequence of their doctrine of 'universal momentariness' as 
exemplified in their doctrine of the 'dharmas'. If things or 
persons are (in the ultimate analysis), series of momentary existences 
(i.e. of 'dharmas') how can they have any time to produce anything? 
Hence they claim that there is nothing called 'production' in reality. 
There is neither any 'agent' nor any 'causal efficacy*. A thing or 
an event only arises depending on certain other conditions. But the 
cause does not 'produce* the effect. At the meeting point of 
several series of momentary events another series of momentary events 
starts which is ordinarily knovm as the 'effect'. In what follows 
we shall critically consider this unique theory of causation and see 
whether any convincing account can be given of 'causation' while at 
the same time denying the concepts of production , agent , and 
efficacy .
A very illuminating account of the theory of 
causation can be found in the 'Tattva-sahgraha' of Santarakçita and 
its commentary (Panjika) by Kamalasila. We shall concentrate here 
on some relevant portions of this book.
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In the Tattva-sahgraha-pan.iIka Kamalasila tries, 
basing his arguments on those of Santaraksita, to establish the 
validity of their theory by considering first some possible 
objections to it (by the * Ha iyayilcas'presumably). These 
objections arise from the momentary nature of the causes 
advocated by them. Since the future event is not yet in exist­
ence and the past event is defunct and hence bereft of causal 
efficacy , neither the future nor the past event can be supposed 
to bring about the present event. The present event also, being 
momentary, is absolutely destroyed in the next moment. Hence it 
will no longer remain in existence in order to exert its causal 
influence on the effect which invariably succeeds the cause.
It might be argued by the Buddhist philosopher that there is no 
need for the cause's exerting any influence on the effect; the 
mere antecedence of the cause is sufficient to establish the 
causal situation. But the opponent urged that the Buddhist 
philosophers would be led to an absurd position if they argued 
that the precedence of the cause is enough to establish a causal 
situation. Mere antecedence is not enough. If it were so, we 
would be led to absurd consequences. An instance of such an 
absurd consequence is a case where we shall be forced to call the 
colour, for example, which exists in an earthen pitcher, before 
it is destroyed by burning, the 'cause' of the smell which one
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gets as a result of the burning.*' Similarly, since the Buddhist
philosophers say that our illusion of the continued existence of a
colour, for example, is due to the continuous flow of homogeneous
colour-moments, the preceding colour-moments in that series would
become the cause of the succeeding colour-moments. The Buddhist
philosopher is thus placed between the horns of a dilemma. He
has to admit either that the effect is produced out of a cause
which destroyed. Since production out of a non-existent cause
is an absurdity, he cannot admit the first alternative. If, on
the other hand, he admits the second alternative, then he will be
bound to grant more than a moment's existence to its cause, and
2
hence bound to give up the doctrine of momentariness.
Not only will it be Impossible for the Buddhist 
philosophers to establish the relation of cause and effect it 
will be equally impossible for them, says the opponent, to show 
any means by which we can cognise such a relation. The causal 
relation is normally detected by perception. When we perceive 
that an object or event follows another constantly and disappears
1. TSP, pp. 168, lines 25-p. I69, line 5. Cf. Jha's translation, 
p. 289. The Sanskrit text of the TSP, is liable to a 
different interpretation if we translate the word 'rupa*, 
occurring in it, as 'form' rather than 'colour*. The inter­
pretation which one may then formulate is possibly something 
like the following. The form or the shape which the earthen 
pitcher has, prior to its being smashed by a club, is the 
cause of the smell one can get from the particles of the des­
troyed pitcher, filling the air.
2. TSP, p. 169, lines 12-22. Of. Jha's translation, p. 29O.
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v/henever the preceding one disappears, we know the former object or 
event to be the effect' of the preceding one. But if causes 
and effects’ are momentary, v/e shall not be able to perceive them. 
Perception requires that there should be a ’correlation' between the 
sense-organ and the relevant object.^ And perception of the object 
follows as a consequence of this 'correlation*. But if everything 
is momentary, then the object will disappear as soon as the 'cor­
relation' takes place, and hence, in the absence of the object, the 
perception itself, which follows this 'correlation', will no longer 
be possible. Kence neither the 'constant conjunction' of the 
cause with the effect, nor the disappearance of the cause and the 
effect can be perceived.
Impossibility of perception can be demonstrated from
the momentary nature of the cognising subject also. Since the
cause and its effect exist at successive moments, the cogniser of
the causal relation must have two successive perceptions. And he
is required to relate the tv/o successive perceptions in one single
perception; otherwise he will not have the notion of the cause
and the effect being related. But how will he be able to perform
2that impossible trick without foregoing his momentary nature?.
Certain other mental phenomena, such as, memory and 
recognition, which presuppose causal operation, will also be
1. See chapter V, p234
2. TSP. p. 169, line 23 - p. 170, line 14- Jha's translation,
p. 291.
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incapable of being explained by the assumption of universal 
momentariness. Memory and recognition are necessarily due to 
previous perception. But if the object is destroyed as soon as 
it is perceived, how can (e.g.) recognition expressed in the form, 
this is the same object I have seen before, be possible? It may 
be argued by the Buddhist philosopher that identity of the object 
is not necessary for recognition. Hair and nails are constantly 
being cut and they grow again as soon as they are cut. Thus 
though the hair and the nails which were cut are, strictly speak­
ing, different from the hair and the nails which grow again, vie 
tend to ignore the difference and think that they are the same on 
account of the extremely close similarity between the two. But 
even if we grant purely for the salie of argument that the identity 
of the object is ret a sine qua non of recognition, what about the 
identity of the subject? Is it not a necessary condition of recog­
nition that the subject that is recognising is the same as the sub­
ject that has seen the object on a previous occasion? For similar 
reasons, the Buddhist philosophers who adhere to the doctrine of 
momentariness will be unable to account for the process of remem­
bering. Phenomena such as the arising of desire for the taste of
a fruit on the mere sight of it** will be equally inexplicable from
2
the standpoint of the doctrine of momentariness.
1. Presupposing that the seer has tasted fruit of the same kind on 
a previous occasion.
2. TSP. p. 170, line 15-p. I7I, line 5'Jiia’s translation pp.292-293.
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V/e shall now examine the answers that Santaralcsita 
and Kamalasila gave to the objection we have just displayed.
To the first objection, that the Buddhist position 
implies the absurdity of the effect's coming into existence from a 
defunct cause, they give the following reply. In their view the 
effect comes out of the cause while the latter is still in 
existence. In the actual words used by Santaralcsita, "what 
happens is that the effect comes into existence at the second 
moment, through its dependence*' upon the cause which has come into 
existence as the first moment and has not yet become destroyed; so 
that when the effect comes into existence, it does so from the cause 
while it is still undestroyed at the first moment."^ Santaraksita 
and Kamalasila argue that it is even necessary that the effect comes 
into being through its dependence upon a preceding cause that has 
ceased to exist at the time the effect appears. Otherwise, in 
their opinion, we shall have an absurd theory that the effect comes 
into being at the same time as the cause. Simultaneous beginning 
of the cause and the effect is impossible in their opinion; because 
if the 'effect' is already existing, what will the cause bring 
about?^ Moreover, they would argue, if it is possible to produce
1. Italics ours.
2. TSP, p. 175, lines 1-3. Jha's translation, pp. 292-293»
3. TSP, p. 175, lines 4-5» ("Satyam api canuvrttau na tadanira
-, -__    n\tasya karanatvaip. ")
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what is already existing, then there would he an equal possibility 
of its being produced once again and so on ad infinitum.^
But have Santaralcsita and Karnalaslla answered the
objection satisfactorily?. One wonders if they haveJ Everything
depends, of course, on what they mean by the * dependence of the
effect on the cause*. There are some obvious cases of physical
dependence. For example, a building is said to * depend* on the
foundation. Here the word * depend* is used in the sense of being
* supported by*. But in all the cases of physical support the
object supported and that which supports it both exist at the same 
2
time. Such cases of dependence will obviously not help the 
authors who want to prove that the momentary effect comes into being 
in the second moment depending on the cause existing (only) in the 
first moment. The word * dependence* is used in another sense as 
well. This sense is demonstrated by propositions such as *the 
success of the Tory party in the next election depends on their 
having a good party machine'. Here the word * depends' is used in 
the sense of being *caused by*. Even if Kamalasila uses the word 
*depends* in this sense, he will not be able to establish anything
1. TSP, p. 175, lines 9-10.
2. For example, the foundation and the building must co-exist at 
one time or another in order that the former may support the 
latter. The foundation is of course laid before the building 
is erected on it. But at the time when the foundation actually 
supports the building, both of them must be existing. Such 
cases of dependence will not help the authors concerned because, 
in their view, the cause cannot, and must not exist at the time 
the effect comes into being.
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with this sense of the word, inasmuch as the whole point at issue is, 
whether the effect can be caused by an entity that is defunct when 
the effect arises.
The sense of 'dependence' which Santaralosita and 
Kamalasila did probably have in mind Is something like the following: 
the 'action* of the cause due to which the effect comes into being
starts at the first moment, when the cause is still in existence.
Only in this sense can the effect be said to come into existence by 
'depending* on the cause which existed and was destroyed at a 
previous moment. But if this is the sense, then they will have to 
admit causal efficacy ; and they can no longer escape the 
situation by saying that causal efficacy is nothing but the pre-
cedene of the cause (see p. ^5" above, and pp. below).
For is the objection advanced by the authors against 
the theory of simultaneous beginning of cause and the effect a sound 
one. Simultaneous causation does not, contrary to what Santaraksita 
and Kamalasila would have us believe, imply that the effect exists 
'already*. It only implies that the effect comes into being at the 
same moment as the cause and that if the cause did not come into 
being, the effect could not come into being either. The authors 
have distorted the position of the advocates of simultaneous 
causation by playing upon the words 'already existing* ('anuvrttau'). 
The expression 'already existing* ('anuvrttau') has a double sense, 
viz., 'existing at the same time as* and 'existing before'. It
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goes without saying that the authors have illegitimately chosen the 
second sense to represent the stand-point of the advocates of the 
theory of simultaneous causation. But the sense these advocates 
have in mind is the first one.
The authors, Santaralcsita and Kamalasila, accuse the 
advocates of the theory of simultaneous beginning of the cause and 
the effect of anthropomorphism. They say that there is no need to 
suppose, as the advocates of the theory of simultaneous causation 
would have it, that the cause grabs hold of the effect like a pair 
of tongs and then 'works' on it. I'or does the effect come into 
being like a sweetheart caught up in the tight embraces of her 
lover.^
It is true that the uncritical mind of the man in the
street may entertain anthropomorphic ideas like the above ones when 
2
he thinks that the cause must originate at the same time as the 
effect, in order that it may operate on the effect. Yet, if we 
probe deep into the matter, vre shall see that no such anthropomor­
phic ideas are essential for maintaining the theory of the simul­
taneous origin of the cause and the effect. The standpoint of the 
advocate of the theory of simultaneous causation can be summed up in
1. TSP, p. 176, lines 8-I4. Cf. Jha's translation, p. 502.
2. If he is bothered at all about the so-called philosophical 
questions about the time when the cause must come into being 
in order that it may 'operate' on the effect! One wonders 
vdiether the ordinary man spends his time in 'idle specula­
tions' such as these!
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a proposition such as, 'a cause is that hy producing which we get 
something else at the same time.' The turning of the key and the 
opening of the lock may he used as an example. îîo such anthro­
pomorphic ideas as we have just discussed need therefore be intro­
duced in order to prove this theory.
Fot only do the Buddhist philosophers argue that the 
cause need not and cannot co-exist with its effect, they also say 
that they do not see any necessity v/liy the cause must exert its 
influence on the effect. In fact there is no causal operation , 
distinct from the cause, ar^w/here in this universe. V/e can speak 
of the 'agent' and the 'patient' in a metaphorical way only. These 
words do not stand for any objective reality."*
"Yavata nirvyaparam evedam visvam, na hi paramarthatah kascit 
kar\ta karma vasty, aryatra dharma-sanketad iti sanudayarthah." 
TSP, p. 176, lines 14-15» Jha's translation, p. 302. Jha in 
fact translates the last part of the sentence, "na hi 
paramarthatah kascit , „ * dharma-sanketat . . , " as "there 
is, in reality, no 'active agent* or 'objective' at all, . , . 
apart from 'convention' , , He has translated the word
'sahketa' as 'convention' and not as 'metaphor'. The relation 
between these two translations of 'sanketa' can be shown by 
saying that the conventional way of spealcing is sometimes not 
true if it is talien literally. Conventional language is some­
times true only if we do not take it literally, but as an 
expression of some other idea underlying it. It is in this 
sense comparable to a metaphorical expression which has some 
other significance underlying its apparent and direct meaning.
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But if there is nothing called 'causal efficacy', how 
will the Buddhist philosopher then explain such colloquial expres­
sions as, 'the fire produces the smoke'? Kamalasila replies, that 
sentences such as 'the cause produces the effect* are only meta­
phorical expressions of propositions such as, 'the effect arises 
depending on the cause'.^ In fact, the word 'depend' only signifies, 
in this context, that 'the effect always arises immediately after the 
cause'. And what is meant by the words 'the cause acts on the
effect' is nothing but 'the cause is always conjoined with the
2
appearance of the effect.' In fact, the hypothesis of a function­
ing’ of the cause in addition to its existenceitself is an unwar­
ranted assumption. V/e must point out a possible misconception a 
reader may have from comments lilie this. He may think, at this 
stage, that the authors like Santaraksita and Kamalasila are not 
really rejecting concepts like production and efficacy. What 
they are rejecting is only the existence of things or substances 
which produce something else by virtue of certain qualities known as 
'causal operations'. In their opinion there are no substances.
1. "Janayatity upalaksanam. Tattadasrityotpadyata ityapi 
vijneyam." TSP, p. 176, lines 24-25. Cf. Jha's translation, 
p. 305.
2. "Idam eva hi karyasya karane *peksa yat tadanantara- 
bhavitvara, karanasyapi karye'yam eva vyaparo yat karyodaya- 
kale sada sannihitatvara." TSP, p. 177, lines 11-12.
Cf. Jha's translation, p. 304*
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The so-called substances are, if analysed logically, streams of 
'flashes of energy' (i.e. streams of 'dharmas'). However, the 
Buddhist philosophers do admit that one 'stream of energies' (i.e. 
the logical analysis of one particular thing) causes another 
'stream'. So a reader may thirlc that since 'energy' represents a 
sort of activity, and since the Buddhist philosophers show that one 
'stream of energies' causes another, therefore they ^  admit 
'causal operations' which produce effects. What they do deny is 
that this 'operation' should be a property of a thing called 
'cause'. In their opinion, 'actions' or 'energies' themselves pro­
duce certain effects.
But if we look deeper into the causal theories of 
Santaraksita and Kamalasila we shall see that the line of argument 
referred to above is based on a misconception of their position. It 
is true that these philosophers do analyse what is popularly known 
as one thing producing another as one 'stream of energies' being 
causally responsible for another. But we must remember two points 
in this connection. Firstly, what Santaraksita and Kamalasila 
really mean by the expression 'being causally responsible for' is 
merely 'being constantly followed by'. And to say that something 
is being constantly followed by something else, is not the same 
thing as saying that the former produces the latter. Secondly, it 
is true that the 'dharmas' are 'energies' and, loosely speaking, 
some sort of 'activities'. Yet these 'energies' are not the same 
as 'causal operations' in the present context. To say, as
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Santaralisita and Kamalasila did, that some energies are being 
constantly conjoined with certain others is not equivalent to saying 
that the former are producing the latter. The expression 'causal 
efficacy' is a technical expression used only in the context of pro­
duction. It refers only to the 'productive power' of a producer- 
cause.
The theory of a 'causal efficacy' distinct from the 
cause itself, has been invented by the advocates of causal efficacy , 
Santaraksita and Kamalasila claim, to explain immediate production of 
the effect. But the hypothesis of a causal efficacy is not at all 
necessary. The temporal precedence of the cause is sufficient to 
account for the immediate succession of the effect. To quote the 
actual words of Kamalasila, "What is it that is called the 'operation' 
of the cause? It is that immediately after which the effect secures 
its appearance, and as a matter of fact, the effect appears 
immediately after the existence of the cause; hence it is existence 
itself which may be called the 'operation'."^
Kow this Is, to me, a very strange argument.* The 
question is, what is it that is known as causal efficacy ? Causal
Jha's translation, p. 305. For the original text see TSP, 
p. 177, lines 4-6* "Vyaparo nâma karanasya ka ucyate?
Yad anantarara eva karyam udayam asadayati, karana-sattanan- 
taram eva ca karyam udbhavatiti sattaiva vyapara-sabda- 
vacya'stu."
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efficacy’ is undoubtedly a functional concept, and It would be
difficult to give an ostensive definition of it. But we can say,
without the slightest hesitation, that this functioning of the
cause is introduced in order to explain the fact called 'production*.
Surely, temporal succession cannot by anj’ means explain 'production*."*
V/e can use an example here to illustrate our point. Suppose we have
two clocks on the table. V/e make clock one a split second faster
than clock two. ITow every ticking of clock one will be followed by
the ticking of clock two. But it would be absurd to conclude from
this that the ticking of clock one is producing the ticking of clock
two. Thus we can see no truth in the proposition, 'causal efficacy
is nothing but "that immediately after which the effect secures its 
„ 2
appearance".
Santaraksita and Kamalasila have ruthlessly criticised 
this concept of causal efficacy which, according to them, has 
neither the sanction of logic nor that of experience. They bring 
out a series of objections against this concept.
What is the factual evidence on which this hypothesis 
of a causal efficacy', as a factor distinct from a cause, is based? 
Surely, this mysterious entity called 'causal efficacy* is not
1. Although the product may succeed the producer
2. See previous page and Jha's translation, p. 305*
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amenable to sense-perception."* What is perceived in a causal 
situation is nothing but the 'constant conjunction' of the cause and 
the effect. In fact, for determining the causal relation between 
two objects we only depend on the positive and negative concomitance 
of these two objects. Whenever we discover that an object comes
Cf. "Bhave satl hi drsyante bijad evankurodayah.
ITa tu vyapara-sadbhave bhavat kincit samlksyate."
(TSP) p. 177, verse 523*)
"As a matter of fact, it is on the existence of the seed 
itself that the sprout is seen to appear.
On the other hand, nothing is seen as coming into exist­
ence on the existence of an 'operation'."
(Jha's translation, p.
"Adrsta-sakter hetutve kalpyamane'pi nesyate.
Kim anyasyapi hetutvam viseso va'sya kas tatah."
(TSP, p. 178, verse 524)
"If you assume the causal character of the (entity called) 
'efficacy', when this 'efficacy' is not perceptible.
Then why do you not assume the same of something else also? 
(or) what is so special about this ('efficacy')? 
(Translation ours. See Jha's translation, p. 305*)
The intended meaning of the second argument is: the
advocates of causal efficacy assume that efficacy produces. 
Yet, Santaraksita points out, this efficacy is never perceived. 
There are so many things in the world who do not cause anything. 
But can one not argue, Santaraksita asks, that even these things 
produce, although their efficacies' are not perceived?
Kote the remarkable similarity of these arguments with that 
of Hume. (See ch.I, : passim , PP.4 1 , ^•
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into existence if and only if"* another is present we call the latter 
the cause of the former. If this is the case, why should we attri­
bute the causal character to a mysterious entity called 'causal
efficacy*? V/hy not attribute the causal character to the cause it- 
2
self? Since all that is amenable to sense-perception is the 
unvarying sequence of tvro objects and that unvarying sequence alone 
is the criterion of the causal relation, what is the use of invoking 
the existence of an 'occult power*?
Again, does this 'efficacy' produce the effect through 
the medium of another efficacy' or not?^ If it does, then the 
causal character should be imputed to that other efficacy . And 
this latter efficacy will also, in that case, depend on another 
efficacy to bring about the effect. The same argument would apply 
to the third ‘efficacy , and hence we shall be faced with a vicious 
infinite regress ('anavastha*)• If, on the other hand, we hold that 
this "efficacy" produces the effect by its mere 'existence*, then by 
the same logic, it may also be argued that the cause itself produces 
the effect by its mere existence. And the hypothesis of an
1. i.e. the former never appears vfhen the latter is absent. We 
must point out that this argument does not take into account the 
possibility of plurality of causes. (See chapter III, p.13^ ).
If an event is capable of being caused by different causes on 
different occasions, then one can no longer claim that if one of 
the causes is absent, the event must be absent too.
2. TSP, p. 177, lines 13-17* Of. Jha?s translation, p. 304*
3* The underlying idea is, anything that produces must have an
additional property called 'causal efficacy*, which enables it
to be a producer.
110
additional efficacy will be entirely futile."*
Our answer to the first of these objections to 
causal efficacy is simply this, that efficacy is a functional 
concept and it is impossible to give an ostensive definition of it. 
Objects in which such functions are fulfilled may have no ostensible 
properties in common. We may search in vain for some perceptible 
qualities which all kinds of food have in common by virtue of which
they 'nourish*. We shall search in vain for some ostensible
property called 'efficacy' in causes.
In answer to the second objection we may say that, 
causal efficacy certainly does not require another efficacy in 
order to perform its task. Just as glue attaches a stamp to an
envelope without depending on some other glue to attach it to the
stamp, so efficacy itself produces an effect without the help of 
another efficacy . But it does not follow from this that the 
cause should also be able to produce something without productive 
energy . The cause is, logically speaking, a different kind of 
entity from its efficacy . Therefore, if the efficacy can pro­
duce something by itself, it does not follow, from the same logic, 
that the cause can also produce something by itself, without its 
efficacy .
A similar attempt to demonstrate the logical 
absurdity involved in the assumption of a 'causal energising', with
1. TSP. p. 178, lines 1-17* Cf. Jha's translation, p. 3C0.
Ill
the help of a dilemma, is discernible in the following argument. 
"That particular entity" Kamalasila argues, "which is of the nature 
of the 'causal efficacy*, is it something different from the thing 
to which it belongs or is it non-different from it? ... If it is 
something different, then the thing itself cannot be the cause, as 
the causal character belongs to the 'efficacy*."^ If it is non- 
different, then of course v/e shall have no ground on v/hich v/e can 
demand a separate entity called 'efficacy*, as the thing called 
'cause' will itself be enough for our purpose.
It may, however, be contended that the thing called
'cause' and this 'productive power* together will constitute the
cause; and neither of them will be able to produce anything in
isolation. But Kamalasila jettisons such an argument by saying
that, "that however is not possible; because there can be no rela-
2
tion between things which do not help one another." This is 
undoubtedly a very strange argument. Firstly, in what sense is 
Kamalasila claiming that a thing and its efficacy do not help 
one another? Secondly, v/hy on earth can there be no relation 
between things which do not help one another? A cigarette- case 
and a paper-weight lying on the same table, although they do not
1. TSP. p. 179, lines 4-7* Translation ours. Cf. Jha's 
translation, p. 3^7*
2. Jha's translation of TSP, p. 3^9* For the original text see 
TSP. p. 179, line 8. "Parasparanupalcarinoh sambandhasiddheh".
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help one another in any way, nevertheless do have a spatial relation­
ship with each other. Y/e may at most say that if tv/o entities are 
entirely opposite in their nature, then the two cannot he connected 
together by a common bond (although they may be related by the 
relation of difference at least). But are the things called 'cause* 
and its 'productive power' possessed of contradictory characteristics?
Santaralisita and Kamalasila observe that one is bound
to recognise causation without causal efficacy in the field of
epistemology at least. Perception, inference etc. are recognised as
'means of right cognition'"* in Indian philosophy. Because of these
'means of correct cognition' v/e are able to have particular perceptual
or inferential knowledge. Kow if perception, inference etc. can be
'means of right cognition', and in the opinion of Santaraksita and
2
Kamalasila, be therefore 'causes' of particular 'cognitions' , with­
out the help of any additional entity called 'efficacy' ('vyapara')^, 
v/hy cannot other causes also produce their effects without causal 
efficacy?^
1. These 'means' are known as 'pramanas'. The word 'pramahs' 
is translated in various ways. They are sometimes translated 
as .’means of right cognition' (see TSF, Jha's translation, 
p. 308) and sometimes as 'ways of knowing' (see B. K. Batt's 
Six ways of Knowing, passim).
2. See footnote next page.
3* See footnote next page.
4. See footnote next page.
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But we must point out^Santaraksita and Kamalasila are 
here twisting the meaning of the phrase 'means of right cognition' 
as 'cause of right cognition' to suit their particular purpose. 
Causes of our particular perceptual knowledge, for example, are in 
fact our sense-organs, their corresponding objects, and a certain 
'correlation' of them. How firstly, we must all agree, that our
2. (Footnote for previous page)
'Keans' may sometimes be the same as 'cause'. For example, we 
can say that 'putting the kettle on fire is a means of boiling 
it'. This can be rephrased as 'putting the kettle on fire is 
the cause of its boiling'. But the sense in which perception 
and inference are said to be the 'means' of right cognition is 
not this sense. Perception is described as the 'means' in the 
sense that it is a 'way' of knowing correctly, i.e. it is one 
of the various 'forms' of correct knowledge. Just as there are 
different ways in which one can take a bath, e.g. one can take a 
shower-bath or one can v/ash himself in a bath-tub, so there are 
different ways in which valid knowledge in general is possible. 
These different 'ways' really correspond to different 'kinds of, 
But because there is some connection between 'ways' and 'means', 
Santaraksita and Kamalasila therefore probably interpret 'v/ays 
of cognition' as 'means of cognition'. And because there is 
connection, in some cases, between 'means' and 'cause', Santa- 
ralisita and Kamalsila therefore take perception and inference to 
be causes of valid cognition.
3. (Footnote for previous page)
Santaraksita and Kamalasila quote philosophers like Kumarila 
Bhatta in support of their argument. (See TSP, p. 179).
4. (Footnote for previous page)
TSP, p.179, lines 17-26. Cf. Jha's translation, pp. 307-308.
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sense-organs are active in every case v/hen we perceive something. 
Secondly, although we may not knov/ v/hat exactly happens when we 
perceive something, we must all agree that there is some 'process* 
or other which is present in every case of perception.
Anyway, the authors reject the utility of the con­
cept of causal efficacy and say that, 'the only basis for the 
relation of cause and effect consists in imimediate sequence, and 
not in any efficacious action'."*
As regards the objection that if mere sequence Is
considered to be the sole criterion of causation any arbitrary
/ _
sequence would have to be regarded as a causal sequence, Santara­
ksita and Kamalasila give the following reply. 'We do not say 
that mere immediate sequence is the basis of the cause-effect 
relationship. Rather, what we do say is that one thing is to be 
regarded as the cause of another v/hen the latter is always found 
to appear in immediate sequence to the former. One thing is
regarded as the cause of another when the latter is found to
2
appear in immediate sequence to the former only.' Thus although
1. "Anantaryaliarnatram eva karya-karana-bhava-vyavastha-nibandhanam 
na vyapara." TSP. p.l30, line 7* Cf. Jha's translation, p.309.
2. "lia hi vayam anantarya-matram Icarya-karana-bhavadhigati- 
nibandhanara brumah. Kira tarhi? Yanniyatam. Tathahi-
yasyaivanantaram yad bhavati tattasya karanam isyate." TSP. 
p.180, lines 19-20. Free translation ours. Cf. Jha's 
translation, pp. 309-310»
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smoke is, in some cases, seen to follow the presence of certain
•]
animals such as cows, horses etc., yet it is not caused by those 
animals, because smoke is not always found to follow the 
appearance of those animals. Sometimes these animals may be 
present, yet there may not be any smoke in the vicinity. More­
over, smoke does not appear only in the presence of these animals. 
It appears even when these animals are absent.
We should note the striking similarity of arguments 
such as these with Hume's statements equating causation with 
'constant conjunction’. Compare these arguments, for example, 
with the remarks of Hume in the Enquiry and Treatise (v/hich we 
quoted in Chapter l), v/here he talies a cause to be 'an object', 
followed by another, all the objects resembling the first being
The allusion is probably to cases where farmers in India burn 
sulphur and other chemical compounds in the evening, in 
stables and cowsheds, to get rid of mosquitos. Although the 
smoke arising from the fire is concomitant with the presence 
of cows and horses in these cases, yet that smoke is not 
caused by these animals. Another possible allusion is to 
the case where the washerman kindles a fire to boil the dirty 
linen when he comes home with his donkey. Do nicies are used 
in carrying dirty linen in India. Although they are (nearly) 
always present when the linen is boiled, and hence concomitant 
with the smoke coming out of the fire, yet they are not 
causing the smoke. See Basgupta's A History of Indian 
Philosophy, vol. I, p.4-66.
followed, by objects, resembling the second.
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1
But v/e must reiterate what we have already stated a 
2
few pages before, that ’constant conjunction’ is not a criterion 
of causal connection. Causal connection is impossible without 
production and two events may be ’constantly conjoined’ and 
neither of them may be the producer of the other. A detailed 
argument showing that the theory of ’constant conjunction* cannot 
give a satisfactory account of causation has been given in Chapter I 
(pp. Gl’lZ)» Another detailed argument demonstrating the 
impossibility of giving a valid account of causation while at the 
same breath denying production will be given in Chapter V|,
The objection that their theory of causation will 
mal-ce perception impossible, really stems, Santarakgita and 
Kamalasila argue, from a misconception of their real stand-point.
It was objected that since the object will disappear after the 
’correlation’ between it and the sense-organ, perception, which
must take place only after this ’correlation’, will be without an
3 /—
object. But Santaraksita and Kamalasila say that difficulties of
explaining perception exist both for those v/ho believe things to be 
permanent and those who advocate universal momentariness. There 
are two possible theories of perception. According to one theory
1. Cf. Enquiry, p.76.
2. See p.|C7 
3» See p.97.*
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consciousness reveals the object without itself undergoing any
1
transformation whatsoever. In the technical terminology of
_ _ 2
Indian philosophy this is knov/n as the theory of *niraicara-jmna’. 
According to the other theory external objects leave their impres­
sions on consciousness, and what we know directly is only these 
impressions.' This is known as the theory of ’sakara-jnâna'.^
How both these theories are beset with particular difficulties.
If we accept the theory of * saicara-jnana*, then perception will 
always be indirect and we will not have a clue as to what the real 
nature of external objects is 1 ilce. Hot only that, we shall have 
the absurd consequence of male ing consciousness itself a variegated 
entity (inasmuch as, according to this theory, consciousness under­
goes various changes in response to the ’impressions' which are, so 
to speale, impressed on it). If, in order to avoid this difficulty, 
we declare that consciousness only reveals the objects (like a 
search-light) without itself undergoing any transformation (i.e. the 
first theory), then we shall not be able to explain the variety of 
our perceptions, Because since consciousness itself is one indeter­
minate entity, completely indexendent of the numerous objects, there 
will be no connection between consciousness and the objects. And
1. The analogy of a search-light revealing things without itself 
undergoing any change, will perhaps make the point clearer.
2. Literally, ’theory of consciousness without any form’.
3« Literally, 'theory of consciousness with a form'
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hence we shall he unable to explain the variety of our perceptions. 
Thus, whether you accept the theory of *salcara-jnana’ or that of 
’nirakara-jKana' you are faced with Insoluble difficulties. Since 
the opponents, who believe in non-changing substances, have to 
accept one of these alternatives they cannot escape the difficulties 
of explaining perception themselves. Why then should they charge 
the upholders of the doctrine of momentariness with inconsistency? 
However, both the theories of ’sakara-jhana' and 'nirakara-jhana' are, 
with their particular difficulties explicable in terms of the doctrine 
of universal flux. Accepting the doctrine of 'niràkara-jnana' the 
Buddhist philosopher can explain a particular perception as something 
that is engendered by a common set of antecedent causes which ushers 
into existence the object and the perception as co-products at one 
and the same time.* Accepting the doctrine of ’sakara-jnana’, they 
would, on the other hand, say that as what is perceived is only the 
'impression' that an object leaves on consciousness, the presence of 
the object at the time of perception is no longer necessary. The
The Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux, p.78*
See also TSP, p.l8l, lines 10-12. "Purvakebhya eva 
svahetubhyas tatha tat j&nam upajayate, yena sa samana- 
kal a-bhaVi-rupadyeVK^vab udhj-at e nan^ '-at. Tadbo dhatmakasya iva 
tasyotpannatvat."
Cf. Jha's translation, p. 311* According to Jha's interpre­
tation, the antecedent causes produce perception in the 'form 
of a perception of an object existing at the same time as 
itself.*
presence of the impression will suffice for the purpose.
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If we look deeper into the arguments discussed above, 
i§antarak§ita and Kamalalila 
we shall see that have contradicted even the common-
sense conception of perception in these arguments. Even according 
to common-sense, perception is brought about by processes involving 
some sort of 'correlation' or other, of the sense-organs and their 
corresponding objects. But in saying that 'the particular per­
ception of an object is engendered by conditions which usher into 
existence the object and the perception as co-products as the same 
time', Kamalasila has contradicted even that comnornsense conception. 
Moreover, by introducing the concept of the 'impression' of the 
object, the author has only side-stepped the problem of how perception
One should not third: that Santaraksita and Kamalasila are claim­
ing here that if one accepts the theory of momentariness, then 
one would be in a position to explain perception in a way that 
does not involve him into the problem about the indirectness of 
perception mentioned on p.il7. They are merely saying that even 
if one believes in non-changing substances one will have dif­
ficulties about explaining perception; inasmuch as he would 
have to accept either of the tr/o theories of 'sakara-jnana' and 
' niraicara-ji^na ', both of which have some defects. So the dif­
ficulty about explaining perception exists whether you believe 
in rnomontaririess, or in noi>-charging substances. Both the 
theories of 'sakara-jnana' and 'nirali’^-jnana' are however expli­
cable, with their particular difficulties, in terms of momen- 
tariness. Santaraksita and Kamalasila are thus not here trying 
to solve the problem, how perception can be direct, when v/hat we 
directly know are only the 'impressions' of the objects.
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is possible when the object is destroyed. Because, assuming that
the 'impression' is left by the object on the consciousness at a
particular time, and that perception of the 'impression' takes place
1
at the next moment, we shall be forced to admit that the momentary 
'impression' will be destroyed at the time the perception is 
produced. So in the absence of the 'impression' itself even the 
perception of the 'impression' will be impossible.
Hot only is there no difficulty about explaining 
perception, there is neither any difficulty, according to the authors, 
in explaining memory, recognition etc. either. It is by no means 
necessary that the person remembering must be identical v/ith the 
person who experienced before. If they are the same in every respect 
then, the authors argue, remembrance itself will be impossible; 
because if the experiencer remained strictly identical, then he could 
not logically be said to remember. For the logical descriptions of 
'the person who has experienced something in the past' and 'the person 
Y/ho remembers this experience later', must have some differences in 
spite of their being descriptions of the same person at different 
times. As a matter of fact, psychical phenomena are strictly 
governed by the law of causation. V/hat happens in reality is that 
remembrance comes about in that same psychical continumu(or chain or
1. Since the effect always succeeds the cause according to him,
and since the 'impression' is the cause and perception the effect 
in this case.
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series= * Santana’) in v/hich its seed has been laid by an antecedent
experience.* Since recognition and the other mental activities we
have discussed on p. TZ-i&re all based on memory, there is no
incongruity in explaining them from the stantÇpoint of the doctrine 
2
of mementariness.
But have the authors really been able to give a valid 
explanation of remembrance? In our opinion it is essential that 
the person who remembers a certain fact identical, with the person 
v/ho experienced it on a previous occasion despite the fact that the 
tv/o different descriptions of the identical person at different 
times do have some logical differences. Otherwise v/e shall be 
faced with the contradiction that a person remembers what another has 
experienced. The reason wliy the Buddhist philosopher is reluctant 
to admit their identity is that, according to him, identity is not 
compatible with any sort of change wliatsoever. He contends that the 
alteration of any particular quality of a particular object implies a 
total alteration of the object itself. But there is, as a matter of 
fact, a whole philosophy behind the proposition that *a thing can
1. "Yatra santane patiyasa’nubhavenottarottara-visista -tara- 
tama-ksanotpadad-smrtyadi-bijamahitam tatraiva smaranadayah 
samutpadyante nanyatra pratiniyatatvat karya-karana- 
bhavasyeti samasarthah". TS?, p.184, lines 6-8. Cf. Jha's 
translation, p.315.
2. Of. TSP, P0I84, line 9* Cf. Jha's translation, p.315*
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survive the alteration of some of its properties'.* And as long as 
the Buddhist philosophers have not refuted the claim of these 
philosophers successfully, we cannot say that the Buddhist 
philosophers have been able to ansv/er the objection brought against 
their stand-point. It is not very clear what Kamalasila means by 
a 'santana' or 'psychical continuum’ or 'chain*. If, per 
impossible, he means by it something over and above the discrete 
mental states, then he will be in a better position to explain memory. 
If, on the other hand, he means by it the flow of ever-changing 
discrete states, then he cannot escape the charge that he is making 
the contradictory statement that the person who remembers is one 
person and that he that has experienced is another.
\7e have examined the arguments of Santaraksita and 
Kamalasila in quite some detail. Our examination has revealed to us 
that they have not been able to give a satisfactory explanation of 
causation. The main reason for this failure is their denial of the 
concepts of agency , production and efficacy . Causation has 
been reduced by them to 'constant conjunction' or 'unvarying sequence'. 
And it is our contention that causation cannot be analysed, without 
residue, in terras of 'constant conjunction' or 'unvarying sequence', 
inasmuch as such an analysis leaves out of account a vital aspect of
1. Aristotle's philosophy is, for example, 6» behind such a 
proposition. See his treatment of 'substance', 'quality', 
'accident' in various places of his Metaphysics and 
Posterior Analytics.
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causation, viz, the aspect of production-. Without the concept of 
production the v/ho le superstructure of the concept of causation 
would seem to tumble down. Events that are 'constantly conjoined' 
or 'unvaryingly precede or succeed one another* are not necessarily 
related by the relation of the producer- and the product . The 
authors have tried to give some explanation of causation while at 
the same time denying production , agency and causal efficacy 
(and reducing causation to 'unvarying sequence'). We have examined 
their arguments in detail and have found them unconvincing. We shall 
argue at length against the attempt to explain causation while at the 
same breath denying production in Chapter VI.
Section iil
Similarity Between Hume's Causal Theory and that Propounded 
by Santaralesita and Kamalasila
/ —
We have so far seen how Santaraksita and Kamalasila 
have tried to formulate a theory of causation while at the same time 
denj’-ing production and causal efficacy . The same attempt is 
noticable in Hume's reasonings as well, as is evident from our dis­
cussion of Hume's theory of causation in Chapter I. Hume has 
relentlessly argued that an occult entity like causal power is not 
amenable to sense-perception in any case of causation.* It is in
124
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the same spirit that Santaraksita argues, that if you attribute a 
mysterious property called 'efficacy*, to the thing known as the 
'cause' when no such 'efficacy' is in fact detected by the senses, 
then why do you not attribute such a property to many other things 
which are evidently not causes?*
Rejecting the utility of the concept of causal
power or operation , Kamalasila has argued that the only basis for
2
the relation of cause and effect consists in immediate sequence;.
He has qualified this statement later by addirg that, only that
sequence is causal, which is constant as well.^ And we should note
the striking similarity of arguments such as these with Hume's
statements equating causation with constant conjunction. Compare
these arguments, for example, with the following remarks of Hume in
the Enquiry and Treatise.^ In the Enquiry he writes, a cause is
"an object, followed by another, and where all the objects, similar
5to the first, are followed by objects, similar to the second."
In the Treatise again, he writes, "7/e may define a cause to be an 
object precedent and contiguous to another, and where all the objects 
resembling the former are placed in like relations of precedency and
1. See p. 102)?].)and TSP, p. 178, verse 524*
2. See p.im and TSP, p. 180.
3» See pp.114-119 , and TSP, p. 180.
4» V/e have already quoted these arguments in Chapter I. See p.62.
5* Enquiry, p. ’J6, Italics as in the original.
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contiguity to those that resemble the latter." Again, he writes in 
the Treatise, "It is experience of the constant conjunction between 
flame and heat in the past that makes us call the one * cause* and the 
other effect.’*^
Both Hume on the one hand, and Santaralcsita and 
Kamalasila on the other, denied causal operation , efficacy , and 
as a consequence, concepts of agents- and production . In our 
view rejection of concepts of agents and production in both Hume's 
philosophy, and in that of Santaralcsita and Kamalasila, is no 
accidental coincidence. It is prompted by, among other reasons, the 
rejection of the concept of non-changing substances which Hume and 
Buddhist philosophers including Santaraksita and Kamalasila held in 
common.
1. Treatise, p. ^0.
2. Treatise, p.164. Italics ours.
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CHAPTER III 
M I L L ' S  T H K O R y  OF  C A U S A T I O N .
Section i
Exposition of Mill * s Theory
In discussing Hume's theory of causation we have
seen that he rejected the conceot of causal efficacy and
reduced causal relations to relations of uniform sequence
between events. But Hume took far too simple a view of what
it is that is found to recur in causal sequences. He so
often wrote as if it were pairs of single events which are
rel'ted by way of ^nvcryiny sequence. Mill corrects this
naive view and rÿghtly insists that, "It is seldom, if ever,
between a consequent and a sinele antecedent, that this
unvarying sequence subsists. It is usually between a con-
secuent end the sum of BPve-^al antecedents; the concurrence
\
of all of them being requisite to produce, that is, to be 
followed by, the consequent." ^
Mi 11 is not, in effect, abandoning Hume's 
'unvarying sequence view' of causation, but rather trying 
to reformulate it in a more accurate way. We frequently 
speak of a single event as causing another. Yet we never 
find that whenever a single event occurs it is 'invariably' 
followed by another. If a person dies from eating a certain
1. SL , vol.I, p.$78.
food, we call the eating the cause of his death. Yet there 
ne^d not be any invariable connection between someone's 
eating this food anM his subsequent death. But of course,
"there certainly is, among the circumstances which took
nlace, some connection or other on which death is invariably 
conseouent; as for instance, the act of eating of the dish, 
combined with a particular bodily constitutor, a particular 
state of the present health, and perhoes even a certain 
state of the atmosphere; the whole of which circumstances 
perhaps constituted in this particular case the conditions 
of the phenomena, or in other words, the set of antecedents
which determined it, and but for which it would not have
happened."  ^ Thus vdiat causal generalisations inform us of 
is simply that an occurrence of a given kind regularly follows 
when a comulex set of conditions is satisfied. Each of the
I
members of this complex set of conditions, from which we 
usually select one as the cause, is required to complete the 
set. Each ic, in a se^s*, in the sa:;e position with regard 
to the effect. Each is equally necessary to bring about 
the effect.
Mill claims that there is no philosophical just­
ification for the distinction between the cause and conditions 
which we ordinarily make. The lack of any philosophical
/ 1 2  7r
1. SL ,vol.I, p.$67. Italics ad in the original.
ground for the distinction between the cause and the con­
ditions of an event, he says, is shown by the "capricious
manner" in which v/e select  ^one of the conditions from a
2
set and designate it 'the cause'. He considers the case 
of the falling of a stone in wate-, end shows that numerous 
conditions can be singled out and called the cause of the 
stone's falline.  ^ Take for example, the condition of the 
presence of the earth. It can be said with full pronriety 
that the fall of the stone is caused by the earth or by 
a power or property or force exerted by it. Then there is 
another condition that the stone must be at a particular
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1. Although Mill calls this selection "capricious", yet he 
admits that common-sense adheres to some principle or 
other in its choice of one condition among many as a 
'cause'. Hsuolly, people call that rerticular condition 
a 'cause' "whose share in the matter is superficially 
the most conspicuous." (SL, vol. I p.$81) And this 
mostly happens to be th.e proximate event occurring 
immediately oefore the effect. Yet he warns us that we 
must not think that in the employment of the word 'cause' 
one ols-^ ys adheres to t>is or any other rule.
(oL, vol. I, p.fSl) In the footnote on p.$72 of T^o 
System of Mo^ic, vol. I, he suggests that people 
usually designate those factors of a causal situation 
'conditions' which they are already aware of in their 
causal enquiry. In contrast, those factors which they 
require to be informed of as formerly unknown to them in 
their causal enouiry, they tend to call 'causes'. "When 
in the inaccuracy of common discourse we are led to 
speak of some one condition of a phenomenon as its cause, 
the condition so spoken of is always one which it is at 
least possible that the hearer may require to be informed 
of."
2. vol. I, p.$80.
$. 81, vol. I, pp. $80-$Sl.
distance from the earth so that the earth's attraction pre- 
nonderates over the attractive nowe^ of same other body. 
Accordingly v/e may correctly say that the cause of the 
stone's falling is its being within the sphere of the earth's 
attraction. Moreover, it is a further condition of the stone's 
reaching the bottom of the water that its specific gravity 
exceed that of the surrounding fluid. Thus one can easily 
mention this fact about the stone's soccific gravity as the 
cause of its falling.
A cause is thus, philosophically speaking, the 
totality of a set of conditions, which being fulfilled, the 
event invariably follows. This set need not consist of pos­
itive conditions only. It mcy contain negative conditions as 
well. By 'negative conditions' is meent the absence of any 
'preventing' or 'counteracting causes'. For example, if a 
garrison of soldiers i.-^ defeated by the sudden attack of the 
enemy at ni "ht, it is possible that the garrison woul^ not 
have been defeated i:^  tte sentinel had not been off his 
post. His beinc off his post was no producing cause, but 
the mere absence of a counteracting cause, and hence the 
'negative condition' of the garrison's defeat. The sets of 
conditions responsible for the consequent occurrences of 
events always include one or more 'negative conditions' as 
well (a special enumeration of which is generally very prolix). 
In accordance with this, Mill defines a cause as "the sum
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total of the conditions, positive and negative together; 
the whole of the contingencies of eveyy description, which
being realised the consequent invariably follows."^
V/e should also bear in mind that we must not,
2
as Hume seems to have done, confine the word 'cause* to 
events or objects only. The word is in fact applicable to 
persistent states as well. Among the conditions bringing 
about, for examcJe, an accident, we can very easily include 
sue''', states as the icy condition of the road where the 
accident took place. Liill, in his discussion of the causal 
conditions of a phenomenon, insists on this particular 
feature of them, and offers an account of how people resort 
to various logical fictions like that of a 'force* in order 
to avoid the necessity of callin? antecedent states of 
nhenomen^ t'"!oir causes.
People usually think that since the states or 
other conditions of an effect may have pre-existed for an 
indefinite length of t^me before the effect actually comes 
into being, therefore they cannot be supposed to bring it 
about. They seem to precede the effect and wait for the 
advent of that eyegt w^ich was requisite to complete the req­
uired concurrence of conditions. As contrasted with them, 
the change or event which takes nlace immediately before 
the effect appears, seems to be a "condition the fulfilment 
of which complets the tale."  ^ As soon as it occurs, "no
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vol .  1 ,
1* ^)|,P*333* 2. See Ch.I, Passim. See specially p.3M,h.l.
3. SL , vol.I, p.$79
other cause is waited for, hut the effect begins immediately 1 3  1
to take p l a c e . F o r  all these reasons they prefer to bestow 
the title of a 'cause' on an event which implies a change in 
the preceding circumstances rather than on a static entity.
Thus instead of saying that the earth causes the fall of 
bodies, "they ascribe it to a force exerted by the earth, or 
an attraction by the earth, abstractions which they can pre­
sent to themselves as exhausted by each effort, and therefore
2
constituting at each successive instant a fresh act." But 
though we may think proper to ascribe the title of 'cause' 
to that one condition, the fulfilment of which completes the 
tale, this condition has, J.fll says, actually no closer conn­
ection to the effect, than any of the other conditions. In 
hie o'T. words, "the production o^ the consequent required that 
th^v ehoulall gyi gt immediately previous, thourh not that 
they shoul'^  all b^gin to exist immediately previous."'"
Causal relations are thus analysed by Mill in 
terms of invariable succession between sets of antecedent con­
ditions, (be they events or* objects or states), and consequent 
phenomena. In doing so, he is remaining true to the tradition
1. ^  , vol. I, p.379
2. , vol. I, p.382. Italics ^s in the original.
3. , vol. I, p.366. i 1868 editiofidT Italics as in the original.
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which he inJierits from his empiricist predecessors^ like Hune 
and Berkeley. Causes do not, according to Hume end Berkeley, 
possess any 'force' or 'efficacy'. And the necessity that 
is traditionally thought of as characterising the causal
5
relation does not lie in the terms of the relation , but in 
a law, a uniformity, or a rule under which the terms are sub­
sumed. Hume, in particular, and Berkeley, both held that
the so-called causal relation between phenomena consists
q
only of succession between them.'
1. Like Hume, Mill also explaine that the word 'produces' 
means nothing but 'is followed by'. See , vol. I, 
p.378. See also p.lA^ , present chapter.
2. Berkeley, Princi nl/T^ e, >g:'/ and XXVI.
3. For Berkeley, see Principles, XXI end XXX
4. For Unrk'Xey, see Principles, XjXXI.
8. V/e must suoak here with some reservation as far as
Berkeley is concerned. Natural phenomena are, accord­
ing to Berkeley, 'causes imorop-rly so called'. The 
only true cause, according to him, is God. For only 
conscious beings, creatures having intentions and ex­
ercising their wills, can properly be said to make 
things happen. It makes no sense to ascribe real 
'power' OS' 'agency' to inanimate things. But it is 
clear that a man does not himself make, for example, 
the idea of boilin.o- water ensue upon the ideas of fire
and heat. He has no control over them. These ideas
must therefore be caused somehow. Berkeley comes for­
ward wi^h the theory that thgy are caused by God. But 
although it is an absurdity to say that one idea makes 
another idea occur, we can very well treat the occurrence 
of certain ideas as signs that other ideas will occur 
subsequently. This is so because God's operations are 
regular and unifoi-m. As Berkeley says, "Now the sejt 
rules or established methods, wherein the mind we denend 
on excites in us the ideas o~^ sense, are called the laws 
of nature: and Mk these we learn by experience, which 
teaches us that such and such ideas are attended with 
such and such ideas, in the ordinary course of things." 
(Principles, sec. XXX). Italics as in the original.
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The empiricist philosophers are, at this stage,
faced vrith a difficulty. If causal relations are equivalent
to unvarying sequences between phenomena, are we to suppose, in
that case, that any case of unvarying s equence would qualify as
a case of causal connection ? Such an objection v/as in fact
brought by Thomas Reid against the view of interpreting causal
relations in terras of unvarying sequence. Reid argued^ that
if we define causation in terras of 'invariable sequence’, then
it would imply tliat night is the cause of day, and day the cause
of night, inasmuch as these phenomena have followed one another
from the beginning. "But it is necessary," KilL says, "to our
using the word cause, that we should believe not only that the
antecedent always has been followed by the consequent, but that
2
as long as the present constitution of things endures, it always 
will be so. And this would not be true of day and night.
Night and day could, under some imaginable circumstances, cëase 
to follow one another without any violation of the ultimate laws 
of nature. Their succession is not an ultimate fact but derivative.
1. This argument of Reid is in fact presented here in the form in which
Kill quotes it in his vol.I, p. 390,
2. By ’the present constitution of things’ Kill means the ’ultimate laws
of nature as distinguished from the derivative laws and their colloca­
tions’. SL. Vol.I. p.351, foot-note.
3. ^  vol. I.p.351*
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Certain additional conditions need to be fulfilled if day is to 
follow night. These additional conditions are factors like ’the 
existence of the sun (or some such luminous body) above the horizon’; 
there being ’no opaque medium in a straight line between the 
(luminous) body and the part of the earth where we are situated.’^
Day will follow night if and only if these conditions are fulfilled.
The day’s succeeding the night is thus conditional. If the condi­
tions which make day possible ( such as, the sun’s being above the 
horizon, there being no intervening object between the sun and the 
earth), had not been fulfilled, then ?/e might have had night 
eternally. Night will thus not be followed by da})' under all 
circumstances. If, on the other hand, the conditions which make 
day possible had been fulfilled perpetually, then we would have had 
day only, without any night to follow it.
If a case is to be, on the other hand, a case of causation, 
the consequent will have to follow the antecedent under all circum­
stances. And this is possible only if the consequent follows the 
antecedent unconditionally. Strictly speaking, an antecedent is 
not an ’ invariable’ one if it is not unconditional as well.
1. vol.I, p.391*
2. SL. vol.I, p.393* "Let me add, that the antecedent which is 
only conditionally invariable, is not the invariable antecedent."
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"Invariable sequence, therefore, is not synonymous 7/ith causation,
unless the sequence, besides being invariable, is unconditional".^
"V/e may define, therefore," hill says, "the cause of a phenomenon,
to be the antecedent, or the concurrence of antecedents, on which
2
it is invariably and unconditionally consequent."
We must pause here a little in order to ascertain the 
full significance of the words ’invariably’ and ’unconditionally’ 
in this context. It is obvious that Kill is trying to make a 
distinction between two senses of the word ’invariable*. One 
sense is that in which Kill is speaking of a sequence being 
’conditionally invariable’.^ [in this sense we should, strictly 
speaking, only use the word ’unvarying’ • because if a sequence 
is dependent on certain conditions, then a report of that sequence 
is not a report of what would have happened under any conditions, 
actual or possible. Hence the word ’invariable’, which has a 
modal sense, i.e. which refers to what must happen, under any 
circumstances, actual or imaginary, cannot be applied to such a 
sequence.] The sense in which a causal sequence is ’invariable’
1. ^  vol. I, p. 392.
2. vol.I,p.392. Italics as in the original.
3. See p.l^ H^ n. 2.
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in Kill’s opinion is, on the other hand, that in which the con­
sequent will always follow the antecedent as long as the present 
constitution of things endures.^ And this invariability of
sequence can be found, in his opinion, only in cases where the
2
antecedent and consequent are uneonditionallv related. But 
the question is, what does Kill mean by an antecedent that is 
’ unconditionally and invariably’ followed by a consequent?
Kill possibly means by this an antecedent that not only is 
followed by its consequent in this actual world of ours, but 
will be so followed even in all physically possible worlds which 
have the same laws of nature as ours. A sequence is invariable 
and unconditional if it holds good in any possible worlds, including 
even worlds which have different initial conditions from our world, 
but nevertheless liave the same laws of nature as ours. But one 
thing is certain. Kill does not mean by an invariable sequence 
a sequence that is to be found in all phy’sically possible as well 
as loFicallv possible worlds 5 Because a logically possible world 
may not only have different initial conditions from ours, but even 
different laws of nature from ours. An invariable sequence is, in 
accordance with Kill’s use of the term ’invariable’, confined to 
worlds which must have the same laws of nature as our ov/n.
1. See p. 133 .
2. See p. i3M •
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So far we have written as if Kill had defined causation 
solely in terms of ’invariable sequence’ or ’succession’ of 
phenomena. But Kill has in fact observed that cause and effect 
are not always successive, but can be contemporaneous as well. In 
some cases, the cause may cease to exist when the effect appears. 
For example, the striking of the match is no longer there when the 
ignition comes about. Yet, the cause need not always perish when 
the effect comes into existence. As a result, the cause is bound 
to co-exist with the effect in those cases. Examples of such 
cases of the contemporaneity of the cause and the effect are cases 
where parents may just co-exist with their offsprings, but are not 
causally active any more. There are also certain cases which seem 
to imply not only that causes may, but also that they must, be 
contemporaneous TO-th their effects. For example, the temperature 
which forces up the mercury in a thermometer, must be continued in 
order to sustain it in the exact position. The question then 
arises, can we, in that case, insist on causation being confined to 
cases of successive phenomena alone?
Some cases of simultaneous causation need not obviously 
bother Kill. Such are cases where the cause need not necessarily 
disappear as soon as the effect comes into being, and where the 
continuance of the cause which brings about the effect is necessary
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to the continuance of the effect itself; because, in such cases, 
the effect need not necessarily come into being at exactly the 
same time as the cause* The case which does bother Mill then is 
that in which "an effect may commence simultaneously with its 
c a u s e * H o w  can he insist on the temporal precedence of the 
cause in the face of such an example?
Mill ultimately has to grant that temporal succession 
is not a distinguishing mark of causation* He grants that "there 
certainly are cases in which the effect follows without any interval 
perceptible by our faculties*” Yet, he maintains that, "even 
granting that an effect may commence simultaneously with its cause, 
the view I have taken of causation is in no way practically affected*”  ^
"I have no objection to define a cause, the assemblage of phenomena, 
which occurring, some other phenomenon invariably commences or has its 
origin. V,Tie the r the effect coincides in point of time with, or 
immediately follows, the hindmost of its conditions, is immaterial.
At all events it does not precede i t * Y e t ,  in spite of all this. 
Mill always refers to causation as * invariable and unconditional 
sequence* giving one thereby the impression that -Jbe regards
1* Vol.I p.397.
2* Vol. I, p* 39 7*
3* SL, Vo1*I,p*397.
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succession as the fundamental element in causation.
Mill warns us that we must not think that an event 
of a given kind must always be brought about by one set of con^ 
ditions only# In fact an event of a particular kind may be caused 
by several phenomena at different times. The effect 'a', may 
sometimes arise from A, and sometimes from B. "^ ainy causes may 
produce motion: many causes may produce some kinds of sensation:
many causes may produce death. A given effect may really be 
produced by a certain cause, and yet perfectly capable of being 
produced without it.
Section ii 
Defects in Mill* s Theory of Causation
Although Mill* s analysis is in mary ways a remarkable 
improvement on that of Hume, yet we must admit that it suffers from 
some major defects as well. In our opinion these defects stem 
mainly from Mill’s denial of concepts like production and 
efficacy • Denying such concepts. Mill tries to define causation 
in terms of ’invariable and unconditional* sequence or relatedness.
1. SB, vol. I, p.505.
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Yet, we shall see that Mill will have to encounter insuperable 
difficulties if he attempts to do such a thing. If, on the other 
hand, he could have justified admitting concepts like production 
and producer then he would not have to have recourse to such 
an artificial device as ’invariable and unconditional relatedness*.
He could have analysed causal relations in a much more realistic 
way.
In the following pages we shall mention a few of those 
defects (depending to a considerable extent on the account given of 
them by Professors Hart and Honoré).^
In the first place, we must note that Mill's ideal of 
* invariable and unconditional sequence* of phenomena can never be 
achieved in practice. Even a scientist can hardly discover causal 
uniformities that will hold good even if all other initial conditions. 
apart from the conditions that are followed by the effects, were 
different. In order to be able to find such a set of conditions 
as will be unconditionally and invariably followed by a certain 
effect, he will have to say that all other conditions (all other
1. Mill's rejection of the concept of production is evident from his 
analysis of the word 'produce* as * to be followed by*. See p.116. 
See also S^ vol. I,p. 378*
2. See * Causation in the Law*. Hart and Honoré, pp. 20-23, 29, 42.
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things, events or states), apart from those specified in the set, 
are irrelevant for the production of the event. But ejren if we 
succeed in discovering some persistent feature of the universe say, 
for example, the motion of the planets, it will he impossible to say 
that if this were to change, some causal generalisation or other 
will not be affected thereby, and so whether a full statement of 
the generalisation should include it. And it is quite possible 
that many similar states are still undetected to this day, as cosmic 
radiation was till recently.
Moreover, one will be faced with a very serious 
difficulty if one regards Mill* s analysis of causation as an account 
of common-sense notions of causation. The unqualified definition 
of cause in terms of invariable sequence does not correspond to the 
way in which causal notions are sometimes used by the ordinary man#
An ordinary man does, for example, on some occasions, specify the icy 
condition of a road as the cause of an accident. Y/hen he does so, 
he is not, by any means, making statements like, 'whenever there 
is an icy patch on a road, it invariably causes an accident.* Of 
course, universal statements of that sort can be formulated, even in 
those cases, by taking into consideration other necessary conditions.
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such as a particular speed with which the car is to he driven, 
absence of certain counteracting causes and so on. But when an 
ordinary man specifies a cause in the way we have referred to 
above, he merely means that the icy patch is the unusual factor 
which is causally responsible for the accident. He does not consider 
as causes the other necessary conditions which are present in all 
cases of accidents due to the icy conditions of the roads. Instead, 
he picks out that unusual factor which is present only in the case 
of the accident, but not in that of the normal happening, and calls 
it the * cause**
Singular statements are not, for the above reason, 
considered unjustified if statements of * invariable and unconditional 
sequence* cannot be produced in their defence. Ik) one will, for 
example, consider a layman's statement that a fall on the staircase 
caused the fracture in a man's leg unjustified or unwarranted, if 
there is no proposition of the form that * falls of such a kind are 
invariably and unconditionally followed by fractured legs of such a 
kind*, which can be produced to defend his causal statement.
As a matter of fact, a layman does not even always know 
all the conditions that need to be fulfilled if a fall is to result 
in a fracture. Mill* s suggestion, therefore, that common^sense
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• selects' one single condition from among a set of jointly sufficient 
conditions as cause is very misleading, V/hat usually happens is 
that, after causes have been identified, we gradually come to know, 
through experience and possibly by being told by experts, that there 
were, in the causal situation, certain other conditions without which 
the particular effect might not have taken place. We call a 
particular thing or event 'cause' from the start, before we come to 
know of the other necessary conditions. Vihen we learn later, for 
example, that the fall would not have been sufficient to produce the 
fracture unless the bone was of a particular structure and the fall 
was of a particular character, vie do not abandon our initial causal 
statement. We simply have to admit that we were ignorant of these 
further conditions about the structure of the bone and the particular 
character of the fall, and yet we called the fall the cause of the 
fracture.
I. See p.\22.
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CHAPTER IV
POINTS OF COMPARISON BETWEEN THEORIES OF CAUSATION INTRODUCBD 
BY HILL AND RUSSELL AND RELg/ANT ASPECTS OF BUDDHIST CAUSAL 
THEORIES,
Section i
Emphasis on the Multiplicity of Conditions in both Mill's Theory 
and in the Causal Theories Developed by 'Theravada* and 
* Sarvâstiimda* philosophy
Kill* 3 view of causation, as presented in the last 
chapter is very similar in many respects to the different causal 
theories developed by various Buddhist schools of thought. To 
start with, rejection of concepts like causal power and production 
is a common feature of the causal theories developed by all schools 
of Buddhism and those developed by philosophers of the empiricist 
tradition like Hume and Kill,^ Both these sets of causal theories 
have stressed that the pivotal point of causation is not production
Rejection of the concepts of production and efficacy is 
explicit in the school to vdiich Santaraksita and Kamalaêîla belonged. 
The * Theravada* and *Sarvâstivâda* schools, however, did not 
deny production and efficacy explicitly. Yet they have 
completely omitted these concepts from their causal explanations.
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but simply * unvarying succession* or ’constant conjunction'
Apart from this general resemblance, the causal theories
advanced by certain schools of Buddhism resemble Mill* s causal
theory in certain specific points. For example, the point on which
there is a close similarity between Mill* s causal theory and the
theories developed by the * Theravada* and * Sarvâstivâda* schools is
their emphasis that the causal relation does not s ubsist between
pairs of s ingle events or objects, but that "it is usually between
a consequent and the sQjm of several antecedents that this relationship
subsists". This sum of antecedents is, in Mill’s special terminology
"the conditions of the phenomena, ... but for which it would not have 
2
happened." The cause is, according to Mill, one of the conditions 
of this set, which common sense singles out and calls the cause. 
ignoming the other factors or conditions which are equally necessaiy 
for the production of the thing called ’effect*.
Mill was virtually^ the first among British empiricists 
to turn our attention to this important aspect of causation, namèly, 
that the 'concurrence* of both that which is popularly called the
1. Mill and some Buddhist schools (see ch. Ill, pp.(37-32; present
chapter, pp.(dB, 199 -I90). admitted the possibility of the
simultaneous origin of the cause and the effect in some cases.
2. See SL^ vol.I, p.36?#
3. Hume sometimes vaguely spoke about them (as the ’occasions* of
occurrences). See Treatise. Book 1, part HI, p. 171.
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cause and those which are called the conditions, is * requisite to 
produce, that is, to he followed hy the consequent.*^ It is in 
the same spirit that the Buddhist philosopher says, "no one thing 
comes from one (other) single thing: from a totality eveiything
arises." ( "Na ki^cid ekam ekasmat,samagryah sarva-sampatteh".).^ 
This * totality* consists of * conditions*, or, what is technically 
known in Buddhist philosophical terminology as *pratyayas* (Pali, 
*paccayas*).
The * Sarvâstivâda* philosophers introduced a very 
subtle point at this stage about the nature of conditions which is 
not veiy clearly stressed in the'Theravâda* philosophy. They 
pointed out that the assemblage of conditions responsible for the 
emergence of a particular 'dhanna' consists not only of the presence 
of some conditions, but also of the absence of certain preventing 
conditions (known in Mill's philosophy as the 'negative conditions* 
of an effect). And there seems to be a remarkable agreement between 
Mill and the Buddhist philosophers on this point that the causal 
phenomena responsible for the emergence of an effect invariably 
contains, besides a group of positive conditions, some negative
1. See Vol.I. p.36?.
2. Nyavabindutika. see BI^ Vol.I, p. 127#
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conditions as well. The idea of a * negative condition* is suggested 
in the * Sarvâstivâda* philosophy with the help of the * general cause*
( * kârapa-hetu*) and * dominating-condition* ( * adhipati-pratyaya*).
V/e shall discuss in detail the concept of a * general-cause* (*kârana- 
hetu! ) and * dominating-condition' ( * adhipati-pratyaya* ) later. ^
But in order to show that the * Sarvâstivâda school anticipated Mill's 
concept of a 'negative condition* we need first to give a critical 
analysis of the * Theravada* and * Sarvâstivâda* theories of conditions.
Section ii
Critical Analysis of the 'Theravada* Theory of the Multiplicity of 
Conditions
The definition of a * Cause* as the s urn total of several 
factors led to further developments in the * Theravada* theory of 
causation. The *Theravadins* analysed twenty four ways in which 
something may condition, or he causally responsible for, the emergence 
of something else. Accordingly, the * Theravâdins* recognised twenty 
four conditions or 'paccayas*. Before we undertake a critical 
analysis of these 'paccayas* (conditions), we would like to make an
1. See pp. 177-79, ISZSS.
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important observation regarding the * Theravada* analysis of 
'paccayas* (conditions). The different categories of 'paccayas* 
were enumerated by the * Theravada* philosophers in accordance with 
the different questions that arise in our mind regarding the nature 
of the relationship between the cause and the effect. But the 
* Theravada* enumeration of the * paccayas* suffers from the following 
defect.'
Certain things and events are grouped by the * Theravada* 
philosophers under one category of *paccaya* because they condition 
certain other things and events in a particular way. For example, 
certain things and events condition their effects by preceding them 
and helping these succeeding factors to come into existence. Certain 
other things and events, on the other hand, condition the existence 
of their effects at exactly the same time as they themselves come into 
being. Hence from the temporal point of view the * Thera vâdins* 
enumerated two categories of conditions (*paccayas*),(5) * the immediately 
antecedent-conditionf’ and (6) 'the simultaneous-condition*• (See p.l5^ .
The enumeration of these two categories of conditions thus owes its 
origin to the question, what sort of temporal relationship a cause has 
to its effect? But one may also want to know, what other relationships 
there may be between the cause and the effect? In answer to such a 
question the * Theravâdins* say that certain things and events cause 
their effects in such a way that the effects alone depend on their causes
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in a unique way* Such things and events are said hy the 
* Theravada* philosophers to aot as (8) *supporting-conditions*• 
However, certain other things and events, the *Theravadins* say, 
are in the relation of mutuel dependence with their effects* Such 
things and events act as *mutuality-conditions*. (See pp. 15/9- I 60 
in this connection^. No(i) it may very easily he the case that the 
same things and events which have been grouped under one of the 
two categories of * paccayas* made from the temporal viewpoint, may 
also be grouped under one of the two categories made from the point 
of view of the nature of the dependence of the effect on the cause. 
(See pp.|5g-^nd 166 in this connection.) In this way, the different 
classes of conditions sometimes tend to overlap.
Tho Twenty Four *Paccayas* ( Conditions) -
the
In the Theravada* literature speculations about^different 
'paccayas* are embodied in the work called the *P a t t h a n a * Y/e
1. The full name of the book is *Fatthanarekarana* or
*Kahâpakarana*. and it is the seventh and the last book of the
* AbhidhgJima -pitaka*. The * paccayas* have also been enumerated 
succinctly by Hyanatiloka, in his Guide through the Abhidhamma- 
Pitaka. I have referred mainly to this book and the 
Visuddhimagga in my exposition of the * paccayas*.
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shall do well to remember that the following classification of 
the different conditions was chiefly concerned with mental processes 
and their conditions, because of the overriding importance of mental 
attitudes in their systems* The four * pratyayas* mentioned in the 
* Sarvâstivâda* work, * Abhidharmakosa recur in both * Sarvâstivâda* 
and *Theravada* classification of conditions. In our analysis of 
the * Theravada* enumeration of the conditions we shall mark these 
four conditions with asterisks* It seems that the four * pratyayas* 
represent a very broad classification of conditions while their 
sub-divisions, either in the form of further *pratyayas* or in the 
form of 'hetus* (causes) provide a more detailed analysis of the 
different conditions*
The twenty four conditions mentioned by the *TheraTrâidins* 
are as follows:
1. Root-condition ( * Ketu-paccaya* )
2* Object-condition (*Arammana-paccaya)
3* Dominating-condition ( *Adhipati-paccaya*)
Antecedent-condition ( * Anantara-paccaya* )
5* Immediately antec edent-c ondition ( * Samanantara-paccaya* )
6* Simultaneous-condition ( * Saha jata-paccaya* )
7* Mutuality-condition ( *Ahnamanna-paccaya* )
8* Supporting-condition ( * Nissaya-paccaya* )
9* Decisive supporting-condition ( *Upanissaya-paccaya*)
10# Prenasoent-condition (’Pure jâta-paccaya* )
11# Postnascent-condition ( * Pacchâjâta-paccaya* )
12# Répétition-condition (*Asevana-paccaya* )
13# Action-condition ( * Kaimna-paccaya*)
12f# Rétribution-condition ( * Vipâka-paccaya* )
15# Nutriment-condition ( * Ahâra-paccaya* ) 
lé. Predominant-condition ( * Indriya-paccaya* )
17# Méditation-condition ( * Jbâna-paccaya* )
18# Path-condition ( * Magga-paccaya* )
19# Closely as soc iatôd-c ondition ( * Sampayutta-paccaya* )
20. Dissociated-condition (* Vippayutta-paccaya*)
21. Presence-condition ( * Atthi-paccaya* )
22# A^b sence-condition ( * Natthi-paccaya* )
23# Disappearance-condition (* Vigata-paccaya*)
24# Non-disappearance-condition ( ' A vigata-paccaya*)#
*(l) * Root-condition* ( * hetu-paccaya* ) is the first of 
the twenty four conditions enumerated in the * Patthâna* * This is 
described in the Visuddhima^/^ as a condition which helps the arising of 
a state in the manner of a root (* mula* ).^ Creed (*lobha*), hatred or 
aversion (*dosa*)^ and delusion ( * mo ha* ) are described in the Patthâna
1# volol, p. 535#
2# Sanskrit * dvesa* #
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as the roots of demeritorious ( * akusala* ) phenomena. The underlying 
significance is probably this: Life is seen in Buddhism as ’unrest*
( * dukkha* ) and the * root-cause* or ultimate cause of this * unrest* 
is viewed as consisting of demeritorious factors like greed, aversion, 
and delusion. Meritorious events and phenomena are, on the other 
hand,rooted in the contraries of this triad, viz, absence of greed, 
absence of aversion, and absence of delusion. The *root-condition* 
can thus be viewed as the nrimary cause of a series of secondary 
causes which result ultimately in the origination of a particular 
effect.
Another strand in the meaning of this * root-c ondition*
is that states which are rooted in these conditions are very firmly
2
fixed, like trees with deep roots.
The classification of events, states, etc. into the other 
twenty three conditions has been made from different view^points. 
Sometimes the classification is made from the epistemological position. 
The *(2) ’object-condition* and the (lé) *pre-^dominant-condition* 
correspond to this view^point. Sometimes the enumeration of conditions 
is made with the object of explaining the continuity and maturity of
1. Sanskrit * du%ikha*. See CCB.pp.i-igf,
2. 2 ^ p. 533.
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thought-processes. The (4) ’antecedent*-, *(5) ’immediately 
antecedent*-, (12) ’repetition*-, (22) * absence* -, and (23) * disappearance- 
conditions* correspond to this view-point. At other times the 
enumeration of conditions is made from the point of view of determing 
the time of the origination of the effect. V/hile some conditions 
cause their effects as soon as they themselves come into being (viz. 
the ( 6) ’ simultaneous-conditions* ), others, [e.g. the (lO)
*prenaseent-conditions*], invariably precede their effects.
Another enumeration of conditions is prompted by the motive of 
showing that whereas in the majority of cases the effect comes into 
being throu.di its dependence on the conditions (e.g. as in the case 
of the effect of a (8) ’supporting condition*), in some cases (e.g. 
in that corresponding to ( ?) the ’mutuality-condition*), the condition 
and the effect are interdependent. Classes of *(3) * dominating*- 
and (9) ’decisive supporting-condition* are brought in to explain 
the phenomenon of the strong influence exerted by certain conditions 
on their effects.^ Although usually conditions help the conditioned 
by their presence (e.g. the (21) * presence*- and the (23)
*non-disappearance-conditions*), some help the arising of the 
conditioned phenomena by their absence (e.g. the (22) * absence* - and 
the (24) * disappearance-conditions). We must also point out that
1. See p.j6l, n. |.
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sometimes the *Theravada* scholastics have unnecessarily multiplied 
the categories of conditions^ by creating a contrary to almost every 
class of positive conditions they could discover. Thus corresponding 
to the (21) * presence-condition* and the (lO) * prenascent-condition* 
they have the (22) * absence-condition* and the (ll) ’postnascent 
conditions*. Me should make a detailed analysis of the remaining 
twenty three conditions in order to appreciate their full significance.
Of the two categories named froig the epistemological 
viewpoint, *(2) * object-condition* ( * arammapa^-paccaya* ) is described 
as that condition which helps the origination of perceptional 
processes like seeing, hearing, smelling. Thus the objects of these 
processes(together with other factors) help their origination.
Objects like colour, foim, sound,smell are therefore described as 
’ object-conditions* in * Theravada* works. * Object-conditions* of 
abstract thinking are however, according to * Theravada* philosophy, 
abstract ideas.
The etymological meaning of * arammana-paccaya* is 
however ’supporting-condition*. This special designation of this 
category is due to the fact that conditions like colours, forms, sounds
1. See p./62-^èelow.
2. Sanskrit ’alambana*.
1 5 5
abstract ideas are described in * Theravada* works as ’supporting’ 
the respective mental phenomena arising due to them. Thus it 
is stated in the V i s u d d h i m a . ’ Oust as a weak man gets up and 
stands upright with the support of a stick or a rope, so 
a particular consciousness’ and its ’concomitants’^ arise and continue 
to exist depending on supports like from (or colour).^
The second category corresponding to the epistemological 
viewpoint is that of (lé) the ’predominant-conditions’ (’indriya- 
paccayas’). This class refers mainly to the five sense-organs as 
opposed to their corresponding objects.
1. ’ Citta* and ’cetasikas* (Sanskrit *caitasikas*)• According
to the ’ Theravadins’ a ’particular consciousness’ (’citta*) 
is invariably accompanied by a number of ’concomitant mental 
phenomena* (’ceta^sikas*). whenever there is a particular 
act of consciousness it is accompanied by certain mental 
phenomena like ’feeling* ( ’ vedana* ), ’conception’ (’sahna*, 
Sanskrit ’samjha*), ’volition’ ( ’ cetana* ), ’correlation of 
the sense-organs and their corresponding objects* (’phassa*, 
Sanskrit ’sparsa’). These ’concomitant mental phenomena* are 
called ’cetasika dhammas* by the ’ Theravadins'• They are 
well described by Mac govern in A Manual of Buddhist nhilosophy 
(see pp. 137-162). Such a theory of * concomitshtis* probably 
arises from observations of the form that cases o ¥  bare and simple 
intellectual awareness are extremely rare. Intellectual 
awareness is so intimately bound up with aesthetic appreciation, 
feelings and conative responses, that it is extremely difficult
to disentangle the purely intellectual aspects of our awareness 
from its usual associates, viz., aesthetic appreciation, feelings 
and COnative responses.
2. VM, p.533* Translation ours.
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liVe have already said (see p.l5^  that five factors explain 
the continuity and maturity of thought-processes* The first of 
them consists of the (4) ’antecedent condition* (’anantara- 
paccaya’). This condition refers to a phenomenon which aids 
other succeeding phenomena by its proximity* There is a certain 
order in our thought-processes* The ’antecedent-condition* is 
introduced to explain this order* The previous stages of a
particular thought-process help the next ones by preceding ihegi; for 
without their doing so, the due pattern of the t hought-process cannot 
be maintained. ^  If some other extraneous element intervened, for 
example, between the particular stages of our perception from the 
first moment of the * correlation’ of the sense-organ and tlie object, 
to the final full-fledged perception,^ we could not have the 
particular perception that we do in fact have*
The *(5) ’ immediately antecedent-condition’ (’ samanantara- 
paccaya’) is a collective name of all those elements of a particular 
’ stream of thought’ which precede their successive elements absolutely 
immediately^ (i*e* with nothing in between) and help the continuity
1. See BTL pp. 152-153#
2* See Ch* V, pp.23^
3# This is obviously the account of perception according to
’ Theraimda* philosophy*
4# As opposed to the ’antecedent conditions* which refer merely 
to the preceding elements*
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of the ’stream*.
Another factor which explains the maturity of a thought-
process or a mental phenomenon is the (l2) ’repetition-condition’
(’âsevana-paccaya*). This refers to a phenomenon (repetition)
which facilitates certain mental processes like learning and
remembering by frequency.^ Another example of this conditioning is
the way the frequent making of meritorious volitions facilitates
2the making of similar meritorious volitions in the future.
The (22) ’absence condition’ (’ natthi*-, [Sanskrit 
’nasti*] paccaya)^ and the (23) ’disappearance-condition’
(’vigata-paccaya’)^ refer to those mental events which have just 
happened, and which assist those which immediately follow them by 
simply disappearing and making room for them. They too explain 
the continuity and development of particular thought-processes.
These two conditions are introduced to emphasise the point that the 
preceding mental events must disappear if the following ones are to 
appear.
Considering the time of the origin of the conditioned,
1. ^  p.104, n ,  p. 538.
2. Still another example is the -rway practice of meritorious actions 
facilitates acting in a meritorious way in the future.
3. ^  p. 108, p. 541#
4# P» 541.
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conditions may be classified, as we have already remarked,^ either 
into (6) ’simultaneous*- (’sahajata’ -), or into (lO) ’prenascent* - 
(’purejata’ -) ’conditions’ (’paccayas’)•
The flame of the lamp and the light emanating from it 
is used as an example of such a case of simultaneous conditioning.. 
The four ’constituents of a person’^ which represent (only) the 
psychical aspect of an individual are described as conditioning 
each other as ’simultaneous-conditions*. The four ’ultimate 
material elements*^ the two constituents of the ’psycho-physical 
complex* (’ nâma-rûpa* ) at the time of conception; the four ’ ultimate 
material elements and the ’elements dervied from them’ ; a particular 
cohsciousness and its ’concomitants’ (*citta-cetasikas’) etc. are 
described as being related by this relation of ’ simult&neous- 
conditioning.^
1. See p. liS.
2. See Ch. II, pp. ^ 9-90.
3. All schools of Buddhism agree that every material element falls
into one or other of two categories: (i) the ultimate ( ’ mahâbhüta’),
and (ii) the derived ( ’ bhautika’). They generally agree that
the ’ ultima tes’ are four in number - earth, water, fire and air. 
(Each of these four however has a special significance for the 
Buddhists, which is different from their significance for the 
other schools of Indian philosophy. ) Regarding the enumeration 
of the ’derived material elements* there is not much uniformity 
among the schools of Buddhism, though they all include the five 
sense-organs and their corresponding objects in the lists of the 
’ derived material elements* *
4. VM, p. 535; M L  p.ioi.
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As opposed to a ’simultaneous-condition*, a (lO)
’prenascent-condition’ (’purejata-paccaya’) precedes the conditioned.^
The different sense-organs, their corresponding objects and the 
2
heart are said to be the *prenaseent-conditions’ of perception and 
thought.
Regarded from the point of view of the form of dependence 
of the conditioned on the condition, we can enumerate two types of 
conditions, viz., (7) ’mutuality-condition’ (’annamahna-paccaya’) 
and (8) ’supporting-condition* ( ’ nissaya-paccaya’). Y.liereas the 
’mutuality conditions’ are described as conditions which help each 
6ther^  ^the ’ supporting-conditions’ are said to be those which ' : 
help others in the manner of foundations (’ adhitthâna’) or supports 
(’nissaya*). An example of this phenomenon of supporting is the 
way the earth or a piece of canvas provide support for a tree or an 
oil-painting.^ Although the phenomenon of supporting can be said
1. pp. 641-642; GAP, pp.103-104. This condition resembles the
'antecedent’ - and ’immediately antecedent-conditions’ in respect 
of -precedence only. However, unlike these two conditions, the 
’ prenascent-condition’ was not introduced by the * Thera vadins’ 
to explain the maturity and development of thought-processes.
2o The heart is presumably the ’ faculty for intellection’ in this context.
3. For example, three sticks are described in the W  (p.535) as
helping each other to stand on the ground (the sticks are supposed
to prop up one another). In the same way, -the ’ four psychical 
constituents of a person*, the ’ ultimate material elements’ etc. are 
also described ( see p.535; GAP. p.lOl) as mutually conditioning 
each other.
4» See Y Ë j P*535.
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to provide a unique example of unilateral dependence, yet the 
* Theravadins’also say that the four ’psychical constituents’ and 
the four 'ultimate material elements' mutually support each other, 
and hence are 'supporting conditions' of one another. One naturally 
keeps on wondering what, in that case, would he the justification 
for creating a separate category of 'mutuality-condition’? Could 
this category of ’condition' not he said to represent an aspect of 
the category of ’supporting-condition’? But perhaps the ’Theravadins’ 
are using the word ’ support’ in a metaphorical sense here. % a t  
they really mean is probably tliat the ’ four psychical constituents’
’ support' each other in the sense that they cause each other to fro 
on existing; each of them is the c?use of the continued existence of 
the other. (The earth does not cause the tree to come into existence.
It merely causes the tree to go on standing in an upright position.)
As contrasted with this, ’mutuality-conditions' cause one another to 
come into existence. (Yet we wonder whether two or more things can 
properly be said to cause each other to come into existence. See 
Chapter V, p.263.)
Although the (9) ’decisive supporting-condition’
(’ upanissaya-paccaya') is said only to explain the extreme form 
of dependence^ exhibited by a 'supporting-condition*, yet a deeper
1. * Bhuso nissayo ijpanissayo* , p. 536.
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scrutiny reveals that this condition is really a *pov/erful*^ 
condition* Such a 'decisive siqjport* is possible in three ways, 
viz, (i) 'decisive support by way of object'( *ârammanüpanissaya- 
paccaya*),^ ( ii) 'decisive support iby way of antecedence*
('anantara-upanissaya-paccaya*),^ and (iii) 'decisive support by 
way of habit* ( ' pakata-i:q)anissaya-paccaya* ).^ The first one 
corresponds to the powerful way certain objects of thought attract 
our attention* Perfomances of noble acts like charity have, 
for example, such a noble quality about them, that they have a 
tremendous impact on our thinking, and we keep on thinking about 
them even after we finish such performances. The second one is 
said to refer to only an 'intense form* of the conditioning exhibited 
by the 'immediately antecedent-condition*. (iii) 'Decisive support 
by way of habit 'refers to the overwhelming influence of habits on 
a man* s conduct.
1. One wonders whether this admission of the concept of power 
would be a case against the * Theravada* causal theory which 
agrees with the general Buddhist trend of explaining away 
causal power or efficacy. But perhaps the * Theravada* 
philosopher even explained the word * forced to* as nothing but 
mechanical reaction of a sort under certain circumstances.
In other words, admission of such a concept of power need 
not force them to admit a producer which produces something. 
But one wonders whether 'power* can really be explained in 
such a mechanical way.
2. W ,  p.536.
3* I L  pp# 53 6-53 7*
4# p* 537#
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Another condition which is brought in to explain what
is commonly known as the phenomenon of * something exerting a strong
influence on another* is the *(3) * dominating-condition* (* adhipati-
paccaya*). One form of this conditioning is the way certain factors
like * intense desire to act* (* chanda*) are said to be concomitant
with every act of consciousness and exercise . dominating influence
on a man's whole psychological being.^ Another form of it is the
2
way certain objects condition certain forms of knowledge.
Me have already remarked on p. Idâthat a particular act 
of consciousness is always associated with some 'concomitant mental 
phenomena* like 'feeling*, 'volition* etc. If a particular act of 
consciousness and an associated 'concomitant*, e.g. 'feeling* have 
the same object, the same 'point d*appui* ( *âsraya* ) and if they 
arise and disappear together, then they are said to be (l9) 'closely 
associated-conditions* ('sampayutta^-paccaya*) of one another.
The constant effort of 'Theravada* scholastics to find
1. Such a conditioning is the peculiarity of a 'simultaneous 
dominating-condition* ( ' sahajata^dhipati-paccaya*). For a 
fuller account see W .  p. 534#
2. Such a conditioning is the peculiarity of a * dominating condition 
by way of object* 0 arammanadhipati-paccaya*). For a fuller 
account see P# 534#
3# Sanskrit * samprayuktaka*. See W .  pp. 539, 540, GAP. plOy. For 
a fuller account see pp. 197-99below. The 'point d* appui* of a 
perception ds thej corresponding sense-organs.
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a 0 ontraiy to eveiy condition inaginable led them to introduce 
the class of (20) 'dissociated-condition* (' vippayutta^-paccaya*) 
as contrary to the condition mentioned above. [This effort 
resulted also in the introduction of the (21) 'presence-' and (24) 
'non-disappearance-conditions*^ as contraries to the (22) 'absence-' 
and (25) 'disappearance-conditions', about which we have already 
spoken on p.(5^ 3. ] The underlying idea is that whereas the 
category of * closely associated-condition* provides example of 
the close interaction between certain *dharmas* (viz. an act of 
consciousness and the 'concommitants* with which it is inseparably 
connected), the category of 'dissociated-condition' refers to the 
way a certain * dharma* conditions another without being inseparably 
connected or interconnected with it. For example, an object is 
the condition of the corresponding perception. There is no close 
interaction between the object and the perception. The object 
exists in its own right whether the perception exists or not.
Besides, the 'point d*appui* of a perception is a sense-organ. The 
'point d*appui* of an object, on the other hand, is the stuff of which 
it is made.
1.
2.
Sanskrit ' vipryukta*•
For (21) 'presence-' ( ' atthi-'. Sanskrit ' asti-' ) and ( 24) 
'non-disappearance-' ('avigata) conditions consult GAP, p.109; 
VM, p.541#
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Two conditions refer to Liberation and the means to 
athieve it* Those factors that help one to states of meditational 
trances, e.g. 'critical investigation' ( ' vitaMca' 'critical 
analysis' (' vicara' ), 'concentration* etc., are said to he (l?)
'méditation-conditions* ('jhâna^-paccaya').^ Those factors that
4 5lead one to Liberation, and those that lead one away from it,
are referred to as (l8) * path-conditions* ( ' magga-' [Sanslcrit
' marga* ] ' paccaya' ). ^
Conditions that refer to the retribution of voluntary
actions are the (13) 'action-conditions' ( 'kamma-paccaya')^ and
(14) 'rétribution-conditions'^ (*vipâka-paccaya'). Since we shall
speak at length about ' voluntary actions' ('karma') and its
1. Sanskrit ' vitarka*.
2. Sanskrit ' dhyâna'.
3. See GAP. p.l06. * Vitakka' and 'vicara' merely prepare one to
enter into a meditation. They probably do not persist in a 
state of deep meditational trance.
£. J. 'wisdom*, 'critical investigation* etc.
5. 'erroneous views' etc.
6. See W ,  p.539.
7. See p.538; GAP.pD.10y»b)5.
8. See VM, p.538; GAP. p.l05.
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retribution in chapter v we shall not spend mors time on this topic
here. Neither shall we spend more time in elucidating the concept
of a 'rétribution-condition*, inasmuch as we shall discuss the main
implications of this concept in our elucidation of tlie (5)
'rétribution-condition* ( ' vipâka-hetu* ) of the ' Sarvâstivâdins*. ^
Both the contrary of the tenth condition,^ the (ll)
* post-nascent condition* ( ' paccha jât^paccaya* ) and the (15)
'nutriment-condition ( ' âhâra-paccaya* )^ are brought in to explain
the continued existence of things that have already come into
existence. The 'nutriment-condition* however explains especially
the upkeep of the body.
Me would like to round off the present discussion of
the conditions by pointing out the major defect of the theory of the
24 ' paccayas*, which we have already hinted at while we were
examining the 'paccayas*.
The defect consists in this that the categories of
'paccayas* are not mutually exclusive. In the case of many
1. See chapter V, pp. 22lf,240-246.
2. See pp.2(3d-20j below.
3. 1. e. the 'prenascent-condition*, see PP« 537-538.
4* Sanskrit * pascat*.
5. See p. 538.
categories of 'paccayas*, their differentiae have not been clearly 
enunciated. And the lesult of this has been that we come 
across many items which can be put with equal justification under 
more than one category. But if the items listed under one category 
can also be listed under another category, what justification 
shall we have for calling them * separate categories'? Certain 
particular categories of 'paccayas* like the ' annamanna* ('mutuality*) 
and the ' sahajata-paccaya* ('simultaneous-condition') will illustrate 
our point.
Certain items that have been conventionally listed under 
the (6) 'simultaneous-condition* (* saha jata-paccaya* ), have equal 
reasons for being listed under the (7) 'mutuality-condition*
( ' anamanna-paccaya*). The items concerned are factors like the 
four 'psychical constituents of a person*, the four 'ultimate material 
elements', and the two constituents of the 'psycho-physical 
personality* ('n â m a - r û p a ' The same is true of the 'dominating 
condition by way of object* ( ' ârammanâdhipati-paccaya')^ and the 
'decisive supporting condition by way of object* ('ârammanû- 
panissaya-paccaya*)î It would be quite possible to find objects
1. See p. 153,
2. See p.iC2, n.2.
3* See p. (61*
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which can he classified under both these categories. Similarly,
an item that has been conventionally listed under the 'prenascent-
1 2
condition* can also be listed under the 'object-condition*, the
'predominant-condition* and the 'decisive supporting-condition'.^
The items concerned are factors like the sense-organs and their 
corresponding objects.
This division of the conditions into twenty four categories 
is a catalogue of "the distinctions broadly marked out by the 
language of familiar life. It is like a division of animals into 
men, vertebrates, quadrupeds, horses, asses, and ponies.
Section iii
A Critical Analysis of the ' Sarvâstivâda* Classification of Causes 
( ' Ketus* ) and Conditions ( ' Pra-bravas* )
In the place of the twenty four conditions ('paccayas*) 
enumerated by the 'Theravada* philosophers, the 'Sarvâstivâda* philosophers 
distinguished only four conditions ( ' pratyayas*) and analysed two of 
them into six different causes ('hetus*). The four conditions
1. See p. |5»'9.
2. See pp. 15*4-
3. See p.
4. See pp. 160-61.
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(*pratyayas*) are: (l) the 'cause-condition* (' hetu-pratyaya*),
( 2) the 'immediately-antecedent-conditions* ( ' samanantara-pratyaya*), 
(3) the 'object-condition ('alamhana-pratyaya*), and the (4) 
'dominating-condition* ( ' adhipati-pratyaya*). The 'Sarvâstivâda* 
analysis of the causes and conditions is more systematic compared 
to the 'Theravada* one, in that the different categories of causes 
and conditions are mutually exclusive. This analysis does not 
contain any overlapping categories like the (21) 'presence*- and (24) 
'non-disappearance-oonditions*. Instead of multiplying the 
number of conditions in accordance with as manjr viewjpoints as 
they could discover, the ' Sarvastivadins* sometimes merged different 
connected viewjpoints into one and named one category of condition 
corresponding to it. (An example of such a category is that of the 
' simultanéeus-cause* ( ' sahabhu-hetu* ) ( see pp.|% -190below) whose
members are both s imultaneous and mutual causes of one another. In 
this category are merged the 'simultaneous-condition* and the 
'mutuality-condition* of the * Theravadins.^ As a result the 
' Sarvastivadins* arrived at a more precise classification of causes 
and conditions.
1 G9
The Four Conditions,
The (l) 'cause-condition ('hetu-pratyaya') is really a 
collective name of a group of five causes ('hetus'), namely,
' simultanéeus-cause ( ' sahabhu-hetu' ), ' homogeneous-cause'
( ' sabhaga-hetu' ), * closely associated-cause' ( ' samprayul:taka-hetu' ),
' retribution-cause' (' vipâka-hetu' ) and 'all pervading-cause'
( ' sarvatraga-hetu'),^ So the nature of this condition will become 
clear when we examine the cuases ('hetus') after our enumeration of 
the conditions. And we shall refrain from making any c omments for 
the present.
The 'immediately antecedent-conditions' (*samanantara- 
pratya^m') refer to those monen-te.ry constituents of a stream of thought 
which are irmediately followed by similar momentary constituents.
They are the antecedent mental conditions which explain the 
uninterrupted flowing of a particular stream of thou^it.
'Immediately antecedent-conditions* refer only to those 
phenomena which are immediately followed by similar phenomena. In 
fact, the Abhidharmokoéa gives the following e tjmiological explanation
1, See A ^  II, p.300. The 'general cause' ( ' kârapa-hetu') is not 
included in the 'cause-condition' (' hetu-pratyaya'). It is 
said to come under the 'dominating-condition* ('adhipati- 
pratyaya'). See ^  II, pp.307-309.
1 ? 0
of this condition!"This sort of condition ('pratyaya') is called
* samanantara-pratyaya* ^  because it gives rise to similar (* sama* )
and immediate ('anantara*) events ('dharmas*) # Now the question
arises, whether the preceding changing states of material objects
can be regarded as * immediately antecedent-conditions* of their
succeeding states? Obviously tlie * Sarvâstivâdins* want to restrict
the application of the term * immediately antecedent-condition* only
to the mental world. Yet they make use of some artificial devices
in order to achieve this result. First they try to argue that
only those states can be said to act as * immediately antecedent-
conditions* which are immediately followed by subsequent states.
In so far as there is usually a considerable lapse of time between
one state of a material object and its next changed state, the
former cannot be the * immediately antec edent-eondition* of the next
one.^ Yet sometimes there may be instantaneous changes in material
objects. For example, there may be instantaneous changes in a place
the
due to a sudden explosion. However, * Sarvâstivâdins* would not be
1. We would like to point out that literally this term means, * similar 
and immediately antecedent condition*.
2. AK. II, p.500, De La Vallée Poussin in fact translates the word
*sama* as * égaux*. But in our opinion the word * similar* brings 
out the intended meaning of the argument much more clearly than 
the word * equal*.
3. See II, pp. 300 f.
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compelled to call the state before the explosion an * immediately 
antecedent-condition,* because the condition of the place before 
and after the explosion are far from being similar. One may still 
produce examples of changes in material things which are both 
extremely rapid and similar. For example, if a man is running 
veiy fast, the different states of his body change very rapidly and 
uniformly. The * Sarvâstivâdin* may s till try to save himself by 
saying that the speed at which the different states of that man 
are changing is still much slower compared to tlmt at which one 
mental state is instantaneously replaced by another. Changes in
the mental world are really and truly instantaneous. Yet is
would not be that difficult to find examples of similar and 
instantaneous changes even in the material world! The 
* Sarvâstivâdin* will in that case be forced to say that no state 
of a material object can be called the * immediately antecedent- 
condition* simply because this name is, by definition^applied only 
to mental states that are followed by other similar mental 
states.
Another question still needs to be answered. A *dharma* 
is an * immediately antecedent-condition* if it gives rise to a 
similar * dharma*. But That determines whether a particular mental
?2
state is similar to its preceding mental state? Of course the 
simple answer that the * Sarvâstivâda* philosopher can, and should 
give is simply that one mental state is similar to its preceding 
state if they both have one identical object. Yet "üiis simple 
answer is hidden under the following intricate arguments the 
*Sarvâstivâdin* brings forward by using the * Sarvâstivâda* 
technical terminology.
One may ask, if a mental state accompanied by * critical
investigation* and * critical analysis* is followed by another which
contains none of these * concomitants*, can the former still be
regarded as the * immediately antecedent-condition* of the lattef?^
The * Sarvâstivâdin* says that the f ormer will be an * immediately
antecedent-condition* of the latter as long as the latter does not
2
contain any * feeling* contrary to that accompanying the former.
The reason is that, if the s ubsequent consciousness has a contrary 
feeling, then one can no longer be said to be conscious of the same 
object that one was conscious of before. Consequently, the 
subsequent consciousness can no longer be similar to the preceding 
one. For example, when I perceive a rose I visually have a pleasant
1# See AK. II, pp. 301 f*
2. This argument is couched in slightly different terms in the AX.
Me are here only trying to give what we think is the gist of the
argument. For the original arguments see A ^  II, p.302 f.
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feeling* If my feeling changes, if I have a painful feeling, 
then I can no longer he said to perceive the same rose*^ Thus 
if the consciousness is to be the consciousness of one identical 
object, it cannot be replaced by a contrary feeling. All these 
intricate arguments merely amount to saying that a succeeding 
consciousness is similar to its preceding one if both of them 
are consciousness of one identical object©
The * Sarvâstivâdins* believe that the last thou^it 
or consciousness (*citta*) and the last * concomitants of consciousness* 
(*caitta*) of the saint at the moment when he is liberated are not
2
the * immediately antecedent-conditions* of some other mental state.
The reason is that, since the passions of the saint, as well as his 
actions are all exhausted at this stage, no further consciousness 
and * concomitants of consciousness* are born after his last consciousness 
and its * concomitants*. But the *Sarvâstivâdins* are faced with: a 
difficulty at this stage. They apparently designated this last
1. V.hat obviously is true is that if I have a pleasant feeling
now while perceiving a rose, then this perception would not be 
the same perception of the rose if the associated feeling were 
to have changed into a painful one. V/hat is doubtful is* 
whether I can no longer be said to perceive the rose if at a 
later moment I have a painful feeling, or if I feel bored©
It may be that the rose may remind me later on of a sad occasion 
(e.g. a funeral where roses were used). I may thus be feeling 
sad while looking at the same rose that I am seeing now©
2© ^  II, pp.500, 305.
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consciousness and its * concomitants*, *mind* (*manas*).^ But 
they are supposed to have taught that one should understand by *mind* 
(*manas*) tlie consciousness which has just disappeared and which 
serves as a * point d*appui* (*âsraya*) for the following consciousness.
Now it could be urged by an . opponent that since no consciousness 
follows the last consciousness of a saint, this last consciousness 
must be called neither *mind* (*manas*) nor * immediately antecedent- 
condition*. And yet the *Sarvâstivâdins* consider it as being 
*mind* (*manas*). ^
The * Sarvâstivâdins* say in rqjly that the case is 
not really the samel * V.hat constitutes the mind ( * manas* ) is not 
activity (*kâritra*), not the actual supporting of the subsequent 
consciousness. It is (really) tlie (quality of being a * point d* appui* 
for this consciousness; that this one should be born or should not 
be born is of little importance. The last consciousness of the 
sainti3^a * point d*appui*. If a subsequent consciousness which was 
to appear, supported by this * point d*appui*, does not appear, it is 
for want of other causes necessary for its appearance. On the contrary.
1. Since the *Sarvâstivâdins* do not recognise any sut5tantial 
entity called mind, mind is analysed by them to consist only 
of consciousness and * concomitant mental phenomena’ like 
feeling, volition etc.
2. ^  II, p. 305.
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wh0-t makes a * dharma* the immediately antecedent-condition* of the 
following *dliarma’ is activity. Once this condition has conditioned 
its effect, nothing in the w orld can prevent this effect from 
coming into being. Therefore, the last consciousness of the saint 
is rightly named *mind*, and it is not an * immediately antecedent- 
condition*.^
Y*Tiat the author of the Abhidharmakosa. Vasubandiiu, is 
driving at is possibly this. Certain things receive particular 
designations solely because of certain functions they perform.
For example, if an individual is to be called a friend, he must 
perform certain acts or other (e.g. he must help the person whose 
friend he is). If on some occasions he does not help his friend we 
shall hesitate to call him a ‘friend*. As contrasted with this, 
certain things receive special designations solely because of their 
nossessin# certain qualities. T}ie possession of these qualities 
may (and does) enable them to perform certain acts as well. But 
their performance of such actions is not the only criterion for their 
receiving their special designations. As a result, we would not 
hesitate to apply these designations to them if we do not see them
1. ^  II, p. 305.
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performing these actions at certain times. For example, we
call a certain thing a table solely because it has certain qualities
(e.g. it has a particular shape). The possession of these qualities,
(i.e. the table’s being a piece of furniture consisting of a top of 
a particular shape, supported by legs of a particular shape), enables 
the table also to act as a support for other things. But even if a 
table never supports anything at any point of its whole history of 
existence, that fact will not prevent us from calling it a table.
In the same way a particular antecendent is called an
* immediately antecedent-condition' solely because of its function^ 
of projecting subsequent conscious events. If it does not always 
perform this function we can legitimately refuse to call it an
* immediately antecedent-condition*. As constra.ted with it, a ’mind* 
is called a ’mind* solely because of certain qualities. These 
qualities may enable it also to support subsequent acts of consciousness. 
But if, because of certain counteracting factors, it is prevented
from being such a support, we shall still keep on calling it a mind.
The sc ope of the (3) * ob ject-condition’ ( * âlambana-pratyaya* )
1. Admission of such a concept of ’causal functioning’ may not be 
inconsistent with the ’ Sarvâstivâda* programme of explaining 
causation solely in terms of conditioning, if the ’Sarvâstivâdins’ 
argue that the ’functioning’ simply consists in being followed by 
the relevant thing.
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is much wider compared to the ’immediately antecedent-dondition’, 
inasmuch as almost everything is described to be, e ither actually 
or potentially, an object of cognition or ’ ob ject-condition*
An ’ ob ject-condition’, which is described as that which helps a 
cognition to arise, is not just a sensation, but a sensation interpreted 
by applying a concept to it# Accordingly, visible objects, audible 
objects, smells etc# are the ’ object-conditions’ respectively, of 
processes like the visual, auditory and olfactory perceptions.
And abstract ideas (’saçijhâ*), ’ thing in itself’ ( ’ dharma’ ), ’feeling’, 
’volition’ etc. are objects of those forms of consciousness which 
are not based on the functioning of our sense-organs. Both the 
’conditioned’ (*samskrta’) and tie ’unconditioned’ (*asamskrta’)
’ dharma s* can act as ’ ob ject-conditions’.
Although the ’dharmas’ co-existing with a particular 
consciousness cannot act as ’object-conditions’ of that consciousness, 
they can very well act as its (4) ’ dominating-conditions’ ( ’ adhipati- 
pratyayas’), inasmuch as they do not constitute obstacles to the 
origin of these co-existing elements. Thus although a ’dominating- 
condition’ does not positively help the arising of another object
1. AK.II. pp.306-307. According to the ’Sarvâstivâdins’ the
’dharmas’ co-existing (’sahabhu*) with a certain consciousness are 
not the objects of this consciousness, (see AK. II, p#308). Yet the 
’Sarvâstivâdins’ would probably admit that these ’dharmas’ can be 
the objects of other consciousnesses with which these ’dharmas’ do 
not co-exist.
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or phenomenon, it nevertheless does not stand in the way of its 
coming into existence.^ This non-interference is comparable 
to the way a sovereign ( * adhipati* ), although he may not do any 
thing constructive to maike his subjects happy, may nevertheless be 
the indirect cause of their happiness by not oppressing them.
The *general-cause* ( *karapa-hetu*) which we shall discuss later,^ 
is said to be the same as this * dominating-condition.*
A *dharma* is not a * dominating-condition* of itself.
But apart from that, every * dharma* is a ’dominating-condition* of 
every other * dharma*, and has, in its turn, every other * dharma* as 
its *dominating-condition’
From what has already been said, it is evident that all 
the four conditions help the arising of mental phenomena. The 
material, and what is known in *Sarvâstivâda* philosophy as the 
* citta-viprayukta dharmas* ^  arise only due to the conditioning of the
1. à L  p.309.
2. This is the reason why this condition is called the * domina ting- 
condition*. Domination (*adhipatya*) is the characteristic of 
a sovereign (* adhipati*).
3# See pp.1%-1^3 below.
4» See p. jgg below.
3# These ’dharmas* are described by the ’Sarvâstivâdins* as non­
material. But they are not, for that matter, mental either.
Factors like origination, continuance, destruction, impermanence 
are examples of these * dharmas*. BTI. p.l63.
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’cause-condition* and the * dominating-condition* • The material 
and the *citta-vipnyukta* ’dharmas* are non-mental. As a result, 
since the * immediately antecedent-condition* and the ’ohject- 
condition* only condition mental events, they cannot condition 
the origination of material and *citta-viprayukta —  dharmas*.
Tlie Six Causes (’Hetus*)
We have so far analysed only those factors which are 
indirectly responsible for the emergence of something else. In 
the technical terminology of western philosophy these factors are 
known a s ’conditions*. All the three conditions, the ’object- 
condition*, the * immediately antecedent-condition* and the ’dominating- 
condition* explain how certain conditions can be indirectly responsible 
for the coming into existence of certain objects and events. The 
’ immediately antecedent-condition’ refers to that antecedent mental 
event which is immediately followed by other similar events. Just 
as the preceding sounds of a single tune that is being sung do not 
produce, but are only indirectly responsible for,^ the sounds following 
them at subsequent moments, so the ’immediately antecedent-condition* 
is only indirectly responsible for the subsequent happenings of similar 
mental events. An object is only one of the factors responsible for
1. I. e. they influence the player to play the next ones.
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the origination of a particular cognition. The other factors 
responsible for knowledge are, for example, the existence of 
sense-organs and the ’correlation’ of sense-organs and their 
corresponding objects. Hence an *object-condition’ cannot (by 
itself) be said to be directly responsible for any particular 
cognition. The *dominating-condition* is only a*permissive 
condition’, and as gjach it is not directly responsible for the 
emergence of anything.
As contrasted with the ’conditions’ or ’pratyayas*, the 
different causes or *hetus* represent factors that are directly 
responsible for the arising of other events or objects. One should 
not, however, interpret the words’factors that are directly 
responsible* as meaning ’factors that produce*. Instead of 
explaining every case of causation (i.e. eveiy case ?/here one thing 
is said to be directly responsible for tlie ^ origination of another), 
as a case of production, the * Sarvâstivâdins* try to explain even 
what is known as ’production* as involuntary mechanical reaction of 
a sort under certain conditions. Even production is explained by 
the * Sarvâstivâdins* as origination (* utpada’) of some elements 
depending (* pratltya*) on certain others.^ In other words, it can be
1. CCB. p.28, and AKV. ii, 4 6 ^ ^ 0  SickehbalsKy
S c .  ^  s o  V A o < ^ \ W t x . r v c K ’ s  -e-cisXt \ c V\ Y  , ' ' ; ^ * 7  0».^ b  y \ 9
\ \Y't s & 6 .
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the origination of a particular cognition. The other factors 
responsible for knowledge are, for example, the existence of 
sense-organs and the ’correlation* of sense-organs and their 
corresponding objects. Hence an *object-condition* cannot (by 
itself) be said to be directly responsible for any particular 
cognition. The * dominating-condition* is only a*permissive 
condition*, and as sjich it is not directly responsible for the 
emergence of anything.
As contrasted with the ’conditions* or * pratyayas*, the 
different causes or ’hetus* represent factors that are directly 
responsible for the arising of other events or objects. One should 
not, however, interpret the words’factors that are directly 
responsible* as meaning ’factors that produce*. Instead of 
explaining every case of causation (i.e. every case v/here one thing 
is said to be directly responsible for tlie .origination of another), 
as a case of production, the ’Sarvâstivâdins* try to explain even 
what is Imown as ’production* as involuntary mechanical reaction of 
a sort under certain conditions. Even production is explained by 
the ’Sarvâstivâdins* as origination (* utpâda*) of some elements 
depending (’pratltya*) on certain others.^ In other words, it can be
1. CCB. p.28, and AKV. ii, 46^ , I c c b ) .
S t C -  ÇO VAc.<^\Wt\TVC»^’ 3 CVx Y  ,  '^ ’7 y
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interpreted to mean only; appearance of certain events in a 
particular way in certain specific circumstances. We can use 
the example of natural phenomena like the flowing of springs to 
illustrate our point. V/e need not bring in concepts of production 
and producer in order to explain how the springs are flowing.
We could simply say that the water is flowing in the springs in 
a particular way because of the presence of certain conditions.
Such conditions are, the presence of water in a place, (due perhaps 
to the melting af a glacier), there being a slope of a particular 
nature on the hill and so on.
We have said before^ that the 'Sarvâstivâdins* analysed
the 'oause-oondition* (’heturpratyaya*) into five different causes
( * hetus* ), viz., the J  simultaneous-cause* ( * sahabhu-hetu* ),
(*sabhâga-hetu*), 'closely associated-cause*
* homogeneou3-cause*/( * samprayuictaka-hetu* ), * all pervading-cause*
( * sarvatraga-hetu* ), and * retibution-cause* ( * vipalca-hetu* ). These
five causes refer to factors that are directly responsible for the
origination of physical, mental and moral phenomena. But t h e
cause ( * hetu* ) which occupies the first place in the * Sanmstivâda*
enumeration of the causes (*hetus* )^  is a different one. This is
called the *general-cause* (*karana-hetu*). The causes (*hetus*)
1. See p. 169 above.
2. Stcherbatsky refers to this condition as * samprayulcta-hetu*. 
See CCB. p»106.
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are then altogether six. Yet the first of these causes (’hetus*) 
is not included by the * Sarvâstivâdins* in the * cause-condition*
( *hetu-pratyaya*). According to them this cause is the dominating- 
condition* ( * adhipati-pratyaya* )• Our next step in the analysis 
of the * Sarvâstivâda* theory of causation will be the critical 
investigation of the causes (*hetus*).
We shall start with the examination of the (l) * general- 
cause* ( * kârana-hetu* ).
It is a little difficult to make out what the * Sarvâstivâdins* 
actually mean by this * general-cause*. Tlie fjirst description of the 
*general-cause* in the Abhidharmakosa is; * it does not constitute 
an obstacle to tlie arising of * dharmas* that are capable of being 
bom* [* susceptibles de naître* ( * utpattimant* ) ]
It is immediately added that the * dharmas* which are 
simultaneous-causes etc. are a Iso * general-cause s’. In the words of
the Abhidharmakosa. "les * dharmas’ qui sont * sahabhû-hetu* etc. 
sont aussi *kârana-hetu* ; les autres *hetus* rentrent dans le 
* kârana-hetu*. Le *hetu* qui ne reçoit pas de nom spécial, qui 
est simplement * kârana*, * raison d'etre*, sans qualification, c'est
1. AK, H ,  p. 246#
2. As translated by De La Vallée Poussin.
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le * kârana-hetu* ; il reçoit à titre de nom particulier le nom 
qui convient à tous les *hetus*
The underlying idea is that the five causes (*hetus*) 
represent different ways in which certain objects or events 
(presuming the existence of certain other conditions) can be 
regarded as being especially responsible for the emergence of 
certain other objects or events* Now if anything is to be 
responsible in a special way, it has also to be responsible in a 
general way in the rtrst place. The species has to be a member of 
the higher class or genus in the first place, before it can be 
regarded aS representing a specification. The 'general-cause*
( * kârapa-hetu* ) is introduced by the * Sarvâstivâda* philosophers in 
order to emphasise this idea. The * general-cause* represents the 
most general way in which something may be responsible for the 
coming into existence of something else. As specifications of this
2
general way, the five causes come under the genus of *general-cause*.
The * negative condition* or the absence of counteracting 
conditions can also be regarded as an instance of the general way in 
which something may be responsible for the coming into existence of
1. ^  II, P. 246.
2. The 'general-cause* does not represent any cause different 
from the five causes, but only a genus of these five causes.
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something else. For this reason "the * general-cause' can be said 
to comprise also the negative conditions. That is why the 
'dominating-condition', which represents a negative condition is 
also said, in the Ab hi dharmako s a. ( AK. II, pp.307-8) to be the same 
as the 'general-cause'*
There is another possible reason why the two are said 
to be identical.^ Saying that 'something is in a general way 
responsible for something else', is virtually the same as saying 
’something is indirectly responsible for something else'.. Now 
properly speaking, it is only a condition ('pratyaya') that is 
indirectly responsible for the emergence of something. Hence 
a * general-cause' is really a condition. This idea is expressed 
by equating the 'general-cause* with the 'dominating-condition*, 
which is really merely a permissive condition. Identifying the 
'general-cause* vdth the 'dominating-condition* safeguards 
us from a possible misinterpretation, viz., that the cause is 
a ’producer*. The cause is, according to the * Sarvâstivâdins*, 
not a producer, but only a condition, although one with the 
qualification, viz., the 'fulfilment of which comnletes the 
tale*. V.hen this condition is fulfilled, no other condition
1. ^  II, pp.307-308.
is waited for, but the effect immediately appears.^
The * Sarvâstivâdins* say that a * dharma* cannot be
a *general-cause* of itself. But apart from that, all the * dharmas*
are *general-causes* of eveiy other conditioned (* samskpta*)
2
* dharma*.
But someone may ask, is this not too sweeping a 
statement? So many * dharmas* ^  stand in the way of the appearance 
of so many *dharmas*. For example knowledge of the * truths* ^  
prevents the appearance of any further vices in a man who did not 
know tlie * truths* before. In the same way, the light of the sun 
creates an obstacle to the manifestation of the stars.
In answer the * Sarvâstivâdins* say that the«f standpoint 
still remains valid inasmuch as the knowledge of the * truths* and 
the light of the s un do not constitute obstacles to the * dharmas* 
that are ’being bom*.^ V/hat is meant here is that the name 
’general-cause* is given to a conditioi^which does not put an 
obstacle to the coming into being of an object or event which has
5
all the conditions of its coming into existence fulfilled. In 
this sense all the conditions that are present at the moment when
1. See chapter III, pp. 130-3j
2. ^  II, p. 246.
3. See chapter H ,  p p . , section entitled, ’The Four Noble
Truths’.
4# * Utpadyamâna*, AX, II, p. 247*
5. CF. ^  II, p. 247.
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an effect comes into existence, but do not obstrict the effecife
appearance, are the ’general-causes* of the effect#
A *general-cause* is really a *dharma* that does not
constitute an obstacle to the arising of another * dharma* in spite
of its being quite capable of doing so. The case is-comparable
to that of a king, who, although powerful enough to oppress his
subjects, refrains from doing so and is c onsequently an * indirect-
cause* of the happiness of the subjects.^
The * dliarmas* then, that are capable of c onstituting
obstacles, may possibly be designated * general-causes*. But
what about those that are incapable of being obstacles? The
*Sarvâstivâdins* maintain that even such *dharmas* are *general-
causes* I ’’They are causes; for even if the sovereign is incapable
2
of harming them the villagers express themselves as we have said.
But they do not speak so about a lord who does not existi The 
underlying idea of this way of arguing is the following.
The term *general-cause* means, among other things, * a 
factor that is indirectly responsible for the appearance of an 
effect*. There are certain iThings whieh are pov/erful enough to
1. Cf. A ^  II, p. 247» This analogy is present also in the 
description of the *dominating-condition*. See p. l7Sr
2. The villagers say with respect to a powerless king who does not
oppress them; "Nous sommes heureux par le fait du maître
( * svâminâ sma^ s ukhitâ]p* ). H ,  p. 247*
3» AJC, II, p. 247*
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obstruct the appearance of an effect. If these things do not 
obstruct the appearance of the effect, then they are indirectly 
responsible for the latter and hence its *general-cause*. The
* Sarvâstivâdins* claim that the presence of even those things which 
are incapable of hindering the emergence of the effect is its
* general-cause*. They probably mean that their incapability makes 
these tilings indirect causes of the effects in the sense that, 
because of their lack of power,these things cannot prevent the 
emergence of the effect. But this would be a far-fetched meaning 
of the expression * indirectly responsible*. It maybe that the
* Sarvâstivâdins* are really trying to make the following point in 
a roundabout ?;ay.
Tliey want to show that all the factors that are present 
at the time something comes into existence are, either directly, or 
indirectly, responsible for that thing. Of course we 7/ould grant 
that the appearance of a thing is, besides being directly caused by 
certain things, also indirectly c onditioned by certain other factors.
But we usually thinlc that only a limited number of conditions are 
directly or indirectly responsible for an effect. The ’Sarvâstivâdins* 
tr^»- to show that it is not possible to restrict ourselves in this 
way in our investigation of the conditions. It is true that a 
particular effect comes into being through its dependence upon a 
particular set of conditions (both direct and indirect conditions).
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But there is a causal background from which this set of cjcnditions 
itself arises. This background itself is, in its turn, dependent 
on another causal background. All these factors are, according 
to the *Sarvâstivâdins', indirectly responsible for the emergence 
of the effect. If they did not exist and constitute, so to speak, 
a ' general background* in which the effect in question can appeap, 
the effect could not have secured its existence. In fact, these 
philosophers wanted to show that if we conducted our search for the 
conditions to its farthest limit, then we would find that nothing 
short of the condition of the whole universe at a particular 
time is in a way responsible for the appearance of an effect.
"Tous les * dliarmas* sont * kârana-hetu* a 1* égard de tous, eux«memes 
exceptés”.^ Owing to the limited scope of our thesis, it will not 
be possible to make a full enquiry^ about the truth of the 
* Sarvâstivâda* claim. But we can at least say this, that the 
range of conditions responsible for the appearance of an effect is 
in fact much wider than what we, at an uncritical level, take it to 
be.
%il e  the * general-cause* represents the general causal 
condition under which a certain 'dharma* arises, the * simultaneous- 
cause* and the following four causes (*hetus*) stand for the things
1. n, p.246. See also p.(72, n. 4.
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or events that are directly responsible for the emergence of other
things or events. The category of ’simultaneous-cause* ( * sahabhû-
hetu*) comprises all those causes whose origins are simultaneous
with those of their effects. It also stands for those objects
and events which mutually cause one another orwhich are
interdependent.^ The*four ultimate material elements* are in this
way supposed to be ’simultaneous-causes* of one another. An act
of consciousness and ’the concomitants of it* are also cited as
2
examples of ’simultaneous-causes*.
Vasubandhu refers, in this connection, to a possible 
objection by the rival * Sautrantika* school. Kust not the word 
* cause* be restricted to cases where the cause precedes the effect,
(e.g. to the case where the seed is the cause of the shoot, the
shoot of the stem and so on)? Vasubandhu gives the example of the
flame of the lamp and the light emanating from it to illustrate
the simultaneous origin of the cause and the effect.^
1. For some unknown reasons,the * Sarvâstivâdins* make one exception 
to the rule that those causes which are simultaneous with their 
effects are also caused by these effects. See AK. II, p.249#
2. AX, II, pp.248-249* According to the ’Sarvâstivâdins* any material 
object is composed of ’four ultimate material elements*. These 
elements are always associated with one another. So are’acts of 
consciousness* and their ’concomitant mental phenomena*. The
* Sarvâstivâdins* observed that the existence of any one of these 
associated elements is concomitant with that of the rest of the elements. 
The existence of the rest of these elements is also, in its turn, 
concomitant with that of t he (prmer. From tliis observation they 
concluded that each of these associated elements are interdependent,
i. e. they cause one another#
3. ^  II, p.253.
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But, the *Sautrântikas* argue^is it not possible that 
the flame of the lamp and the light emanating from it are just 
CO-effects of one identical set of preceding conditions?
Vasubandhu tries to justify his point, at this stage, by having 
recourse to the famous formula, * this being that becomes* (*asmin 
sati iday bhavati* ). He says that we could test whether a certain 
case is a case of causality by ^ p lying to it the formula, * when 
A being present B a Iso is present, and A being absent B also is 
absent, A is regarded as the cause, and B as its effect*. This 
being so, Vasubandhu argues that * if we examine the ’dharmas* 
which we have defined as simultaneous (and mutual) causes, we see 
that they all exist when one of them exists, none exists when one 
of them is missing*. Because they pass this crucial test, we 
could say that they are, therefore, simultaneous causes of one 
another^ (and not just co-effects of a common set of preceding causes).
Before we go- on to discuss the next cause (* hetu*) in 
the list of the six causes, the *homogeneous-cause* (*sabhâga-hetu* ), 
we must point out that the *Sarvâstivâdin*s view of the simultaneous
AK. II, p.254* Vasubandhu is not taking account of the fact "Wiat 
by applying the same logic one may also argt^e that what he is 
taking as simultaneous and mutual causes are really the common 
effects of a set of preceding causes. One could argue that whenever 
these preceding causes are present these simultaneous ’dharmas* are 
present, and whenever these preceding causes are absent, these 
simultaneous *dharmas* are also absent. So unless Vasubandhu can 
find out some other criterion of a causal relationship besides constant 
conjunction, he will be forced to admit a preceding set of constant 
conjuncte as the cause of these simultaneous ’dharmas*.
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origin of the causes and effects is diametrically opposed to the
»
view of the Buddhist logicians like Santaraksita and Kamalasila.
To tliem the simultaneity of causes and effects is a contradiction
in terms. Since we have already spoken at length about this,^ we
shall not spend any more time on tliis topic here.
As contrasted with the category of cause just mentioned,
the (3) *homogeneous-cause* (*sabhaga-hetu*) represents the category
of causes which always precede their effects. Besides being
distinguished from the * simultaneous-cause*, it is also distinguished
from the sixth cause, the *retribution-cause* ( *vipaka-hetu*),
inasmuch as its effect, as contrasted with that of the *retribution- 
2
cause*, is of the same nature as itself. This categoiy of 
causes is brought in to explain what is commonly known as ’homogeneous 
production* as well as the apparent continuity of a particular 
object, mental or physical. In this way, although the five
* constituents of a person* are momentary, and as a result are 
destroyed in the next moment to that in which they are bom, similar
* dharmas* arise immediately and t ake their place and give us the 
feeling that they constitute a continuity.^ Apart from the problem 
of the continuity of an object, we have to explain also the problem
1. See chapter II, p. 102.
2. See below.
3. AX, II, p.255.
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of homogeneous ’production*. We must plant rice seeds and not
something else if we want to grow rice. The ’homogeneous-cause*
explains such phenomena as * homogeneous production*.^ The
first embryonic state is also described in the AbhidharmakoAa as
being the *homogeneous-cause* of the five following embryonic states
and the five post-embryonic states namely childhood, adolescence,
2
youth, middle age and old age.
A problem confronts us immediately at this stage. Can 
we describe a ’ homogeneous-cause* as the cause of the emergence of 
an exactly similar * dharma* ? If we can, how can the first 
embryonic state be the * homogeneous-cause* of, for example, the 
state of childhood or of adolescence?
The problem can perhaps be solved in two ways. One 
could either say that the first embryonic state is the * homogeneous- 
cause* of the next embryonic state; and the second one is in its 
turn the * homogeneous-cause* of the third and so on. In this way, 
the * Sarvâstivâda* philosopher will perhaps be able to demonstrate 
a close similarity between a *homogeneous-cause* and that which it 
conditions. Yet, in spite of all that, one cannot claim that there 
is absolute identity between one embryonic state and the next. One
1. ^  II, p. 255.
2. AKt.II, p. 256.
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ha3 to admit some difference or other between the twoo Considering 
all this, it would probably be better to describe the ’homogeneous- 
cause' as that which accounts for the similarity between the otherwise 
different states of what is commonly known as the same individual 
or the same object, or that between the different individuals of one 
particular group.
It is further said in the Abhidharmakoêa that ' the 'dharmas*
belonging to a certain 'category* and to a certain * state* (*bhumi)
are causes of similar * dharmas* of the same 'category* and of the
same state. *^ The * dharmas* are classified, in the Abhidharmakoéa,
in different 'categories* (* nikayas*) according to whether they are
capable of being * abandoned* by knowledge of the * four truths* or 
2
by meditation. They are classed, on the other hand, into ten 
different 'states* (*bhumi*) in accordance with the 'different worlds 
of existence* the * Sarvâstivâdins* analysed.
Now this needs some elucidation. From the viewQpoint 
of a gradual progress towards Salvation (* Nirvâpa*) all the elements 
of life are supposed by the * Sarvâstivâdins* to "assume two different 
characters: they either are characterised by a tendency towards life.
1. ^  II, p. 256.
2. See AK, II, p. 256. "Par la vue de chacune des quatre vérités,
ou par la méditation." For an account of the 'Four Noble Truths* 
see chapter II, pp.
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commotion and turmoil,^ and then they are called ' sasrava*, i.e. 
'influenced* by passions; or they are * uninfluenced* ( * anasrava* ),
i.e. they exhibit the opposite tendency towards reduction of life, 
appeasement of commotion.... Roughly, the first set of elements 
(the *sasrava-dharmas*) correspond to the ordinary man,^ with all 
his enjoyments and bothers in life; the second make up the saint 
who....cares only for Finol D e l i v e r a n c e . T h e  'Sarvâstivâdins* 
believe that by proper knowledge^ some of the elements that tend * 
towards 'commotions* can be stopped from manifesting themselves.^ 
Every disquieting or 'demeritorious* ( * alcusala* ) * dharma* lias a 
"special antidote in the agency of wisdom; when suppressed it 
becomes an * anutpatti-dharma*, an element which never will return, 
a blank is substituted for it; this blank (* nirodha*) is called 
'cessation through wisdom* ( * pratisahkiij/â-nirodha* ). "^
1. Commotion and turmoil are equivalent to 'suffering* (* dukkha*) 
in Buddliist philosophy.
2. i.e. to the life of the ordinary man.
3. CCB. p.49.
4. I.e. knowledge of the*Four Noble Truths) knowledge that there
are no substantial souls etc.
5. This * stoppage of manifestation* is sometimes referred to as
* suppression of dharmas* ( CCB. p.^O), * abandonment of dliarmas*
(AK. H, p.256, and p. above). And it is obvious that what is 
meant is that by knowledge some of the elements can be totally 
annihilated. For example, when one realises the non-substantiality 
of things, his belief in a substantival * soul* and object, and all 
' feelings, volitions etc. connected with this belief, disappear 
completely from his mind.
6. CCB. pp.50-51*
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But only the irntD.al stages of saintliness can be 
reached by wisdom. In order to be liberated, it is not enou^ 
that one gets rid of ones wrong views and the passions associated 
with it. Even the external world should cease to exist as such 
for the liberated person. For as long as the external world 
exists, and a person is consciois of it, he may, even if he 
knows for once that there are no substantival objects in that 
world, fall back to his initial wrong views and start committing 
actions again. Since the external world as such cannot be 
eliminated, the best remedy under the circumstances is, according 
to the Buddhist philosophers, to eliminate sensations of it.
Now practical observation has mown to the * Sarvâstivâda* 
philosophers that when a certain degree of intense concentration 
is reached, certain sensations, like those of taste and smell 
disappear. These philosophers believed that witji more intense 
concentration we could reach states where even the sensations of 
sight, touch and hearing would be absent and one would cease to be 
aware of the external world as such. In accordance with this 
observation and belief the *Sarvâstivâda*, philosophers claim that 
certain * influenced* elements, i.e. sensation?, can be suppressed 
by different meditations only.
But even by suppressing the sensations one will not 
achieve the highest goal. A liberated man should cease even to
ISO
be conscious of himself* As long as he is conscious of his own
self, he is still self-centred and may engage in selfish activities.
The ’ Sarvâstivâdins' believed that with the help of mediation one
can attain a state in which even abstract ideas and consciousness
as such would disappear. This is 'Nirvâna*, absolute
annihilation of the * samskpta* (i.e. empirical) * dharmas*.
The imagination of the Buddhist philosophers constructed
different states of existence or 'different worlds' corresponding
to the different states of meditation.^ Thus they imagined a state
of existence where all sensations corresponding to matter gradually
disappear. This is referred to by them as the 'world of purified
matter*,^ in contrast to the empirical * world of matter* (in their
. 3
special terminology, the * world of desire*}. Working further on 
U})on the same principle, a higher state of existence is constructed, 
which is a purely spiritual world consisting of non-sensuous 
consciousness, devoid even of purified matter*
1. The * Sarvâstivâda* philosophers held this doctrine of the
* three worlds* in common with several other schools of Buddhism.
2. I.e. *rüpa-dhâtu*. See CCB. p.52, and I, pp. 73 and 79*
3* I* e. * kâma-dhâtu*.
4. This is usually referred to as * arüpa-dhâtu*. Sometimes this
is also referred to as * ârûpya-dhâtu*. (See for example * S-phutârthâ 
Abhidharmakosawâldivâ* . ed. Wogihara, part I, pp.255, 256;
Ëdgerton*8 Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar and Dictionary, vol.I, 
p.263*
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The * Sarvâstivâdins* believed that these states of existence can 
be entered either by rebirth in them (* utpatti*) or by méditational 
practices.
A * Dharma* that can be suppressed merely by * knowledge*
(e.g. of the * f our Truths*) is the * homogeneous-cause* of another
* dharma* that can likewise be sjappressed merely by knowledge*.
In the same way * dharmas’ that can be * abandoned* by the different 
states of meditation, are supposed to be the * homogeneous-cause* 
of ’dharmas* that can similarly be * abandoned* by different states 
of meditation. * Dharmas* belonging to different ’states of 
existence* (’bhumi*) are also described as *homogeneous-causes* 
of * dharmas* belonging to corresponding ’states of existence*
(’bhumi*).
The next cause in our scheme, the (4) * closely associated- 
cause* (*samprayuktaka-hetu* ) is described in the Abhidharroakoêa^ 
as representing only a more intense form of the interaction between
* dharmas* about which we have already spoken in the description of 
the * simultaneous-cause*. This point is made clearer in the 
Abhidharmako sa with the help of the following example. Suppose a 
group of merchants are travelling together in a caravan and protecting
1. ^  II, p. 268.
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each other from the dangers of the r oad. In this case they only 
help each other while retaining their respective individuality.
But if this group use even the same food and drink and do the same 
work together then they lose much of their previous separateness 
and become more unified. The mere mutual helping of the merchants 
is comparable to the way the various * simultaneous-causes* help 
each other. The merchants are more united when they have the same 
food and drink and do exactly the same work. This is comparable, 
according to the * Sarvâstivâdins*, to the unity which an act of 
consciousness and its ’concomitants* have when they have the same 
’point d* appui* ( * samâsraya* ), same object, and same time of 
origination^ An act of consciousness and its ’concomitants* are 
in this case said to be * closely associated-causes* of each other.
* Closely associated-causes* thus refer to mental phenomena only.
As contrasted with this,*simultaneous-causes* refer to both physical 
and mental phenomena.
Before we proceed to discuss the next cause we should 
like to make some observations about this last cause. It seems 
more plausible that the particular act of consciousness and its
1. The perception of a rose and the feelings, volitions etc.
concomitant with it can be used to illustrate the point. The 
consciousness of the rose and the feeling, volition etc. connected 
with "this consdiousness have the same ’point d*appui* Ci. e. the 
eyes). They both have the same object (i.e. the rose). They 
also arise and disappear at the same time.
’concomitants*, which are supposed to he ’closely associated-causes’
of each other, are really mere invariable associâtes of each other#
This is due to the fact that they are partly caused^ by some
common causes. Whenever we perceive a rose we also, in almost all
cases, have a pleasant feeling. But we cannot say that the pleasant
feeling causes the perception. We ought rather to say that the
perception of the rose and the pleasant feeling associated with
2
it have some causes in common. The erroneous belief of the 
’ Sarvâstivâdins’ that ’consciousness’ and its’concomitants* cause 
each other is due perhaps to their equating causation with ’constant 
conjunction’j and their insisting that the applicability of the 
formula, ’this being that becomes’, is the sole criterion of causal 
relationship.
As contrasted with the reciprocal causality exhibited 
by the ’closely associated-cause* the next two causes the ’ all- 
pervading-cause’ (’sarvatraga-hetu’) and the ’ retribution-cause’
( ’ vipaka-hetu’) are paradigm cases of unilateral causailty. The 
(5) ’ all-pervading-cause’ comprises the underlying innate passions 
(*anusayas’ which later give rise to all sorts of demeritorious
1. I.e., they both have some causes in common in addition to having 
some specific and unique causes.
2. e. g. they both originate in dependence upon the same ’point
d’appui’ or ’asraya’ (i. e. the eyes) and the same object (i.e. 
tlie rose).
3. The word ’ anusaya’ is explained as meaning ’ a bias, a proclivity, 
a persistance of a dormant or latent disposition of mind leading 
to all kinds of evil volitions’. See BTI, p.1^2.
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consciousness. It is called 'all-pervading* (*sarvatraga'), because 
unlike a *homogeneous-cause* it is not confined in its activity to 
'dharmas' of its own 'category* (* nikâya*);^ but it can give rise 
to passions and defilements belonging to other 'categories' as well.
Both the demeritorious (* akusala*) and those of the 
meritorious ( * kusala* ) 'dhaimas* which proceed from craving,^ lead 
to certain painful or pleasurable consequences. Such meritorious 
and demeritorious 'dharmas' are then said to act as ( é) * retribution- 
causes* C * vipâka-hetu* ). The 'retribution-cause* therefore refers 
to voluntary actions. Neither the 'indeterminate* (*avyakrta*)
'dharmas* nor the 'pure* ('anasrava') ' dliarmas* ‘ that are not preceded 
by craving, can act as * retribution-oauses*.
The * indeterminate dharmas* are the results of voluntary 
actions. Every fact resulting from the 'maturing process* of 
voluntary actions belongs, like the actions themselves, to the realm 
of human and animal life. But as contrasted with the voluntary 
actions which are either meritorious or demeritorious, their results 
are morally indifferent (*avyakpta*). As natural outcomes of
1. See pp. 103
2. ^  II, p. 269.
3* Even meritorious 'dharmas* may proceed from craving or aspiration,
inasmuch as people may act in accordance with their aspiration for
earning merit or for going to heaven. And such actions are 
normally considered to be meritorious actions.
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antecedents, they are completely foreshadowed by these antecedents, 
and hence arrive completely involuntarily. Only a voluntary 
action can be morally good or bad, and can lead to retributoiy 
results. But the phenomena resulting from voluntary actions 
are involuntary happenings, resembling to a large extent certain 
natural processes like the flowing of springs. Like the flowings 
they are, as it were,merely mechanical reactions of a sort under 
certain conditions (see p.l2l). Just like the flowihg of springs, 
such involuntary results can neither be called good nor bad, and 
can lead to no moral conseuqences either. The 'pure* ( * anasrava* ) 
'dharmas* are not causes of retribution inasmuch as they are not 
preceded by craving.^
The word * vipaka* (*vi* + *pac* = to cook, to mature, 
to ripen) can stand either for a 'state* or for an 'operation*.
It can either mean a state that is the result of an operation,
* vipâlca*, or an action which matures or 'ripens* ( * vipacyate* ). ^
A ’retribution-cause* thus either means a cause of the 'matured state* 
or an action which matures into a particular effect.
The prefix * vi* of the ?;ord * vipâka* implies 'difference*.
And a cause is called 'vipâka-hetu* because its effect is different
1. ^  n, pp. 271-272.
2. ^  II, p. 271.
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in nature from itself,^ There are many reasons why the effect is
said to be different in nature. To start with, the cause itself
is either meritorious or demeritorious, whereas its effects lack
any moral character. Moreover, there is no confonnity between
the cause and the effect as regards number. One single cause
may be the cause of many effects.
Neither is tliere any symmetry between the cause and
its effect as regards time. It can happen that the retribution
of an action belonging to one single period of time (*ekadhvika*)
can last three periods of time (*traiyadhvika*); but it is not true
conversely. The retribution belonging to one single period of
time cannot be the result of an action belonging to three periods 
2
of time.
Ydiat is meant is probably the following: I may at
present reap i±ie consequences of an action committed by me in the 
past. I might have reaped the consequences of that action in the 
past as well (i.e. at the same time as the action was committed).
I may have to reap the consequences of that action even in the future. 
As contrasted with this, if I am reaping some consequences at the 
present, then this consequence may be the result of actions committed
1. ^  II, p. 272.
2. ^  II, pp. 274-275*
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in the past* It may also he the result of present actions*
But it cannot he the result of future actions. Actions 
committed in the future cannot he said to determine the present 
state of affairs.
Difficulty connected with identifyin.p: the * karana-hetu* with the
' adhipa ti-nra t.va'^’a *
Before we finish the discussion of the six causes and 
the four conditions we must point out a difficulty that arises as a 
result of identifying tlie ’ general-cause* ( * karapa-hetu* ) with 
the * dominating-condition* (*adhipati-pratyaya*).
The 'cause-condition* (*hetu-praiyaya*) is divided by 
the 'Sarvâstivâdins* into five different causes ('hetus'):
* simultaneous-cause* (* sahabhu-hetu* ), 'homogeneous-cause* ('sabhaga- 
hetu*), * closely associated-cause* (*samprayuktaka-hetu*), *all- 
per^ding-cause* (* sarvatraga-hetu* ), and 'retribution-cause*
(* vipâka-hetu* Yet, surprisingly enough, one of the dauses
('hetus') which, according to the 'Sarvâstivâdins*, tops the list 
of the causes ('hetus'), the 'general-cause' ( * karana-hetu), is 
not included by them in the 'cause-condition* (*hetu-pratyaya*).
1. ^  II, pp. 274-275.
2. See p. )%|.
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On the contrary, this is said to he identical with the 
* dominâting-condition* ( *adhipati-pratyaya')i We have already 
suggested^ the possible reason which led the 'Sarvâstivâdins' to 
identify it with the * dominating-condition' (*adhipati-pratyaya*)•
But one question still remains unanswered. If this * hetu*
(cause) does not come under the genus * hetu-pratyaya* ('cause- 
condition'), why call it a * hetu* (cause)? Call it anything else: 
call it an *adhipati-pratyaya* (*dominating-condition* ) if you like.
But why 'Hetu* ('cause*)? If, on the other hand, we try to 
save the * Sarvâstivâdins* by saying that what they really meant to 
say (as opposed to what they ejqplicitly said), is that it comes 
under both the * hetu-pratyaya* ('cause-condition') and the * dominating- 
condition* ( *adhipati-pratyaya*), then the 'pratyayas* (conditions) 
will not be mutually exclusive and this defect will make the foundation 
of the theory of the 'hetus* ( causes^ and * pratyayas* (conditions) 
very weak.
Section IV
Is there Anythin# in Buddhist Causal Theories Corresponding to Mill's 
Insistence that the Causal Sequence Must be Unconditional?
We have already seen that Kill and the different schools
1. See pp.
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of Buddhism were unanimous in explaining the causal relation simply 
as the relation between a set of conditions and the conditioned.
The *Sarvâstivâda* school comes closer to Kill than 
any other school of Buddhism in maintaining that the entire set of 
causal conditions invariablycontains, besides the 'positive 
conditions', some 'negative conditions' as well#^ 'Negative
conditions' are introduced by the *Sarvâstivâda* philosophers by 
their concepts of * dominating-condition* and ' general-cause',
Now causal relations were, in the first place, explained 
by Kill as consisting of unvarying successions between sets of 
antecedent conditions and phenomena consequent vq>on them# But the 
question is, is this account of causation in terms of the unvarying 
sequence of events of a given kind, given certain complex sets of 
positive and negative conditions, a sufficient one? V/ould every 
case of unvarying sequence then qualify as a case^ of causation?
Y.e have seen how Kill saved himself from the incongruity of treating 
any arbitrary sequence of phenomena as a causal sequence with the 
introduction of the concept of 'unconditional sequence'# In orderto
1. Both the 'Sarvâstivâda' and the ' Theravada' schools share Kill's
opinion that the effect can, in some cases, be considered to
come into existence at the same time as the cause# The
'simultaneous'- and 'closely associated-causes'of the 'Sarvâstivâda' 
school and the 'simultaneous'- and 'closely associated-conditions' 
of the ' Theravâda' school provide examples of such simultaneous 
origin of causes aid effects.
2. See pp. I77f ,/82f.
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qualify as a causal sequence, a sequence must be, besides being 
unvarying, unconditional as well.
Buddhist philosophers also analysed causal relations 
as relations of constant conjunction or unvarying sequence. Did 
they have recourse to any device in order to save themselves from 
the incongruity of admitting any arbitrary sequence or conjunction 
as a case of causation? As far as we know, only the causal 
theory of Sâhtarakgita and Kamalaéîla, out of all the theories 
w'e have reviewed so far, did explicitly invent such a device.
Yet that device does not seem to be the introduction of the concept 
of unconditional sequence •
In the Tattva-eahrraha-nan.lika (p. 180) KamalasHa
writes; *T/e do not say that mere immediate sequence is the basis
of the cause-effect relationship.... V/hat we mean is that one thing
is to be regarded as the cause of another when the latter is found
to appear in succession to former only and never vrithout it.^
Smoke is not seen to follow the presence of animals like cows and
2
horses only. It appears even in their absence.* In this way
1. Assuming of course that tliere is no such thing as a plurality
of causes* Buddhist philosophers like Sântaraksita and Kamalasila 
did not discuss the possibility whether the same effect can be 
caused by different causes on different occasions.
2. "I'la hi vayam ânantarya-mâtram kârya-kârana-bhavâdhigati 
nibandhanagi bruma];i. • • Tathâhi, yasyaivânantaram ya bhavati tat 
tasya karapam igyate. Na ca dhume gavâde^ eva anantaram bhavati, 
asati api gavadau tasya bhâvât. ” Cf. Jha* s translation of the
Tattvasahrraha-pan.ilka, pp.309-310* See also chapter II, p*(|iJ,Tî.Jt
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Kamalsîla tries to show that although smoke is seen in many cases 
to accompany the presence of certain animals, yet it is not caused 
by their presence, inasmuch as it appears even in the absence of 
these animals.^
It seems then that both Kill on the one hand and 
Santarakpita and Kamalasila on the other, did have reco urse to 
different devices in order to avoid the incongrui'ty-of admitting 
every case of unvarying sequence as a case of causation. But the 
devices concerned were different in the two cases. In Kill’s 
case the device consisted of the introduction of the concept of 
* unconditional sequence*. Sântraksita and Kamalasila however 
avoided the incongruity by insisting that only in that case can an 
antecedent be a cause, when the consequent never arrears vâthout 
the antecedent.
Section V
Can Russell* s View of Causation be Compared with the Buddhist views?
So far v;e have compared different Buddhist theories of 
causation with the causal theories of some British empiricist 
philosophers who have denied causal efficacy or operation. Now
1. See chapter II, pp. IIM-JIS*.
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causal operations were also denied by Bertrand Bussell. Observing 
this, Stcherbatsky wanted to compare Buddhist theories of causation 
with Russell*3 interpretation of causal laws as well. We shall 
see to what extent such a comparison is feasible.
Stcherbatsky tried to compare the Buddhist analysis of 
causal relations, especially as it is introduced by Sântaraksita . 
and Kamalasila, with Russell* s analysis of causal relations in terms 
of * functional interdependence*.^ V/e are, however, doubtful about 
the extent to which such a comparison is feasible, because formulae 
expressing * functional interdependence’ do not provide us with any 
clue whatsoever by means of which we can distinguish the cause from 
the effect. Buddhist analyses of causal relations are however, 
at least in the majority of cases, based on a clear distinction 
between a cause and an effect.
2
In the essay, * On the Notion of a Cause*, Russell 
pointed out that the traditional presentation of the concepts of 
cause and effect is beset with numerous difficulties. He therefore 
recommended the replacement of the traditional concept of causation 
by that of * functional dependence*.
1. See vol.I, pp.119, 142, 145*
2. Published in Mysticism and Boric, pp. 132-151 «
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He remarked that the concepts of cause and effect 
play no part in the theoretical sciences like physics. "In the 
motions oi mutually gravitating bodies", for example, "there is 
nothing that can be called a cause, and nothing that can be called 
an effect; there is merely a formula. Certain differential 
equations can be found, which hold at every instant for every 
particle of the system, and which, given the configuration and 
velocities at one instant, or the configurations at two instants, 
render the configuration at any other earlier or later instant 
theoretically calculable. That is to say, the configuration at 
any instant is a function^ of that instant and the configurations 
at two given instants. This statement holds throughout physics... 
Russell suggested that the pattern of the physicist’s analyses should 
be extended to every field of study which deals with the notions of 
cause and effect. Instead of speaking, for example, of one event 
causing another, we should only speak of calculating the state of 
a system at any one time in terms of its state at any other time 
with the help of certain differential equations. Russell said that 
since the essential function that causality is supposed to perform 
is that of enabling us to infer the future from the past, or to
1. Russell is using the word ’function’ here in its mathematical sense. 
In the mathematical sense a function expresses a correspondence 
between two variables such that for eveyy value of tie one there 
are one or more determinate values of the other.
2. Mysticism and Locic. p.li+l*
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infer events at any time from events at certain assigned times, we 
can therefore easily replace the notion of causal relations by 
that of ’deterministic systems’* And he defined a ’deterministic 
system’ in the following way:
"A system is said to be ’deterministic’ when, given 
certain data, e^ , e^,...., e^ , at times t^ , t^..*•••, t^ 
respectively, concerning this system, if 3^ is the', state of the 
system at any time t, there is a functional relation of the form
t^ ®^1’ V  ^2*..' V V
The system will be ’deterministic throughout a given period’ if 
t, in the above formula, may be any time within that period, **V^
We can, with regard to a ’deterministic system’, 
therefore, infer the value of any of its states at a particular 
time in terms of the values of its states at certain other 
assignable times.
Now we must make an important observation with regard 
to the relation of ’functional ( inter-)dependence’• The relata 
of such a relation are really interdependent. One of them depends 
on the other in the same way in which the other depends on it.
Both of them are, in this sense, exactly equal. We have, in that 
case, no way of telling which one of the two relata is the cause and
1. Mysticism and Lopûc. p. 145*
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which one the effect. However, Buddhist interpretations of 
causal laws are, at least ih the majority of cases, free from such 
a difficulty. According to Sântaraksita and Kamalasila, the 
effect comes into being depending on a set of conditions which 
have preceded it in an unvarying way. A cause is thus a collective 
name of a group of conditions which are unvaryin^y followed by an 
entity called the effect. A cause is thus that which precedes, and 
the effect, that which succeeds.
Philosophers of tlie ’ Sautrantika' school also insisted 
that causes must, in all cases, precede their effects.^ The 
’Theravadins' and the 'Sarvâstivâdins* however say that although 
the effect mostly succeeds the cause, yet in some cases it must be 
admitted to come into existence at the same time as the cause.
Cases of the simultaneous beginning of causes and effects are 
exhibited by the 'simultaneous*- and * closely associated-conditions* 
of the * Theravâda* school and the ’simultaneous*- and ’closely 
associated-causes’ of the ’ Sarvâstivâda’ schools. Only the 
relationships exhibited by these ’simultaneous’- and ’closely
1. See p. 1^ 0 above. According to the ’ Sautrântikas* causes
precede their effects and do not continue to exist when the 
effect appears. The past is unreal; it does not exist at the 
present.' Since the cause precedes its effect, it must be 
unreal or absent at the present. See A.Bareau’s Les Sectes 
Bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule, p. 157, thesis 10 etc.
313
associated—conditions* and ’causes* can be compared to relations of 
’functional interdependence’ in the Russellian sense. Causes 
cannot, in these cases, be marked out as those factors which precede 
their effects.
Causal theories developed by most Buddhist schools do 
not thus have any parallel to Russell’s interpretation of causal 
laws as laws of functional interdependence. Only the analysis of 
-Some causal relations made by the ’Theravadins’ and ’Sarvâstivâdins’ 
can be compared to Russell’s analysis of causal laws as laws of 
’functional interdependence*.
But we must admit that both Russell and the school 
represented by Sântraksita and Kamalasila share certain criticisms 
of ii:e popular notions of a cause. Both Russell and this school 
of philosophers have argued against the ordinary notion of causal 
’operation’ Both have also argued that the ordinary notion of 
causation is fraught with anthropomorphic ideas. Russell, for 
example, pointed out that the idea of a causes’s compelling üie 
effect appears to have arisen from the assimilation of causes to 
human volitions. In his own words, "any s et of circumstances is 
said to c{pmpel A when A desires to do something which the circumstances
1. For Russell see Mysticism and Loyic. p. 139, "The mistake in this 
maxim consists in the supposition that causes ’operate’ at all". 
For the Buddhists see Cliapter II, pp. |03~)U.
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prevent, or to abstain from something which the circumstances 
%
cause." V/e have also seen how Sântaraksita and Kamalasila have 
warned us against holding such ideas as the cause* s grabbing hold 
of the effect like a pair of pincers and then 'working* on it.^
But inspite of these points of resemblance, the difference between 
Russell* s interpretation of causal laws and that of the Buddhists 
is too great to be ignored.
1. Mysticism and Logic, p.138.
2. See Chapter II, p. 102.
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CHAPTER V
REMARKS ON THE THEORY OF THE * TV/ELVE-MEKBERED DEPETJDENT
ORIGINATION*^
We have so far seen how the tendency to deny concepts
like causal efficacy and production constituted a salient feature
2
of theories of causation held by some Buddhist logicians. We have also
seen how some early Buddhist schools tried to explain causal connections
without introducing any such coneJ>ts as production and efficacy.^
4
With the help of their formula * this being, that becomes*, they 
tried to analyse every causal process operating in the physical and 
mental world in terras of 'conditions* and * that which they condition*.
The doctrine on which such typically Buddhist analyses of causation 
are based is known in Buddhist circles as the 'doctrine of dependent 
origination* ('pratîtya-samutpâda). But Buddhist philosophers of every 
school also spoke of another aspect of their special 'doctrine of 
dependent origination* which is known among Buddhist thinkers as the 
'doctrine of the twelve-membered dependent origination'.^ In this 
chapter we shall try to demonstrate that the origin of the idea that
1. 'Bvâdasânga-pratltyasamu tpada'.
2. See chapter II, pp*3^'i23.
3* See chapter IV, pp.
4, 'Asmin sati idam bhavati'.
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the pivotal point of causation is not the concept of production , 
hut merely that of necessaiy and sufficient conditions , can he 
traced in its rudimentary form even in this 'doctrine of the twelve- 
memhered dependent origination*.
Of course we are not suggesting that denial of the concepts
of production and efficacy are as clearly formulated in the 'doctrine
the
of/ twelve-memhered dependent origination* as it is in the analyses of 
causation^ referred to ahove. In fact, concepts like cause ('hetu'), 
producer ('janaka*), condition ('pratyaya*, 'paccaya*), * jatika*
('descending from*), origination ( * samudaya*, * prahhava*, * pahhava*)^ 
were used indiscriminately in ancient Buddhist texts in discussions of 
the significance of the * twelve members* ( * nidanas* ), as if there 
was no difference at all between them.^
But although concepts of production and efficacy were 
not explicitly denied in the logical analyses of the 'twelve-memhered 
dependent origination* yet the following points must he considered with 
regard to such analyses.
The relationships between each 'member* of the 'twelve- 
memhered dependent origination* and its immediately succeeding or 
preceding 'member* are analysed, in the various works in which the
1. See p ,214'
2. Throu^out this chapter we shall tiy (when necessary) to give
both the Sanskrit and the Pâli terms used in Buddhist literature.
The Pâli term will always succeed the Sanskrit one.
3. See Keith's Buddhist Philosophy, p.97; Thomas* Buddhist Thought.
p.58; DN, II, 57; M ,  P*30.
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doctrine is enunciated, as causal relationships. Yet if we scrutinise 
the relationships concerned deeply enough, we shall find that most 
of these relationships can he represented more easily as the relationship 
hetA'een the necessaiy and sufficient condition and that which they 
condition, rather than as the relationship between the producer and the 
produced. This shows very clearly that the relationship between the 
cause and the effect was, in some places at least, conceived by 
ancient Buddhist philosophers on the pattern of the condition and the 
thing conditioned.
Of course the relationship between one or two 'members* 
and their immediately succeeding or preceding * member* may, at least 
at the outset, be comparable to the relationship between the producer 
and the produced as well. But then there are two alternative 
possibilities.
It is possible that the Buddhist philosophers concerned 
were using the term 'cause* to mean both^ a 'condition* and a 'producer*. 
In that case they might have actually referred sometimes to a condition 
and at other times to a producer while talking about a 'cause*.
Alternatively, it is quite possible that althou^ the 
relations between some 'members* apparently resembled relations between
1. Not at the same time of course. But they may have used the term 
'cause* sometimes to mean a 'condition* and at other times to 
mean a 'producer*.
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a producer and the product, yet the Buddhist philosophers really meant^ 
even by these relations merely connections between the conditions and 
the conditioned. This is very likely to have happened if a 'producer- 
cause* was analysable in Buddhist philosophy, in general, in terms of 
a condition or a group of conditions. Buddhist philosophers might 
even have used words in these contexts which apparently signify 
'production* and 'producer*. Yet is is quite likely that, they meant 
by these words * appearance of things under certain conditions* and 
'condition*. If a is in fact analysable as really being b,, then we 
may sometimes^ use the word * a* while really meaning *b*. For example, 
we may, on some occasions, talk about * salt* while really meaning
* sodium chloride*. In this way, the Buddhist philosophers might really 
have meant 'condition* and * appearance of things under certain conditions* 
by the use of the words which apparently mean * producer* and ' production*.
If the first alternative alone is true, we can no longer 
make the stronger claim that the relation between each member of the
* twelve-membered dependent origination* and its immediately following or
1. As opposed to what they explicitly said.
2. We shall, towards the e nd of this chapter, consider some reasons 
why we think that it is quite likely that a * producer* was so 
analysed in Buddhist philosophy*
3* If we have been habituated to using the word *a* in our day to 
day conversation for a long time.
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preceding 'member*^ is a relation between the condition and the
conditioned. Yet this does not prevent us from making the weaker
claim that the term 'cause* has at least in some contexts been
understood by Buddhist philosophers to refer to a condition in the
logical analyses of the * twelve-membered dependent origination*. Even
if the first alternative alone were true, we can, on the basis of that
alternative alone, hope to show that the rudiments of the analysis of
causation in terms of conditioning, rather than in terms of production
can be traced in the 'doctrine of the twelve-membered dependent
origination*. But we have grounds for believing, as we shall show 
2
later, that even the second alternative can be true. And if the 
second alternative were true, then that would strengthen our claim 
that the outlines of the theory of analysing causation in terms of 
conditioning can be found in the * doctrine of the twelve-membered 
dependent origination*. In what follows, we shall first attempt an 
analysis of the relationship between most 'members* of the * twelve- 
membered dependent origination* and their putative effects as that 
between the necessary and sufficient conditions and the conditioned. 
After that we shall state the reasons why we think that it is quite 
likely that even the second alternative is true.
1. I.e. between each * member* that is supposed to be the cause and 
that which is supposed to be the effect.
2. See 263^•
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Before going on to demonstrate how we can analyse the
relations between the majority of the twelve 'members* and their
immediate successors as those between the necessary and sufficient
conditions and the conditioned, we have to answer two preliminary questions.
First, what do we exactly mean by necessaiy and sufficient conditions?
Secondly, what does the 'doctrine of the twelve-membered dependent
origination* really signify?
As regards the first question, since we shall speak of
necessaiy and sufficient conditions at some length in a later chapter,^
we shall only make a few necessaiy remarks here. Some factor is a
necessaiy condition of another if the latter cannot exist without the
former. A factor is a sufficient condition of another if the
existence of the former inevitably implies the existence of the latter.
In the words of Professor A. J.Ayer, "What is meant by saying that a is
a sufficient condition of b is that however the c ire un stances are varied,
other than those whose constancy is tacitly implied, a would not occur
without b* s also occurring; while what is meant by saying that it is a
necessaiy condition of b is that b would not occur without it. But from
this it immediately follows that if a is a sufficient condition of b, b
is a sufficient condition of a; and if either one is a necessaiy and
2
sufficient condition of the other, the relationship is reciprocal."
lo See cL.Vl) pp 273-74
Tbe
2. /TTbblem of Knowledge. A. J.Ayer, pp. 171-172, Pelican Series.
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Section 1
Sigrnificance of the 'Doctrine of the Twelve-membered 
Dependent Origination*
As regards the second question, there is controversy among 
Buddologists about the final import of the 'doctrine of the twelve- 
membered^ dependent origination*. Y^ hile some scholars try hard to find 
in it an explanation of the origin or evolution of the cosmos^ (or 
'existence*) others try to limit its explanatory force only to the 
analysis of the origination of * suffering* ( ' duKkha*,M?5.l’.
The view tliat the * doc trine of the twelve-membered 
dependent origination* is concerned with human suffering^ is widespread 
among prominent Buddhologists. Oltramare, for example, is of the
1. In fact, there is controversy even about whether there were actually 
•b.?elve 'members* or * nidanas* in the original formulation of this 
classical 'doctrine of the twelve-membered dependent origination*.
For an account of other versions which put the number of the'members 
down to less than twelve see Conze* s Buddhist Thou^t in India.
p. 157* See also note 1 of p.2%^.present chapter.
2. Cf. R. C. Childer* s article in Life and Essays of HoT. Colebroolce. Vol. 
H,  p.454)# Eugene Bumouf (introduction a 1*histoire du Bouddhisme 
Indien, p.466 f.) sees the whole doctrine as an attempt to explain the 
successive causes of the process by which phenomenal 'being* evolves 
from * non-being*. Another scholar, M.Kern (Manual of Indian Buddhism. 
p.47 f.) believes that the doctrine is based on various ancient 
cosmogonic myths, describing poetically the destruction and creation 
of the world.
5. Or, for that matter, of human life in itself, inasmuch as it is
vitiated with * suffering* or * unrest't Some Buddhologists, e. g. M. 
Oldehberg ( Buddha, p. 254 f#) are of tlie opinion that the doctrine 
concerns not only the present life of the individual, but also his 
past life and past actions of which the present life is a result, and 
also the future" life which evolves from the present life. We agree 
with this view. [See p.211 note 1 below.]
* Etch^batoky translated 'duhkha» as 'unrest' in CCB^n*l‘’4g,53 ,
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opinion that the Buddha's aim in formulating this doctrine was not to 
explain the origin of life hut only human suffering, and of explaining 
it thus without introducing a so-called permanent 'self or God.^
After these brief remarks about the significance of the 
'doctrine of the twelve-membered dependent origination* we shall 
introduce a short explanation of the twelve 'members', in order to 
elucidate our view that the relationship between most of these * members* 
and its following or preceding * member* is that of necessaiy and 
sufficient conditions and that which they condition •
The full significance of the 'doctrine of the twelve-membered 
dependent origination* can be summed up in the form of the two following 
propositions;
1# *(a) Individual suffering. ( * duhkha* ) is due to
(b) individual actions, ('karma').'
2. *(b) Individual actions are due to, or arise under the influence of
(c) 'infections*^ (*kle§a*).*
1. Oltramare ( see PBDC. pp. 28-29) said that it appears from the 
doctrine that the Buddha wanted to say that suffering was evolving 
in abstracto by the causal process initiated by ignorance [see pp. 
for the meaning of * ignorance* ( * avidyâ* ).]
2. At the veiy beginning of our introduction to these twelve 'members*
or 'nidanas* we shall mostly use the word 'cause* instead of
'necessary and sufficient conditions*. We shall come to use the 
terms 'necessary and sufficient conditions* more vigorously when 
we actually come to our analysis of the members as 'necessary and 
sufficient conditions*.
3. * Infection* ('klesa') is used here as a generic term implying both
'ignorance* ('avidyâ*, , 'avijjâ') of the real nature of things and
craving or passion ('tr^nâ*, *taphi*) which is aroused in individual 
human beings as a result of their putting wrong values to objects 
due to ignorance.
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Now, the argument which we have put forward in a nut­
shell with “the help of the two propositions mentioned ahove can he 
further analysed in greater detail for the sake of clarity. And this 
detailed analysis of this argument can be expressed in the form of twelve 
separate propositions.^ Before going on to enunciate the 'doctrine of 
the twelve-membered dependent origination* in the form of these twelve 
propositions, it is necessaiy to make a few explanatoiy remarks about 
the detailed analysis of the twelve'members*.
1* There is a difference of opinion among Buddhologists about whether 
the doctrine that is traditionally known as the 'doctrine of the 
twelve-membered dependent origination* really represents the form 
in which the Buddha taught it. Some think that the original 
doctrine taught by the Buddha contained only a few of the twelve 
'members* that tradition has handed down to posterity. They think 
that the doctrine in its traditional form (implying past, present, 
and future life) is only the result of later Scholastic (both
* Theravâda* and * Sarvâstivâda*) interpretations. ( See Conze* s 
Buddhist Thou^rht in India, p. 15?) According to Conze, originally 
the doctrine had nothing to do with rebirth* The basis of his 
argument is the fact that in a very large number of formulations 
of the doctrine in archaic Buddhist works four of the twelve 
members, which are essential for making the formula refer to re­
birth, are missing (see BTI. p*157). For a detailed account of 
such variations in the enumeration of the twelve 'members* see IC. 
197-9; III, 70-72; Oltramare pp.27-3^ Y/e shall assume, for
the sake of explanatory convenience, that the formula has reference 
to successive lives. Besides, the opinion of scholars like Con^e 
contradicis completely the forceful argument behind the remarks of other 
very eminent Buddhologists like Mrs. C.A.F.Rhys Davids. Cf. "In the 
central links we have the wo iking of, the process of sentience, 
culminating in the central links —  sense-feeling-desire- and 
representing fresh ebullition, a new source of causal force reaching 
on into next birth. There its resultant is renewed sentience, 
eventually again to be darkened by the inevitable di seas e-dec ay-de a th- 
a centre of effects in sentience due to causes in the past". 
(Encyclopedia of ReUjgjon and Ethics, vol^, 673 b). Mrs. Rhys Davids 
does not think that the rebirth-orientated doctrine is necessarily of 
later origin. See also Keith's Buddhist Philosophy, pp.97-98. See 
also n.1,p.2:i0iu this connection.
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In order to make the doctrine more intelligible the present 
life of the individual was analysed by Buddhist philosophers into 
greater detail# The present life is analysed first in the f o m  of 
prenatal existence (in the form of a foetus in the mother's womb) 
comprising an amalgam of 'consciousness* (' vijnana*; vinnana*), a 
'psycho-physical complex* in the rudimentary fonn (*nâma-rüpa*), and 
the formation of the organs of sense ( * sa^yatana*, * sa^ayatana* ).^
The present life is then analysed in its post-natal stage as consisting 
of (a) the * functioning of perceptual (and conceptual) processes*
( * sparâa*, * phassa* ) ; (b) the consequent * craving* ( * tpspa*, * tanhS* ) 
of the individual (growing out of 'feelings* (*vedana*) of pleasure, 
pain etc#) for objects (perceived and conceived); aixL (c) lastly, as 
committing of further actions ('karma*, *kamma*) by the individual 
under the influence of * grasping* ( * upâdâna* ) after desired objects.
The future life evolves as a consequence of such actions (committed 
under the influence of * ignorance* ). The future life is then analysed 
in two aspects; (a) 'birth* (*jati*), and (b) * aging + death* (* jarâ- 
marapa*). The present life of the individual and its retributory
1. Sometimes 'ça^Jâytana* ('salayatana* ) is interpreted as
referring to that stage of the sensiS-organs when they are 
perfectly developed in a man, but have not yet started to 
function. In tiiat sense,' the 'sadâytanas* ( *sa!J.âyatanas*) . . 
would refer to^the se.'se-organs of the post-natal stage. '■ 
' (See MaCf overn, A Î of EuddlT^ ’ vt I hilosophy. p. 173.)
i i , : I . (
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principles could, not, however, appear inside the arena of the ever- 
revolving and ever-flowing c y d e  of existence at all unless these are, 
in their turn, conditioned hy two principles, * ignorance* (* avidyâ*) 
and voluntaiy actions* (’samaras*) committed hy the individual in 
his past life. The twelve members of the archaic formulations of 
•tlie * doctrine of dependent origination* are then: (l) * Ignorance*
(*a\ddya*, * avi jjâ* ), (2) * voluntary actions* ( * saraskaras*, * sankharas* ),
(3) * consciousness* (* vijhâna*, * vihhâna*), * psycho-physical complex*
( * nâma-rûpa* ), (5) * sense-organs* ( * sadayatana*, * saj-âyatana* ), (6)
* perception* ^  (* sparsa*, *phassa*), (7) * feeling* ( * vedana) (8)
* craving* (*trspa*, * tanhâ* ), (9) * grasping after desired objects*
(* upâdâna*), (lO) * actions committed in the present life*, or * commencement 
of the principle of present life* or, more briefly, * becoming* ( * bhava* ), 
(11) * birth* (present) (*Jati*), (l2) * aging and death* ( * jarâ-marana* )@
We are now in a position to put the argument behind the archaic 
formulations of the * doctrine of the twelve-membered dependent 
origination* in the form of twelve propositions in the following way.
oi
lA & IB, We prefer translationc/■ • sparsa* and * vedana* as * perception* 
and * feeling* in this context. Seefp.ii3-A "below in .this 
. connection®
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The order in which we have presented these propositions 
corresponds to the order which is traditionally referred to in 
Buddhist texts as the ‘reverse order* (*pratiloma desana*) of 
the teaching of the ‘doctrine of the twelve-membered dependent 
origination*. The usual order in which the doctrine is 
presented in Buddhist texts is known as the * s t r a ^ ^  #rd#r* 
C‘anuloma desana*), Cf, JEAS. vol.37, article, ‘Formulation 
of Pratrtva-samutnada* ^  B . C . Lav;. ,
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(i) Life is permeated with (l2) (suffering, especially in the form 
of) * a/dn^ and death* •
(ii) The necessaiy and sufficient condition of (12) (suffering, especially), 
‘afirinp: and death* is (ll) *hirth*.
(iii) The necessary and sufficient conditions of (ll) *hirth* are (lO) 
‘actions committed in the previous life* or ‘becoming*.
(iv) The necessary and sufficient condition of (lO) ‘actions committed 
in the previous life* or ‘becoming* is (9) ‘grasping after desired 
objects* ®
(v) The necessary and sufficient condition of (9) * grasping* is (8)
* craving*.
(vi) The necessary and sufficient condition of (8) * craving* is (7) 
‘feeling*.^
(vii) The necessary and sufficient, condition of (7) ‘feeling*^  is 
(6) ‘perception*
(viii)The necessary and sufficient conditions of (6) ‘perception* are 
the (5) * sense-organs*.
(ix) The necessary and sufficient condition of (5) * sense-organs* is the 
existence of a ( 0  * psvcho-phYsical complex*.
(x) The necessary and sufficient condition of the existence of the
(v) ‘psvcho-phvsical complex* is the existence of (3) * consciousness*
1, An ignorant person will either crave for pleasant feeling or desire 
to get rid of or hate painful feelings.
2A & 2B. See notes lA and IB, previous page.
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(or conscious impressions which survive the physical death of 
an individual and become the necessary and sufficient condition 
of a next individual life).
(xi) The necessary and sufficient condition of (3) * consciousness* is 
( 2) * voluntary actions* •
(xii) The necessary and s ufficient condition of (2) *voluntarv actions* 
is (1) * Ignorance* .
Before going on to demonstrate the relation between each
* member* of the 'doctrine of the twelve-membered dependent origination* 
and its preceding or succeeding one^ as that of a necessaiy aiai 
sufficient condition and • that which they condition , it is necessary 
to make a few more explanatory remarks about the * twelve members*®
Section ii
More Explanatory Remarks About the * Twelve Members*
We have already seen that * suffering*, such as (l2)
* aging and death*, is conceived in Buddhist philosophy as being 
conditioned by (ll) * birth*. Some Buddhist texts have, however, 
elaborated the last ‘member*, * suffering*, by saying that aging and death
( * jara-marapa*), grief (* soka*), lamentation ( * parideva*), sorrow (* duhkha*),
1* I.e. the relation between each * member* and its putative
* effect*.
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^oom ( * daunnanasya* ), and anguish ( * upâyâsa* ) are all different 
forms of * s u f f e r i n g * T h e  reason why the latter five are added to 
(a) ‘aging and death* in some texts and omitted in certain others is 
the followihg. Some scholars did not think it necessary to mention 
the latter five explicitly inasmuch as they thought that the concept 
of the different forms of ‘ suffering* is implied in that of ‘ aging and 
death* #^
The eleventh member, (ll) * birth*, represents the ‘becoming*^ 
of the individual, his passing out of the mother* s womb.^ It is further 
analysed in the various Nikavas and in the Kula-madh'»mmaka-karika as 
the descent of the individual in a particular 'category* (‘nikaya* and
* gati* ) of existence,^ or the ajssuming of a new * aggregate* ^  (‘skandha*,
* khandha* ) of the elements which survive the death of an individual. ^
Buddhaghosa's as
1, See tha/definition of the first * noble truth* / discussed by 
HoC. Warren in JPTS. 1891, p.l36. See also TDDC. pp.31-52.
2. Some texts conceived grief, lamentation etc. as forming a separate 
‘member* in the causal process. They depicted *birth-aging-death* 
as causes (or conditions) of grief, terror, anguish etc. "Yattha 
atthi ayatiip jâti- jarâ-marapam sasokantam bhikkhave sadaram 
saupâj^san ti vadami'* ( S^ II, p. 102); **%ere there is in the 
future decay and death, I declare brethren, that with it is grief, 
affliction and despair". (Kindred Savings. II, p.71#)
3. See TDDC. p.31,
4, See TDDC. p.31.
5* e. g. the categories of human beings, animals, spirits, etc,
6o The five ‘aggregates* [panca-skandha , * khandha ] are introduced •
in Buddhist philosophy in order to explain the particularity of 
individuals. The elements surviving the physical death of an 
individual are supposed to assume a new ‘aggregate* and thus reappear 
in the world in accordance with the actions of an individual in his 
past life,
7. See DN, II, 305, K &  III, 249, SN, II, 3, 1K7, pp. 557, 565. (Cf.
May's translation, pp. 265 f. )
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Since the words (lO) *hhava* and (ll) * jâti* are veiy close 
in their meaning, and since they both can be translated as ’becoming’, 
one is naturally faced with the difficult task of picking out their 
difference. One way of explaining their difference is to say that 
while the concept "becoming* signifies merely the series of ‘réexistences* 
of the individual after death, the concept * birth* specifies this
1
* réexistence* by saying that an individual is b o m  to live a particular
2life in a particular state. Another way of explaining this difference 
is to interpret ‘becoming* as referring to the moment of conception,^ 
as contrasted with the actual * birth* of the individual. But the 
explanation which can explain this difference most satisfactorily is 
the one given by Buddha^osa. According to him ‘becoming* (‘bhava)
signifies only the acts^ which condition * réexistence* And ‘birth*
1. We are deliberately using the French word, ‘reexistence* here inasmudh 
as this word, in our opinion, brings out the dynamic aspect of 
existence, as conceived in Buddhism, more clearly, rather than the 
word * rebirth* •
2. See Formule Bouddhique ~‘Des Douze Causes. Oltram&re, p. 10. **La 
naissance ponctue l'existence, ou, pour mieux dire, la série des 
existences d*un individu."
3. ‘Pratisamdhi-kgana*. TDDC. p.30. See also Buddhist Philosophy. 
Keith, p.lOZf.
* Karmabhava* i See Visuddhimagga. XVII, p. 201. See TDDC. pp. 30-31* 
For an account of different kinds of being see P. C.Bagchi* s article 
in E-pigranhica Indica. XXI, p. 203.
5. "Punarbhava-janakam karma", "paunarbhavikam karma". TDDC. p.30.
Cf. also Compendium of Philosophy, p.189, n.1.
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(' jâti') refers to the effect of those actions.^
That which causes (lO) ’becoming* (or ’reexistence*) is 
(9) 'grasping* (in its various aspects). (9) * Grasping* can be
2
understood as our constant inolina.tion to grasp objects of sensual, pleasure* 
It also refer to our adherence to (ii) ’false doctrines*,^ (iii) to 
* moral and ascetic rites*^ and to ’belief in a soul*.  ^ The underlying 
significance is that ?;e are reborn because we perform various actions 
under the influence of our constant inclination to gra.sp sensual objects.
(De La Vaille Poussin defines * grasping* as "cause de la force qui projette 
l’acte". See TDDC. p.27») We are reborn also because we perform
various actions under the influence of our tendency to * grasp* ’false
. » 6vaews .
Some texts treat (9) ’grasping*, however, a^ s nothing but 
an intense form of (8) * craving*. ^  And it is of course needless to
1. For further remarks on tlie nature of the concept of * becoming* see 
TDDC. pp. 29-31* (10) ’Becoming* or ’existence* (’bhava*) is
conceived as being possible in three spheres of existence.
SN, II, p.3; m *  II, p.58;
Iv-N. I, p. 66. See also 
TDDC. p. 27.
2* * îlâraa-upâdâna* #
3. ’Drpti, ditthi upâdâna*.
if. * Sila^ata, sHabbata nmâdâna*.
5. ’Atmavada, attavâda upâdâna*.
6. e. g. belief in false doctrines, in the efficacy of moral rites etc. 
Because such actions are performed under the influence of ’desire*
(or ’grasping*) and * ignorance*, individuals committing them are 
bound to be reborn to reap the consequences.
7* One text (Sî^ IV, ifOO) equates it sjjraight away with *cliving* (’trsnâ*,
’tanhâ*). Another text, the Krva. Sâlistamba Sûtra/T^80) equates it 
with * excess of craving* (* trsnavaipulya* ). The same Sam^uitta Nikava 
equates it, in other places (ill, 101, I67; IV, 89) with a term 
similar in meaning to 'craving*, namely *chanda-raga* (translated as 
’exciting desire* in Pâli-Fn^lish Dictionary, ed. T.W.Ehys Davids and 
W, Stede, p. 107).
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elucidate how (8) 'craving' leads to rebirth.
According to De La Vallée Poussin the term 'upâdâna*, connotes
not only the process of * attachment* or * grasping* but a Iso the object
1 . 2
of it. This object is, metaphorically speaking, the * fuel* of the
fire of passion or incessant grasping. * Upâdâna* is thus a comprehensive
term denoting both the process of 'grasping* and the object grasped.
(9) * Grasping* is either caused by, or merely an intense
form of, (8) * craving*. But what is 'craving*, and how is it caused?
hhen an ignorant man perceives an object, he either gets pleasurable
or painful (7) 'feelings’. Pleasant 'feelings* make him * crave* for
the object of pleasure and act accordin^y. Alternatively, he tries
to avoid those objects which arouse painful 'feeling* in him and act
accordingly. (8) 'Craving* is tr;ofold, in accordance with whether the
individual * craves* either for having more pleasant 'feelings* or for
severing himself from painful * feelings* • Buddhist texts add a third
kind of * craving* to these two# SoTmebTo-es men also desire not to .be
parted from that ’neutral* ’feeling* which marks certain states of
3
mediation in which there is neither any pain nor any pleasure.
1# See TDDC. p. 27*
2. Or the material which the fire consumes. This connotation of
the term * upâdâna* is in keeping with its various etymologies.
See TDDC. p.27 in this connection.
3. See TDDC. p.25; Keith Buddhist Philosophy. p.l03. The word which
we have translated here as 'neutral* is really *adulddiamasukham* in 
Pâli, which literally means * neither painful nor pleasant*. As such, 
this word does not qualify states of meditation only. It also refers 
to feeling felt in day to day life. It refers to a feeling that
is neither markedly pleasant nor markedly painful.
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Buddhist scholastics went on enumerating many other categories of 
(8) 'craving*: sometimes it is (8) 'craving* for the*ohjeots perceived
hy the six sense-organs^ [or for the six different (7) 'feelings* caused 
hy six different kinds of (6) * perception* Sometimes it is of
three kinds: ( i) 'craving* for objects of sensual pleasure, (ii)
'craving* for existence, and (iii) * craving* for non-existence^ 
tor, according to certain interpretations, (see note 4 below) for 
power]
in
'Peeling* is capable of causing desire only^an * ignorant* 
man, who ascribes wrong values to objects perceived. When an * ignorant* 
man perceives something he makes an * incorrect judgement* ('ayoniso 
manaslcara*). This 'incorrect judgment* colours his (7) ‘feelings* as well.^
1. a  H, p. 3.
2. TDDC. p. 25.
3. DN, II, PP061, 308; in, pp.216, 275; SN, HI, pp.26, 158, v p.420;
Itivuttaka. p.50. For another different way of classifying (8)
'craving* see D ^  III, p.216.
The term * vibhava-tanhâ* can be translated both as "* craving* for 
non-existence or annihiliation [also a mistaken 'craving*, since it 
implies the reality of existence (or being or substance)] 
and as " craving for power". For various discussions on the 
meaning of the term * \ib ha va-tanhâ* see Suttaninâta. verses 856, 867; 
Atthasâlinî. sec. 745 ad finem; Oldenberg*s Buddha, p.243#
5. In the words of De La Vallée Poussin, the erroneous judgment "est
cause d* ignorance concomitante à la * vedana* ('feeling*)". ç-^
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Bedause a saint (*erhat*) can judge j^orrectly, he does not succumb
the Sarvastlvada
to ‘craving*. According to/scholastics, although (8) * craving* is 
conditioned by (i) ‘ignorance*, it itself in its turn nourishes (i)
* ignorance*, inasmuch as it causes the delusive conception^ of objects 
perceived. ^
As is obvious from what we have said above, (7) * feeling*
can, firstly, be of three different kinds, namely, (i) pleasant, (ii)
painful and (iii) neither markedly pleasant nor markedly painful.^
It can also be categorised into six different ones in accordance with
the feelings associated with the five different kinds of perception^
5
and with conceptual cognition. It is sometimes conceived as being 
contemporaneous with (6) ‘perception*.^ The relationship between (7) 
'feeling*and (6) 'perception* has been compared, in the Ma.inhima Nikâva 
(hi, pp.242-243), to that between the fire and the heat resulting from 
the friction between two pieces of wood. (Fire and heat are the 
common effects of a cause, i.e. friction).^ Other texts, e.g. the
1. X.e. the man who craves perceives them as * real* or 'existing in
themselvesi
2. C.g. objects of visual perception, auditory perception etc.
3. II, 53» 82 etc. See also TDDC. p.23 and Keith's Buddhist 
Philosophy, p.103* See also p. , n. , present chapter.
4# g. visual perception, auditory perception etc.
5. S]^ H ,  p.3#
6. In the words of De La Vallée Poussin, "étant produits par un même
complexe de causes ( ‘ sâmagrl*)". TDDC. p.23.
7. This example is a Iso meant to suggest the idea that the existence of
a feeling is concomitant with that of a perception In the same way,
the existence of a perception can also be said to/6oncomitant with that 
of a feeling. On the basis of the premise that the existence of each of 
these is concomitant with that of the other, Buddhist philosophers
(continued on next page.....)
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Atthasâlinî (sec.286) conceive (7) ‘feeling* as being the resultant 
of (6) 'perception*. De La Vallée Poussin pointed out that (7)
'feeling* has sometimes been represented as being concomitant and 
conascent even with (3) 'consciousness* (or analytical or discriminative 
knowl edge) and * \^1 i ti on*. ^
In the ‘doctrine of the twelve-membered dependent 
origination* (7) 'feeling* is said to be caused by (6) * perception*.
V7e are taking the liberty here of freely translating the word * sparêâ*
(Pâli 'phassa') as 'perception*. The actual etymalogical meaning of 
the word is 'contact*. Buddhist philosophers believe that all the 
different forms of pereptual knowledge, e.g. visual, auditory etc. 
involve actual * contacts* between the sense-organs and their corresponding 
objects. V/’e would like to indicate., in this context, that their 
account of perception is not altogether incorrect. Prom our present scienti­
fic knowledge we know, for example, that in every case of seeing
there is an actual contact between the light waves and the eye. In 
every case of hearing there is an actual contact between the soundjKraves 
and the ear-drums and so on. Of course Buddhist philosophers did not 
have the knowledge of soundwaves, lightwaves etc. which we now have.
Yet even they must be credited with having ri^tly claimed that
(.......continued from previous page.)
wanted to conclude that each of them is dependent oh the other. We 
would, on the other hand, like to point out that the feeling concomitant 
with a perception is just caused by this perception.
1. See TDDC,
tente i ' i
’cetana'
2 3  4
corresponding to every case where se see something or hear something, 
there is some process or other which establishes a relation between 
something external and a particular sense organ. In the case of 
visual perception, hov/ever, the Buddhist philosophers can no longer
be shown to have correctly claimed that there is a 'contact* between
(according to the present interpretation) 
the eyes and the object, since there i^, strictly speaking, only a
'contact* between the visual organs and something^ of the external
object.
It is evident that Buddhist philosophers meants by 'contact*.
('sparsa'), at least in the context we are discussing here, perception.
However, Miss Horner translates 'phassa* (Sansk. 'sparsa') as
'sensory impingement', in Milinda's Questions, I, p.82.
Detailed analyses of the perceptual process of the individual
can be found in the Nikayas and some commentarial works. The Majjhima
Nikâya, for example described 'visual perception* as originating in
dependence upon (or being 'conditioned* by) the eye and colour (or
matter or form). It further says that the 'correlation* of three factors
[namely eye, form and visual sensation (or cognition)] is knov/n as
2
'perception* (or 'contact'). Other forms of 'perception*, e.g. auditory,
1. I.e. the lightwaves emanating from the object.
'—/
2. 'Cakkhuç ca avuso pa ticca rupe ca uppajjati cakkhu-vinnanaip, tinnam 
sangati phasso...', I, p.111.
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olfactory etc. are also analysed, in a similar way, as resulting from 
the 'correlation' of the respective sense-organs, their corresponding 
objects, and the 'cognitions' ('vijnana', 'vinnana')^ which constitute
p
essential factors of the corresponding 'perceptions'. Moreover, 
in addition to the five sense-organs mentioned above, Buddhist 
philosophy introduces one more sense-organ which it designates 'mano-indriya'. 
Etymologically this word means 'mental organ'. But a proper rendering of 
this term, which conveys its full significance, is 'the faculty of 
intellection'.^ Objects known by this faculty can be summed up by the word 
'dharma' (Pâli 'dhamma'), which implies all 'non-sensuous objects', e.g. 
concepts, ideas, and even 'things in themselves', (designated as 'dharmas')^. 
The correlation of the 'faculty of intellection, a 'non-sensuous object', 
and the 'cognition' ('vijnana') which originates (by being conditioned 
by these two factors)^ is tmown as a (sixth) form of 'perception' or
1. Some Buddhist texts, however, prefer to interpret these 'vijnânas'
(or 'vinnanas') as 'sensual images' or 'bare awareness of particular 
sense-data'. [De La Vallée Poussin translates it as 'idée'. See TDDC, 
p.22.] According to them, those perceptions which can be expressed in 
prepositional forms, (i.e. using Western logical terminology 'X is 
blue', or 'I know X as blue') require, in addition to 'vijnana', 
['adhivacana', literally 'denomination' (see TDDC, p.19, n.2.^ p.22, 
para 2)]. See also MKV, p.?4 in this context.
2. See May's Candraklrti Prasannapada, pp.261-262. . See especially note
9^1, 2 of p.261. See also Vasubandhu, Sthiramati's Trimsikâ, p.20.
3. Stcherbatsky translates it as 'the faculty of the intellect or 
consciousness'. See The Central Conception of Buddhism, pp.8, 96, 97.
4. See ChoII, pp.%T-43, for the meaning of the word 'dharma'. Stcherbatsky 
refers to 'concept' (('samgna'), 'feeling' ('vedana'), and 'samskâra' 
('volition') as the objects known by this faculty. See Conception of 
Buddhist Nirvana, p.236 under 'âdhyâtmika-ayatana'.
5. See g ,  II, p.72i IV, pp.68, 86.
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• intellec tuai intuition* • ^
As we have already seen, * perception* depends, for its
origination, not on the sense-organs alone, hut (at least) on their
corresponding objects. Buddhist texts use one single word, * âyatana*,
to denote both these factors. As it is extremely difficult to give an
exact English rendering of this highly technical term, we shall use the
expression * sourde of perceptual (and * intuitive* ) knowledge*, as an
approximate English corollary of this term * âyatana*. The five sense-
organs such as eye, ear etc. are described in the IdkâTOS as being 
3 . . .
material but invisible, thus being distinguished from the fleshy organs 
in which they are immanent (or which * support* them). The sixth organ, 
which we have translated as * the faculty of intellection*, is described
1. Some Buddhist texts, however, describe * perception*, as a resliltant
of such correlations and not the correlations themselves. The
resultant is variously described, either as (i) ‘vijnana* or (ii)
* Sara jnâ* [(i) ‘consciousness*, (ii) ‘notion*, * perception*,
* appellation* ]. See TDDC. pp.22-23. For the two opposing views 
consult AK. Ill, p.30; Atthsâlini. p®109. There is dissension among 
Buddhist philosophers also with regard to the number of the factors 
essential for a ‘perception*. Some texts (e.g. II, p.97» 
Milindapahho, p.6o) think that only two factors are essential for 
‘perception*. Another text (Mahâyagga I, sec. 2l) adds more factors 
to the three mentioned above.
2. Shcherbatsky tried to translate this term in various ways as ‘ entrance*,
‘door* (cf. MKV. p. 564» * âyatana* = * âyadvâra* ), * that which introduces*, 
‘support*, meaning thereby that ‘consciousness* arises in us ‘ throu^*
or ‘being supported by* these factors. He has given the etymological 
analysis of the term in Sanskrit as "ayara tanoti", which means roughly, 
(the place) where * motion* (‘âyam*) 'reaches full expansion*. The term
*âyatana* thus stresses the dynamic character of ‘consciousness*.
See Central Conception, p.8. 
be La Vallée Poussin translates this term as, "siege, lieu de production, 
cause, domaine". ( TDDC. p.lS) These translations are also in keeping 
with the etymological analysis of the term as "âyam tanoti".
3. But made of * subtle matter* ( *rüpa-prasâda* ). See TDDC. p.18. Each 
sense-organ is composed of the same elements* (see Ch.IV, p.if*,
(continued on next page )
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as being immaterial, invisible and not susceptible to contact.^ The
the
six organs are referred to as/’internal sourcès of perception ( * âdhyatmika-
the
âyatana*) and their corresponding objects are referred to as/* external 
sources of perception* ( * bâhyâ-âyatana* ). La Vallée Poussin notes 
that the Samyukta Nikava ( SN. II, p.24) equates these last * sources* with 
‘external psycho-physical complexes' (*nâma-rüpas*).^
He also points out that certain Buddhist texts^ omit the 
(5) ‘six sources of perception* from their enumeration of the 'members*
( * nidanas* ) of the irwelve-membered dependent origination*. These 
texts relate (6) ‘perception* directly to the (4) * psycho-physical complex* 
(*nâma-rûpa*)• And he adds, "Ce qui s'entend aisément, car les six 
organes ne sont qu'une définition ou une précision du *nâma-rûpa*•
D'autres documents.omettent ’ vi jnâna* et * nâmarûpa* ( SN. II, 13; III, 
pp.4^» 96), et, en effet, les six organes équivalent à "* nâma-rûpa* 
coupled with * vijnana* " (comp. DI^ II, p. 64)»
(....continued from previous page.)
n. 3 ) of which their corresponding material objects are composed. 
The sense-organs are also described as being susceptible to contact 
with their corresponding objects. See KN. I, p.190. See also 
ï'ïï<V. p. 126, n.1; P3vcholo;?:ical Ethics. Mrs. Ehys Davids, p. 173 in 
this context. And see specially TDDC. p. 18, n. 3.
1. See TDDC. p. 19.
2. See MKV. pp.l6, 31; p. 236; Sî^ VI, p. 175*
3o See TDDC. p.18.
4. Suttaninata. 870, and D ^  II, p„ 62.
5. TDDC. pp.19-20.
( é) 'Perception* tlius necessarily implies the existence 
of a (4) * psycho-physical complex* equipped with * sense-organs* • But 
this (4) ‘psycho-physical complex* alone is incapable of causing (6) 
‘perception* e v e n  being equipped with the ‘sense-organs* unless it is 
aided by (3) * consciousness* • Yet it is difficult to determine exactly 
what sort of relationship exists bet'.veen(3) 'consciousness* and the
(4) * psycho-physical complex*. A H  that we manage to understand from 
some cryptic remarks of the Nikavas is that the (4) * psycho-physical 
complex* and (3) 'consciousness* necessarily * depend* on each other.
'What is really meant is something like the following;
On the one hand, individual ‘consciousness* could not exist 
at all unless the * psycho-physical complex* itself existed first. (See 
TDDC. p.13.) Here the words * psycho-physical complex* refer probably 
to the foetus and not to the individual as such. According to this 
interpretation consciousness (*vijnana*) is in principle separable from 
the ‘psycho-physical complex*. [See S ^  II, p,3; I, p.53*] Yet
it does not, in practice, exist (as an individual consciousness) without 
being conjoined with some * psycho-physical complex* or other. It is 
supposed to descend into the womb and, by being conjoined with the foetus, 
to form an integral part of an individual as such. Besides, the different
1. See S^ II. 104; 2E» II» 63. ^See also TDDC. p.13. The relationship
between (3) ‘consciousness* and ,^(4) * psycho-physical complex* has 
been compared to that between two reeds standing by supporting each 
other. See also May* s Candraklrti Prasannapada. pp.268-269, and n.975#
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forms of perceptual experience^ which an individual is capable of 
having depend, for their origin, on the functioning of the sense-organs 
of the individual (ioe* * the psycho-physical complex*). On the other 
hand, the particular * psycho-physical complexes* which we individuals 
have depend, according to Buddhist philosophy, on ‘consciousness*^ 
because it is (3) ‘consciousness* which survives the death of the body 
and assumes a new existence by being inseparably connected (or finding 
a new support) with a different body.^ It is therefore (3) ‘consciousness* 
which determines not only the ‘psychical frame work* of an individual 
[(4) * psycho-physical complex*] but also [according to certain Buddhist 
texts, see TDDC. p.13] its particular bodily structure.^ Besides 
the * psycho-physical complex* could not exist at all without (3) 
‘consciousness* itself^ On the basis of such observations, it is
1. Buddhist texts describe them as *prativijnana*, i.e# ‘consciousness
in its active form*. See TDDC. p.l3, Cf. May*s Candi%kirti Prasannanada. 
p.270, n.98lo May discusses the term *prativijhapti* instead of 
*prativijnana*•
2. "Dans les cas ordinaires en raison d*actes ou dispositions anciennes 
( * samkâras* ) entre après la mort dans une nouvelle existence." TDDC. 
p.l2. See also p.543® "Samnivisate... gatau. "
3. See TDDC. p.13. "Le * vi jnâna*, principe spirituel. ..de la ge^neration. "
* Consciousness* has also, sometimes, been regarded as the "principe 
vital". See TDDC. pp.I3, 14; and FBDC. p.15.
4® According to this interpretation,^particular individual (3) ‘consciousness* 
necessarily forms an integral part of a (4) * psycho-physical complex*. 
(See TDDC. p. 14). ‘The psycho-physical complex* does not, however, 
signify any substantial unity. See TDDC. p*l6. It is only that which 
determines the individuality of individuals. See TDDC. p.lT. The 
Sanskrit/Pali word which we have rendered into English as * psycho­
physical complex*, signifies, in the opinion of some Buddhologists, on 
veiy rare occasions, ‘the external world*. See in this connection TDDC. 
pp. 17-18; WRkS, 1905, p.402. See also The passage they refer to
is in the Samvuhta Nikâva. II, p. 24®
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concluded, in the Samyutta Nikava ( SN. II, p.lO^) and the Dieha 
Nikava. (PN. II, p# 63) tha t consciousness and the * psycho-physical 
complex* are interdependent.
Buddhist philosophers have taken great pains to prove that 
(3) ‘consciousness* does not represent any static permanent substantival 
entity. (3) ‘Consciousness*, according to them, implies dynamic 
streams of ever-changing conscious moments (*vijnanasrota*) which usually^ 
arise being conditioned by the correlation of factors like sense-organs, 
their corresponding objects and **un élément intellectuel" (possibly an 
act of attention).^
It is (3) ‘consciousness* which conditions a new * individuality* 
or * personality*, known in Buddhist technical terminology as a (4)
* psycho-physical complex*. But what conditions this (3) ‘consciousness*
itself, which marks the beginning of a new existence? In * Theravada* 
and *Sarvâstivâda* philosophy this unique conditioning factor consists of 
our (2) ‘voluntary actions* ( * semskaras*, * sankharas* ).
1. I have used the word * usually* here because I am not very sure 
whether this ‘consciousness* would be entirely identified by 
Buddhist philosophers with the ‘consciousness* that survives 
‘physical death* and conditions the next birth of a human being.
See also The former ‘consciousness* is undoubtedly related
to the latter one, yet it is very difficult to determine whàt sort 
of relationship it really is. The foimer one is sometimes designated 
as ‘pravptti-vijnana* (see p.23n, n.% ). The latter one is probably 
that which is variously described as that which is * invisible* 
(‘anidassanam*) [or ‘cannot be characterised* (see Middle Length
  Savings. I, p.392)], * infinite* (* anantam*), * luminous all over*----
(* sabbat pabhami ). [See MK» I, p.329; I, 223*]
For a difference of interpretation see Dialogues of the Buddha,
I, p.283, n.2, Bee also Régamey’s Three Chapters from the 
Samâdhirâ.jasûtra, Preface, p.26.
2. See TDDC, p.l4^ See also il, p.237.
241
We are b o m  in particular states in order to reap the
consequences of our past actions. Our particular * mental* ^  as well 
2
as ‘physical* make-ups, and the particular situations in which we find 
ourselves are thus conditioned by our past * voluntary actions*• We 
are, in normal circumstances, rewarded or punished by some agents, 
e. g. parents, judges etc. Sometimes, when no external * dispenser of 
justice* is visible, we attribute such power of dispensing to an 
‘Invisible Judge*, i. e. God* Since the * Thera vada* and * Sarvâstivâda* 
philosophers did not believe in the existence of such a personal Creator 
God, they suggested that our actions themselves determine the forms of our 
reward or punishment. [Since the actions can, strictly speaking, no 
longer be said to exist once they have been committed, Buddhist 
philosophers may be expected to come forward with the following modified 
proposition; ** The * impressions* of the ‘voluntary actions* persist in 
a state of flux, surviving the * physical deaths* of people, and determine 
the mental and physical make-ups of new individuals.*'^]
We have used the words * voluntary action* here as an En^ish 
rendering of the term * sagiskâra* (Pali * sahkhara* )# Actually, this
1. Here we find the direct connection between * voluntary actions* and
* consciousness*.
cc B
2o See :  ^' '.,J  pp. 34-55. See also ^  I, p. 37.
3. Cf. Jayatilleke* s‘Problems of Translation and Interpretations, UCR.
vol. 7» p. 216.
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highly technical term * saniskâra* has many different connotations, 
depending on the variety of circumstances in which it is used. Accordingly, 
it is impossible to produce one single English expression which would 
convey all the different connotations of this word. Etymologically, this 
term implies * that which puts (or ‘acts*) t o g e t h e r * I n  this sense the 
term * samskara* (* sahkhara*) can quite easily be used to signify ‘action*.
It is undoubtedly in the sense of ‘action* that the term ‘samskâra* has 
been used in the ‘doctrine of the twelve-membered dependent origination* 
as denoting its second * member*. But any act. whatsoever is not a 
* samskâra*. A * samskâra* must necessarily be a * voluntary action* if
1. TDDC. p.10; CCB. p. 20, especially n. 5; I, p. 127, n. 6.
* samskptatvam*... * sambhûya kâritra*. In this sense, even ‘ imagination*
( * prakalpa* ), which is essentially a false construction ( i. e. which 
knits false ‘ideas* together) can be designated a * samskâra*. This
* imagination* is said to have as its * point d* appui* empirical ‘thought* 
or ‘consciousness* (W^, III, p.99; SN, II, p.65), such as false ideas 
like * I exist*. Such false * thoughts* and ‘ideas* help * imagination* 
in its function of incessant mental fabrication of false ideas. See 
TDDC. pp.10-11.
2. TDDC. p.10, See also CCB. p.20, n.7# See also Keith*s Buddhist 
Philosophy, p.100.
3. This ‘voluntary action* can either be ‘meritorious*, ‘demeritorious*, 
or * neutral* ^j^ * aniG jya*-( ânenjya, âne jya) abhisahkhâram* ] [See S ^  II, 
p.82, V, p^\50; )^AK,IV, p.107,n.1. The word * samskâra* ( * sahkhara* ) can 
also imply 'actions* of the body, e. g. * inhalation* and * exhalation* ; 
of speech, e.g. ‘critical argumentation* ( * vitarka* ) and * critical 
analysis* (* vicara*) ; and of mind, e.g. ‘conceptualisation* or 
‘denomination* ( * sam jnâ* ), and ‘feeling* (‘vedana*). [See I, p.301; 
SN. IV, p. 293; Vibhahga, p. 135. See also TDDC. pp. 9 and 10J7 But no 
action can be retributive * samskâra* unless it is conditioned by a 
‘vôlition* (‘cetana* ). It is in order to stress this point, that the 
word ‘samskâra* has sometimes been directly applied to ‘volition*.
(TDDC. pi 10 and FBDC. p.lé). It must be noted in this context that the 
position of Buddhist philosophers in maintaining that overt voluntary 
actions are * results of counterpart hidden operations of willing* is in 
direct opposition to the position of philosophers like
(continued on next page....)
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it is to be retributive, (in the sense of causing * rebirth*, 
[•punarbhavâbhisamskâra*, IKV. p.545® See also TDDC. p. 12]).
Many scholars, e.g. Keith (Buddhist Philosophy. p.lOO) 
and K. 14 Jayatilleke (Some Problems..., in UCR. vol.7, pp.208-224) have 
tried to translate the word, * saçskâra* ( * sahkhara*) as it is uæd in 
the * doctrine of the twelve-membered dependent origination* as 
* disposition*. But we do not feel happy about this translation of 
the term * saçskâra* (* sahkhara* )« Professor Jayatilleke has given 
three reasons for his preference for the term ‘disposition*. The 
reasons he has given are as follows. Firstly, the word * disposition* 
denotes pattern reactions. Secondly, it has the necessary dynamic 
quality of * samskâra* in influencing the present, and thirdly, it comes 
to mean an organised mental tendency produced from past experience.^
Now, in the first place, the word * sahkhara* undoubtedly 
means ‘voluntary action* in the context of the ’twelve-membered dependent 
origination*. In that case, there seems to be no justification for 
translating it as ‘disposition*. Disposition signifies merely a
(......continued from previous page)
Gilbert Ryle (The Concept of Kind, pp. él-72). They do 
not believe that there are any * secret operations* * in the mind*, 
corresponding to * volitions*, which are related to overt voluntary 
actions as their causes. For different meanings of the word
* sagiskâra* see CCB. pp. 6, 7, 20-23, 29, 39, 55, 69.
1. * Soma Problems of Translation,” p. 223®
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tendency# In contrast to a disposition, a voluntary action is an 
overt happening which takes place at a particular time and place.
It is possible that Dr. Jayatilleke wanted to point out 
that the word * sahlchara* primarily means, as the second * member* of 
the * twelve-membered dependent origination*, an act of willing and 
not voluntary actions as such.^ That is probably the reason why 
he commented that * sahkhara* denotes * an organised mental tendency*.
But even then we must point out that an act of willing can, on no 
account, be compared to a disposition, in any sense of the term 
‘disposition*.
An act of willing is not similar to disposition in the 
Eylean sense of the term. According to Ryle‘disposition^merely 
denote tendencies or capacities. Thus he comments that "to possess 
a dispositional property is*..to be liable to be in a particular state, 
or to undergo a particular change, when a particular condition is 
realized. " "Dispositional statements are", according to him, "neither 
reports of observed or observable states of affairs, nor yet reports of
Such an opinion would go against the views of eminent scholars 
like Stcherbatsky (see CCB. p.20, n.?), Keith (see Buddhist 
Philosophy. p.lOO) and De La Vaille Poussin (see TDDC. p.10) who 
believe that * sanlchSra* refers to voluntaiy action in the present 
context.
The Concept of Mind, p.120, italics ours.
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unobserved or unobservable states of affairs. They narrate no 
incidents. ” He further adds, "To say that a person knows something, 
or aspires to be something, is not to say that he is at a particular 
moment in the process of doing or undergoing anything, but that he
is able to do certain things, when the need arises, or that he is nrone
to -^0- feel certain things in situations of certain sorts. There
is no reason to think, on the other hand, that acts of willing
signify merely tendencies or capacities.
Of course there is another sense of the term ‘disposition* 
which Ryle has not taken account of. Such a sense of the term can 
be found in a statement of the form, ‘I was disposed to hit him*.
Here the word * disposed* does signify that a person was, at a particular 
moment in the process of doing or undergoing something.^ But an act 
of willing is not comparable to a disposition even in this sense of 
the term ‘disposition'. An act of willing does also refer to 
something a person is in the process of doin,g. Yet willing refers to 
a deliberate choice. When I am disposed to hit somebody, on the other 
hand, I need not deliberately choose to do so.
lo The Concept of Mind, p.43# Italics ours.
2. The verbs * to know*, * to aspire* etc. signify dispositions according
to Ryle.
3o The Concept of Mind» p.112. Italics ours.
4. See the second quotation from The Concept of Mind, in the preceding
paragraph.
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We have already seen^ that individual * suffering* is due 
to * voluntary actions*. What causes this * voluntary action* itself 
is (l) ’ignorance*. Briefly speaking, we act in a particular way 
because we are ignorant of the real nature of objects, put wrong
values to them and crave either for possessing or for getting rid
of them. For example, a small baby would crawl towards a lifted 
cigarette butt lying on the floor and try to play with it, because 
it does not know what red hot fiery objects are really like. Adult 
(2) ’voluntary actions* are also conditioned by various sorts of (l) 
’ignorance* and ’craving* resulting from such (l) * ignorance*. Although 
’ignorance* may be summed up as (l) * ignorance* of how * suffering* is
caused and how to get rid of it, as well as of the real nature of both
external objects and ’self*. Pâli scholasticism has gone quite a way 
in its fabrication of the different items that can be listed under 
(1) * ignorance*.^
lo See p.
2o (1) ’Ignorance’ is described as the (i) * ignorance* of ’causation*,
which includes both causal explanation of the origin and destruction 
of * suffering* [i.e. ’the Four Noble Truths*, (see pp9UrSch.IIl).
See DN,II, p.90, Suttaninata. verse 724» V, p.439, Vibhahgra. p. 155, 
Hetti-nakarana. p.280 and causal explanations of objects and 
entities ( * idappao0ayata-paticcasamuppanna dhamma,* see Netti^nakarana*, 
p.28). ’Ignorance* is further categorised into ( ii) * ignorance* of
the origin and disappearance of the ’five aggregates’ (*pancaskandha*,
or ’khandha*) which explain individuality (see ppS4%iDch.IIl) in 
Buddhist thought, (see Sj^ HI, pp. l62. I71) ; (iii) ’ ignorance’ 
concerning ’self* (or substance); (iv) * ignorance* of taking what is 
really ’painful* as ’pleasant*, what is * transitory* as * eternal*, 
what is devoid of self as possessed of self (Suttanipata, verse 756), 
and what is * impure* as ’pure* (see MKV. pp.46O-461). ’Ignorance* has
been described in the Visuddhima^ga (XVII, in Warren* s Buddhism in 
Translation. p.l70) as * ignorance* concerning our past, our future, 
the relation between past and present and so on. All the items 
listed under ’ignorance* imply and hence can be summed up as wrong 
evaluation of the objects of experience. * Ignorance of causal
(continued on next page.....)
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One must not come to the conclusion that since (l)
’ignorance* is represented as the first * member* of the ’twelve-membered 
dependent origination*, it itself is therefore uncaused. It is 
described in the Canon, as well as in the commentarial literature, as 
being due to the ’five hinrances* ( * nivaranas* ), i.e. * craving* 
’spitefulness*, ’sloth* and ’torpor*, * pride* and * skepticism*. The 
Sayvutrta Nikava (TV, p.70) and the Ahguttara Nikâya (V, pp. 113, ll6) 
add many more items to the list of causes of * ignorance*. But
l(L
commenting on them,La Vaille Poussin says, " Convoitise, méchanceté*, 
etc. peuvent être résumés en un mot, *trsnâ*,^ ’soif, désir*. La soif 
cause, nourrit 1* ignorance, comme 1* ignorance la soif; ni l’une 
ni l’autre n* ont eu de commencement (voir 01 trama re, p. 34 P#,
Visüddhim., XVII apud Y/arren, 171; comp. Majjh, I, 54, ou 1* ignorance 
est en causation réciproque avec les * âsravas*, c one uni see ne e. désir de
( continued from previous page)
explanations of the origin and cessation of suffering* also implies
* vnrong evaluation* inasmuch as we * suffer* precisely because we act 
under the influence of desire growing out of our wrong evaluation of 
objects. For further accounts of * Avidyâ* (’avijjâ*) and the items 
listed under it consult TDDC. pp.6-7; P.C.Bagchi*s *A Note on the 
Pratîtya-samutpâda-sütra*, published in Epigraphies Indica, vol.XH, 
pp.202-203. For original sources consult MàhâvaA/?a. vi. sec. 29 ( SEE. 
XVII, p. 104) ; IvKV; pp. 328, 542, 564; Visuddhimagga. XVII, pp. 527-528; 
Netti^nakarapa. p.75; pp.10-11; Suttaninâta. verses 1032-1033; AK.
Ill, p.28.
1* Italics ours.
2. TDDC. p.8.
3. Italics ours.
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1* existence, hérésie)!'^
be La Vallée Poussin also tries very hard, in keeping with the 
argument quoted above, to bring to our notice the extremely important 
point that (l) * ignorance* is not causally connected with its immediately 
succeding ’member*, alone. * Ignorance* must be present in every case 
in which any one of the rest of the * twelve members* is causally 
responsible for its following * member*. Unless * ignorance* is there, 
no * member* can cause the succeeding ’member*. * Ignorance is thus 
a necessary condition of the fact of some other *member* causing its 
succeeding ’member*. * Ignorance* is in fact a necessary condition in 
every case in which one *mæber* acts as the cause of the following * member*
In defence of his thesis he refers us to the Abhidharmakosawâkhvâ^ and
the Samyubba Nikâva^ where it is argued that **si la sensation ( * vedana* ) 
agréable (ou désagréable) produit la soif (ou le dégoût), c’est qu’elle 
procède d’un contact auquel 1*ignorance est associée (*avidyâsparéajam 
veditara pratityotpadyate * tpgnâ* ...)**. He adds, "C’est 1* ignorance qui 
fait de sensation un "membre" (ahga), c*est-a-dire un élément causal de 
l’existence: car la sensation ne produirait pas la soif s’il n*y avait
pas 1* ignorance chez celui qui sent... *
1. TDDC. p.8. Italics ours.
2. I.e., * voluntary actions*.
3. See TDDC. p. 9.
4* III, p p#46, 96.
5. TDDC. p. 9.
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Section 111
Analysis of the Twelve * Members* as Necessary and Sufficient Conditions
After introducing a short explanation of the different 
’members* of the * twelve—membered dependent origination* we are now 
in a position to give our reasons why we think that the relationship 
between most ’members* and their immediate successors can more easily 
be represented as that between either a necessary or a sufficient
condition, or a both necessary and sufficient condition and the
1 . 2 conditioned* This gives us the opportunity to defend our thesis
that the rudiments of the idea that causation can be analysed in terms
of conditioning, rather than in terms of production, can be traced in
the ’doctrine of the twelve-membered dependent origination’*»
Our view is based mainly on two arguments: (l) the
language in which we can express the relationship between one ’member*
and its immediately following one appears more natural with the
introduction of terms like * necessary* and ’sufficient condition* and
’the conditioned*, rather than with that of terms like ’producer* and
’the product*# (2) Secondly, the relationship between one * member*
and its immediate successor^ is, in most cases, that of reciprocity#
1# See pp# •i'*-», 3-'*^
2# See present chapter#
3# In other words, between a so-called ’cause* and its so-called
* effect*#
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Yet although the producer can, in all cases, he said, to produce
the product, the product can never he said to produce the producer#^
as pointed on the previous page 
xnerefore, for both these reasons, it seems more natural to analyse,/4he
relationship between most ’members* and their immediate successors (i«e«
tneir supposed effects*) as that between necessary conditions, or
sufficient conditions or conditions which are both sufficient and
necessary, and that which they condition* To analyse their relationship
as that between a producer and the produced would appear highly artificial.
The Sanskrit/Pali words which are most frequently used to
denote the relationship between the different ’members* of the ’twelve-
membered dependent origination*, are ’pratyaya, paccaya*. Thus we veiy
often come across descriptions like the following in the Nikâvas.^
"Vedanâpaccayâ tanhl, tanhâpaccayâ upâdânanu.. ** Such statements are
usially translated as: "Conditioned by ’feeling* ’craving* comes to
pass, conditioned by * craving* * grasping* comes to pass. The
corresponding descriptions in Sanskrit, using the word ’pratyaya* can
be found e.g. in the MK7 (ppo554> 555).^ Other words which explain the
1. See p.iSk, ruiabelowt
2. SN, II, pp.1-2.
3. Kindred Sa^ /infrs. II, p. 2.
4# Cf. May’s Candraklrti Prasannapada. p.262.
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{'prabhava')
1 p
* members* are * he tu*, * nidâna* , * samudaya*, * pabhava*/, * jâtika* # "
Now all these terms, * hetu*, ’paccaya*, * nidâna*, * samudaya’, ’pabhava’,
’ jâtika* have often been used almost synonymously, as if there were no 
distinction in their meanings.^ This shows clearly that despite the 
fact that all these words^ are sli^tly different in meaning, they have 
all been understood by Buddhist philosophers to have something in common. 
TiVhat is that common factor? All these terms have been understood by
1. See specially MKV* PP»553, 554, 557#
2. M ,  II, pp. 57-59, 62-63; H ,  pp. 52-53#
3# See Pali-Snglish Dictionary. FTS edition, p.192. Later Pâli
scholastics tried to draw a distinction i)etween a * hetu’ and a
’ paccaya*. See Pali-Bnp^lish Dictionary, p. 192.
4# There is an incredible variety in the way in which these terms have 
been translated into En^ish. See Dialogues of the Buddha, part II, 
pp.52-55, 58-^1; Kindred Savings. II, pp.39-48# Both the words
’ hetu’ and ’paccaya* have sometimes been'translated as ’cause’ and
sometimes as ’condition*. It shows clearly that there was confusion 
among Buddhologists as to (l) whether the Buddhist theory of ’dependent 
origination’ is about production, or about conditioning. P.C.B-agchi, 
(see Epigraphica Indiea. vol.XXI, pp.199-204, passim, see especially, 
p. 2?) . Otramare C see FBDC. p. 9)^ bg La Vallée Poussin ( TDDC. passim, see 
specially pl9) all seem, to a certain extent, to suffer from this 
confusion. This confusion itself may be a result of the 
confusion which Buddhist philosophers themselves had about whether 
theterm ’cause* signifies either a ’producer* or a ’condition* 
or both. See oh#III, pp#i%nJ about the distinction between a 
’ cause’ and a * condition* *
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Buddhist philosophers to represent some aspect or other of a ’cause*.^
Let us assume then, for the sake of brevity, that the 
relationship between each * member* and its succeeding one is that of 
cause and effect. Now the question is, does this word * cause* signify 
here a * producer*, or does it signify a * condition*? The translation 
of the word * jatika* as * source of production* in the Kindred Sayings 
does not really help us in our enquiiy. Because this word has been 
used synonymously with * nidâna*, * samudaya*, * pabhava* in the Samyuk^ 
Nikâi^. which have been translated as ’base*, ’uprising*, ’cause’ 
in the Kindred Savings ( II, pp.39-48)• The words ’ nidâna’ and ’ samudaya* 
have, moreover, been used synonymously with ’hetu* and ’paccaya* in the 
Dlgha NTkâva (ll. pp.57-58), which have been translated as ’ ground’ and 
’cause’ in the Dialogues of the Buddha (pp.52-55)* None of the words 
like ’base*, ’uprising*, ’ ground*, ’ cause* need necessarily imply
evident from
1. That they have been so understood is/the fact that the word ’cause’ 
is always found in the midst of a large number of words given in 
the Pali Dictionary, as well as in various translations of the 
Nikâyas. as English renderings of idie words ’paccaya*, ’ pabhava*,
* samudaya*, ’ hetu* and ’ nidâna’• (See Pali-English Dictionary. PTS 
edition, pp.6, 37, 14^» 192 [Part II]; and pol94 [Part Ij. See 
also Dialogues of the Buddha. Part II, pp#52-55, 58-61; Kindred 
Savin‘S* II. no. 59-40. ) For the meaning of the word ’ jâtika’ see 
Pali-Bnglish Dictionary. PTS, edition, under the word ’ jâti’, (Part I, 
p. 114) and ’jâtika* ( p« 115).
2. See Kindred Savings. II, pp#39, 41* Many other authors have also 
introduced words like ’produce*, 'producer* in their analysis of the 
relationship between the individual ’members* of the ’dependent 
origination’» See e.g. P. C.Bagchi’s'A. Note on the Pratltya 
Samutpâda’, in Enigranhica Indiea. voloXXE, pp#199-204, passim, 
especially p. 207# See also note 4 of p.^s%.
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’production*. Moreover, it is quite possible, as we have already 
remarked, tliat since a *producer-cause* was analysable, in Buddhist 
philosophy in general, in terns of a ’condition*, Buddhist philosophers 
might have really meant by the words * source of production* merely 
* condition for origination* .
Now, if we analyse the concepts of (ll) birth and (l2) 
aging and death we immediately feel inclined to represent their relation 
in terms of conditions ( One should not conclude that since the relationship 
between one * member* and its immediate successor has been understood 
by Buddhist philosophers to be a causal relationship, and since that same 
relationship has been analysed by us as that of c onditioning, we therefore 
understand by causation nothing but conditioning. On the contrary, 
we believe that the concept of ’causation* is inexplicable without 
that of ’production*. See chapter VI in this connection.) Vie feel 
tempted to say that the (ll) birth of an individual is a necessary 
and sufficient condition of his subsequent (l2) aging and, in most cases,^ 
even of death.^ If anything may be said to ’bring about* the
1. See p.
2. In those cases where death is due simply to the failure, on the part 
of tlie vital organs, to function at a very old age, we can undoubtedly 
say that birth is both a necessary and sufficient condition of deatli* 
But in cases of accidental deaths and untimely deaths, we can only 
say that birth is only their necessary condition. Their sufficient 
conditions are those extraneous factors like the accident.
3. N, Dutt’s statement in the Aspects of Kahâyâna Buddhism, (p. 209) 
also seems to corroborate our view: "Jâti* cannot be the cause of
’ jara-raarana*. The underlying idea is that if there be * jâti*, it 
is inevitably followed by * jara-marapa*." Italics ours. He 
probably means by * cause* a * producer*.
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(untimely) death, in some cases, of an individual'^is some particular 
accident or disease*^
The relationship, between all the other ’members’, with the 
exception perhaps of that between (i) the first and the second, (ii) 
the seoo nd and the third, ( iii) the ninth and the tenth, and the ( iv) 
tenth and the eleventh, lends itself very easily to the analysis in 
terms of condition and the conditioned#
(Si«i 20%^
We have already noticed^that the terms representing the 
tenth (’bhava’) and the eleventh (’jâti*) ’members* are very close in 
their meaning and Buddhist philosophers had to strug^e very hard to 
explain their difference# This fact in itself suggests that the 
relationship between them is more likely to be that between a necessary 
and sufficient condition and that which they condition rather than 
that between a producer and a product* ^ Even supposing that the tenth 
* member* represents ’the series of ’réexistences’ whereas the eleventh
It
one is merely a specification of it, it sounds very artificial to say
1. ïïe cannot, however, speak of anything as bringing about aging.
Aging does not require any external ’producing factor*• It is 
the inevitable consexjuence of the birth of living organisms .
2. See pp. 23% -
Consult these pages also for the technical terms referring to these 
'members *•
3. Production necessarily implies the existence of tv^ o separate objects 
(e.g. the hen and its eggs) or events, v/hereas, in the case of 
conditions, if a ( e. g. X* s being an équângular triangle) is a 
necessary and sufficient condition of b (e.g. *^ s being an equilateral 
triangle) then we can separate a and ' b- only by logical abstraction.
See P. "129;
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that ’réexistences* ’produce* their specification, * birth*. It 
seems more natural to say that 'réexistences* necessarily imply,, or 
are ’necessary and sufficient conditions* of their specification, namely" 
’birth*.^
But if we take the tenth * member* as signifying * voluntary
2
actions’, then of course it may be more natural to say that our 
’voluntary actions* ’bring about* ’rebirth* after death.^ We would 
like to point out that in this interpretation the producer, voluntary 
action, belongs to a former life and the product, rebirth, to a 
subsequent life. As contrasted with this, the foimer interpretation 
does not place the cause (’réexistence’) and the effect, birth, in different 
lives.
We have already brought the attention of readers to the 
question whether (9) ’grasping* really represents an independent ’member* 
of the * twelve-membered dependent origination*.^ It is possibly only 
an intense form of (8) ’craving*, and in that case, strincdy speaking it 
cannot be said to be ’produced* by ’craving*.
Although (B) ’craving’ may, in a sense, be described as
1. The converse of this proposition, namely, birth' is a necessary
and sufficient condition of’réexistances* is also true.
2. See p. 218
3. Or rather, they determine the particular character of our
’ psycho-physical make-up’ in a next life. See p. 2i+i .
4* See pp. 20.9 .
5. See n.3 of p. 2^^-
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being brought about by (7) ’feeling*, yet it becomes extremely 
difficult to say whether it is (7) ’feeling* which produces (8) 
’craving* while (l) * ignorance’ is a necessary condition of such a 
production, or whether ( b) it is ’ ignorance* which produces (8) 
’craving* whereas (7) ’feeling* is a necessary condition of such a 
production.^
(7) ’Keeling* can, in a sense, be described as being 
’produced* by (6) ’perception*. Yet doubt is cast on such an 
efficacious power of (6) ’perception* by some remarks found in Pâli
texts such as: ’feeling* is contemporaneous and concomitant with
r bt
’perception*. Lin the words of^La Vaille Poussin, "étant produits
par un même complexe de causes ( ’ sâmagri’). "^
lo See p. 3^1 It is perhaps unlikely that (l) ’ ignorance’ should 
produce (8) ’craving’, inasmuch as (8) ’craving* itself is also 
described as ’conditioning* (l) * ignorance* (see po^ü). And 
although ’a* aid ’b’ can be said to be ’necessary and sufficient 
conditions’ of each other (see p.2fl). they can h£,rily be said, strictly 
speaking, to produce each other. (See p.2sO, ' ), Of course it is
possible that (l) ignorance may produce (8) craving, and then this
(8) craving may, in its turn produce further (l) ignorance. But (8) 
craving cannot, by any means, be said to produce the same ignorance from 
which it secures its own existence. And it is obvious that the 
ignorance that is referred to when it is said in the Canon and the 
commentarial literature, "La soif cause, nourrit l’ignorance, comme 
l’ignorance la soif" (see p.U"#), is the ignorance that ’nourishes’ 
craving.
2. See p.23i, ruL>, and TDDC. p. 23.
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As is obvious from what we have already said above,^ 
’perception* is not produced by any one single factor* It is simply 
another name for the ’correlation’ (’ sahgati’) of at least three 
factors, e* g, the sense-organ, its corresponding object and the 
corresponding ’cognition* (’vijnana*) which fonns an essential factor 
for the corresponding ’ perception’. It is, by no means, produced 
only by its preceding factor, (5) ’sources of perception’ ( ’ sa^âyatana* ).
Neither do the three antecedents of (6) ’perception’, 
viz., (5) the * sources of perception*, (4) the ’ psycho-physical con^lex’ 
and the (3) ’consciousness’ represent three consecutive factors which 
can be deduced from their respective antecedent factors. (5) The 
’ sources of perception’ are definitely implied by the very concept of
(4) a ’ psycho-physical coijplex’. That is clearly the reason why some 
texts have even dropped the (5) ’ sources of perception flrom their 
enumeration of the different ’members’.^ It is therefore not a separate 
factor which can be ’produced* by the (4) ’psycho-physical complex’®
1® See pp. 23m. “ 23^.
2. We do not deny that some texts have, however, described 
’perception’ as the * resultant* of such a ’correlation’ and 
not the ’correlation*, itself. Such texts do, however, 
constitute a very tiny minority. See n. 1 ® It is in
any case debatable whether the word ’resultant* signifies a
’ produc t*.
3. See p. 2.31.
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In fact, even (3) ’consciousness* does not stand as a separate factor 
apart from and in addition to (4) the * psycho-physical-complex* • (4)
The ’psycho-physical complex’ and (3) ’consciousness’ are categorically 
dèscribed in the Nikavas as being interdependent.^ We cannot, in 
that case, describe the (4) ’psycho-physical complex* as being 
’produced’ by (3) ’consciousness*. And Stcherbatsky* s remarks in
The Central Concention of Buddhism are very pertinent in this context:
_ 2 
"it was impossible to deduce.... * nama-rupa’ from * vijnana’". What is
implied here is that instead of saying that (3) ’consciousness’ ’produces’
(4) the * psycho-physical complex’, we should rather say that (3)
’consciousness* and (4) the * psycho-physical complex’ are necessary and
sufficient conditions of each other.
(5) ’Consciousness* itself is not either, strictly speaking’,
the product of (2) ’ voluntary actions’. The sole function of (2)
’ voluntary actions’, as it is represented by ihe early Buddhist texts,
seems to be ’determining’ the particular structure of the ’consciousness’
of the individual in the next life.^ The ’consciousness of an
individual is supposed to survive his physical death^ and assist in the
1. See pp.3>'*'-239. This shows very clearly that they have been
conceived after the pattern of ’a’ being the ’necessary and
sufficient condition* of *b’; and *b’ being, in its turn, the 
necessary and sufficient condition of *a*. See pp. 2W3
2. CCB. p. 28, n. 3.
3# Seefp. Quo - Oui.
4. Seegp. 23^.
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formation of a new individual by being inseparably connected with 
some material elements that ultimately leads to the formation of 
the body of a new individual. ’Consciousness* is therefore already 
subsisting, and the * impressions* of the 'voluntary actions* of a 
past life only shape its particular make-tp.
Although (l) ’ignorance* is designated in early Buddhist
literature as the ’cause* of (2) ’voluntary actions*one is
entitled to have doubts as to whether the word ’cause* here
necessarily implies a ’producer*. In a sense ’desire* or ’craving*,
2
can also be said to prompt our actions. And we must also bear in 
mind that a vast number of Buddhist texts describe this * craving* 
itself as being ’caused* by ’ignorance*.^ In this sense ’craving* 
can be said to produce ’actions’, whereas it itself may be said to 
be caused by ’ignorance*. * Ignorance* may, in this sense, be described 
as the ’ ultimate cause*, or the ’cause of the cause* of ’voluntary 
actions*. And this way of arguing is in line with the spirit in which 
’ignorance’ is described in the Théorie Des Douze Causes, as being 
intimately connected with all the other ’members* of the * twelve-membered 
dependent origination*.^ * Ignorance* can thus be said to be the
1. See p.
2. Cf. TDDC. p.27* "De cette soif intense, procédera l’acte; l’upâdâna
est la cause de la force qui projette l’acte.
3. See p. oun»
4. See p. a.u.%-
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’necessary condition* of all the other ’members* acting as the
* sufficient condition* of their succeeding * members*.
Yet, there is also difficulty in considering ’craving* as 
causing * voluntary actions*. ’ Voluntary action* is the second ’member* 
of the *twelve-membered dependent origination* and * craving* is the 
eighth one. As a result, ’craving*, the ei^th ’member* succeeds 
(not immediately thou^) * voluntary action* the second one. Yet we 
expect the cause to precede the effect and not succeed it. How could
* voluntary action* then, as the second * member* of the ’dependent 
origination*, be caused by à later ’member*, the ei^th one?^
Coming back to the second argument of our thesis, which we 
have already referred to o n t h e r e  is ample evidence that some
j,
early Buddhist texts have categorically expressed the relationship 
between some ’members* which they described as causes, and some others 
which they have referred to as their effects, as that of reciprocity.
Vie have already given hints about this relation of reciprocity while we
1. Perhaps the solution to this puzzle lies in interpreting the 
second * member* of the *twelve-membered dependent origination* 
as referring to an element of the past life of an individual.
In that case we shall have to look for the causes of the * voluntary 
actions* of the past life in the past life itself (they would 
probably be ’ignorance* and * craving’/^ast life). ’ Craving* as 
the eighth * member* of the traditional formulation of the * twelve- 
membered dependent origination* could then be taken as causing 
actions committed in the present life, which would be represented 
by the tenth * member* * bhava*, and not actions committed in the 
last life represented by the second * member*, * samskara*.
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were discussing the 'members' individually. It will therefore be
sufficient to refer the readers to the pages where we have already
explained these ’members’, in order to make our point.
Firstly, the reciprocal relation between (3) ’consciousness’
and (4) the ’ psycho-physical complex’ has been compared in the Nikâyas
to that between two reeds standing, supporting each other. Secondly,
we have also seen how (6) ’perception’ and (7) ’feeling’ have also
sometimes been described by Buddhist philosophers as being contemporaneous
5and interdependent. Thirdly, in the opinion of^La Vaille Poussin, as 
we have already seen,^ the omission, upon occasions^ of the (5) ’si%J 
sources of perception* from the traditional enumeration of the ’members’ 
only indicates that the (4) ’ psycho-physical complex’ and the (5)
’ sources of perception’ necessarily imply one another. Moreover, 
in the opinion of some scholastics, although (8) ’craving’ is conditioned 
by (1) ’ ignorance*, it itself, in its turn is supposed to ’nourish* (l) 
’ignorance’.^ Lastly, although ’consciousness* is reputed to be, 
according to traditional enumeration, the cause of causes of both ’feeling*
1. See pp. 20.9 -
2. See p.33%, rul.
3. See p. Û.30
4. See p. a'i*:!
5o See p. 0.30.
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and ’craving*, they themselves are sometimes described, in their
turn, as being concomitant (and also conascent) with ’consciousness*.^
No more actual textual evidence can, it is true, be found
of the mutual causality between any other pairs of causes and effects
of the ’twelve-membered dependent origination’. Yet, we do not think
that such mutual causal relation is veiy difficult to derive between
those ’members’, if we follow the natural implications of the texts.
For example, (lO) ’becoming’ and (ll) ’birth* may also be interpreted
as mutual conditions* Neither of them could be said to subsist
of
without the other. The same is true als</(ll) ’birth’ and (l2)
2
’aging and deatli*. Even if one insists that the relationship between 
these alleged ’causes* and their alleged ’effects* cannot, in the absence 
of textual evidence, be shown to be that of * mutual causality,* the 
categorical declaration, in some texts,^ of the * mutual causality’ 
between some ’members* is enough evidence for us to say that the rudiments 
of the programme of analysing the relations between causes and effects
lo Samvukta Nikâya (il. p.lOl) says that ’consciousness* is firmly 
placed wherever there is ’craving* etc. The Ma.I.lhima Nikâya 
(l, p.295) represents ’feeling* as being concomitant and co__^ nascent 
with ’consciousness*. And it is hinted in these texts that 
whatever Is concomitant, \s also interdependent. ( See fp. 23».', n . 0
2. It is even suggested in the Kathâvatthu. (the fifth book of the
Abhidhammaoitakaj (XV, sec. 2), a work which mentions some controversial 
points existing in Buddhist texts, that one ou^t to understand (ll)
’birth* and (lO) ’becoming* on the one hand, and (ll) ’birth’ and (12) 
’aging and death* on the other, as interdependent. The Kathâvatthu (XV. sec, 
2) suggests that one should also interpret the relationship between 
(1) * ignorance’ and (2) ’ voluntary actions’ as that of mutual 
conditioning.
3* See pp.2^i-^'»'^above.
as that between necessary and sufficient conditions and the conditioned 
can be traced in the ’doctrine of the twelve-membered dependent 
origination’. Since these ’members’ are supposed to be interdependent 
or mutually conditioning each other, it is obvious that they cannot 
produce each other. Two separate things could hardly produce each 
other. V/hat the analogy of the two reeds^ does establish is only the 
following. The existence of each of the reeds is a necessary and 
sufficient condition of the other's continued existence in a particular 
state. It does not establish that the two reeds cause each other 
to come into existence, or produce one another# Considering all 
this one ought to conclude that the relation between those ’members’ 
which are supposed to cause one another, is really that between a 
necessary and sufficient condition and that which they condition.
The relation between a producer and the product is an asymmetrical 
relation. If one thing produces another, the latter cannot also be 
said to produce the fonner.
So far we have only tried to prove that Buddhist philosophers 
used the term ’cause' in most places, in the course of their elucidation 
of the ’doctrine' of the twelve-membered dependent origination! in the 
sense of condition. We would now like to point out that although 
some ’members’ may, at the outset, appear to be producing their succeeding
1# See p. Ï3», n. 1.
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’members', yet the Buddhist philosophers probably meant^ even these 
’members’ merely to condition their successors*^ This possibility 
suggests itself from the fact that a producer was analysed in Buddhist 
philosophy in general in terms of a condition or a group of conditions. 
Production necessarily implies a producer, an agent. Yet Buddhist 
philosophers have, almost unanimously, rejected concepts like 
substances (mental and physical), and, as a consequence, producers, 
agents etc.^ Instead of talking in terms of permanent selves, 
agents etc., they have, on the contrary, tried to explain the whole 
stream of phenomenal existence in terms of impersonal factors and 
relations of conditionality. In view of the fact that a vast literature 
has already been produced making this last point, it would be best, we 
think, to quote some authorities in order to establish it. Edward 
Conze has, for example, very clearly said in his Buddhist Thought in India 
(p. 158). "It^ explains how it is possible for an individual to appear 
to come into being without the existence of a permanent self, which 
would be subject of his deeds and experiences and the recipient of 
pleasure and pain which result from his deeds. At every point 
impersonal factors are brought into play, and there is no one who knows.
1. As opposed to what they actually said.
2. See p. 211
3. See oh® II, pp.
4® Conze means by ’it’, *pratitya-samutpada* (’dependent origination’).
feels, craves, grasps, is born, decays or d i e s * T h e  same spirit 
is noticeable in Stcherbatsky’s remarks: "The special theory aims
at explaining the notorious and puzzling fact that Buddhism assumes a 
moral law, but no subject of this law* There are good deeds and a 
reward for them, there are bad deeds and punishments. There is a 
state of Pinal Deliverance. But there is no one who commits these 
deeds, no one who abides in a state of Bondage and no one who enters 
into Pinal Deliverance, no Soul, no Ego, no Personality® There are 
only groups of separate elements, physical and mental, which are 
interrelated, which form themselves and which unform themselves...«a 
personal agent, an abiding spiritual principle, the subject of the 
moral law, is not at all necessary."^ 01 trama re has also made such inter­
esting remarks: "11^ a voulu apprendre à ses disciples que la
misere ne vient point à l’homme de quelque agent externe échappant à
1. Compare Conze's remarks with that made by Stcherbatsky in 
A Êîü T, p.129. "Instead of explaining every causation as a 
process resembling human cooperation, he (SLcherbatsky is referring 
here to the typical Buddhist philosopher) regards even this human 
cooperation as a kind of impersonal process. All cooperating 
causes are convergent streams of efficient moments. They are 
called "creeping" causes (*upasarpana-pratyaya’) since their movement 
is a staccato movement. In their meeting point (’sahakari melana*) 
a new series begins. "
2® He means the ’theory of the twelve-membered dependent origination’.
3® ^  I, p. 136.
4* Oltramare refers to the Buddha here.
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sa prise; et qu’elle n’est pas non plus inhérente à une substance
immuable, ce qui la rendrait elle-même incurable# He quotes 
2
Buddhaghosa in support of his thesis as saying; "La roue de 
l’existence roule sans ’cause personnelle’ et sans récipient passif**..# 
1’ ignorance, etc., la roue de l’existence exclut, pour le retour d’une 
nouvelle naissance, touttcause telle que le dieu Brahma...; elle 
exclut aussi tout;ame qui serait le récipient passif du bonheur et 
de la misère.
After developing the arguments mentioned above,^
at some length, we are now in a position to reiterate our point, that the 
outlines of the theory that causation can be analysed solely in terms 
of conditioning can be traced in the 'theory of the twelve-membered 
dependent origination’. Stcherbatsky has, relentlessly, tried to draw 
our attention to this unique and important aspect of the ’ twelve- 
membered dependent origination’. He has, for example said in
5
The Central Conce-ption of Buddhism. "The stunbling-block to eveiy 
explanation^ came from the supposition that the formula was meant to 
represent some evolution in which one member was rroduoin^^ the other:
1. PBDC. p.29.
2o Oltramare himself quotes Buddhaghosa from Visuddhimagga. Ch.XVII, 
p. 175, in V/arren* s Buddhism in Translation.
3. FBDC. p# 29.
4# See p.ik.9 and above.
5. p.28, n.3.
6o He is referring here to the explanation given by European Buddholo gists#
7o Italics ours.
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it was then impossible to deduce e.g. * nâma-rûpa* from ’vijnana*." 
Speaking about the early Buddhist theory of causation in general, he 
remarked in his ConcentKr^ f Buddhist Nirvana.^ "Strictly speaking it 
was no causality at all, no question of one thing -producing the other. " 
Other scholars, such as N.Dutt, followed suit: "Those scholars, who
expected to find in it a key to the origin of the world have been 
disappointed and condemned it as illogical and incongruous.
It is just a chain of instances to illustrate the law 
of *idappaccayata*
* Jâti’ cannot be the cause of ’ jarâ-marana’. The 
underlying idea is that if there be ’jâti*, it is inevitably followed 
by ’ jara-marapa’.
Early Buddhist philosophers tried to bring to light, with 
the help of their ’ theory of the twelve-membered dependent origination’, 
the extraordinary point that ’human suffering’ is not ’produced’. either
1. CB^ p. 40.
2. Italics ours.
3. It means ’dependent origination’.
4® Aspects of Mahâvâna Buddhism, p.209. Italics ours. N®Dutt
probably means by the term ’cause’, ’producer’. [See also p.. . 153 
n.3 ]. He is probably trying to warn his readers that they should 
not think that ( 12) ’ aging and death’, as a ’member’ of the ’twelve- 
membered dependent origination’ is produced by (ll) ’birth’. What the
’ theory of dependent origination’ is trying to elucidate is, according
to him, merely that each of the ’members’ is conditioned by the 
preceding one. (l) ’Aging and death’ in particular, are only 
conditioned by (ll) ’birtîi*. Aging and death are not possible without 
birth. Birth is thus the necessary condition of aging and death* 
Moreover, birth cannot be there without aging and death also being 
there. Birth is thus also the sufficient condition of aging and 
death*
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by any external Creator of human lives, or by any internal ’permanent 
soul’. Their general theory of ’dependent origination’ extends this 
denial of ’production’ to every phenomenon and declares that nothing 
at all is ’ produced’ in the real sense of the terra. Everything merèly
’comes into existence’ depending on some conditions. ’Mahâyâna^ Buddhism 
carries this argument one step further and claims that what is 
’dependent* does not ’exist in itself’, (i.e. is not ’Real’). ’Real’ 
is what possesses a ’ reality of its own’ ( ’ svabhava’).^ Since 
everything is dependent on other ’conditions’, everything is relative 
(’ sünya’ ). The phenomenal world is thus entirely ’relative’ and hence 
’ unreal’, viewed from the stand-point of the Absolute. "A dependent 
existence is no real existence, just as borrowed money is no real 
weal til.
1. See CBN, p.40. ’ Real’ is what does not depend on anything else
(’paratra nirapekpa’). Cf. XV,^^^2o
2. CBN, p#41. See also MkV. p.263, n.3#
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CliAPTBR VI
IS A VALID S^CFLAIATION 0? CAUOATION POSSIBLE 17ITH0UT THE CONCEPT 
0? PRODUCTION ?
Section i
Attempts to Enrôla in Causation Without the Concept of -Pro:duction
So far we have seen how Berkeley, îiume, Mill and Russell on the 
one hand, and some Buddhist schools on the other, tried to explain 
causation without the concepts of efficacy and ' production'® Such 
an analysis reduces causes to necessary and sufficient conditions, and 
effects to what they condition. However, we would like to argue that 
the notions of production and 'efficacy are so intimately connected 
with the concept of causation- tliat it would he impossible to give a 
valid explanation of causation without these notions. It is not possible 
to analyse causal relations solely in terms of necessary and sufficient 
conditions.
One of the several spheres in which the language of ’ cavpe-effect* 
is primarily applicable is that of human activity. Here the cause is 
a conscious agent, the voluntary actions which he perfoims are the means 
by which he brings about certain things called effects. Sometimes when 
we persuade or induce another to perform a certain act, we say we c ^ e
2?
another to do it; we make him do it® Here we say we cause 
another, because we'manipulate* the latter, we use him as a means to 
bring about certain states of affairs. Such cases have an obvious 
similarity with cases where we manipulate certain objects or events in 
nature in order to produce certain desired states of affairs. In such 
cases, we call that by manipulating which we bring about some desired 
result a ’cause* and the result its ’effect'.
The word ’ cause' is used in the second case in the sense in which 
the applied sciences use the word. According to these sciences, the 
cause is something under human control; we can produce or prevent the 
happening of the effect by producing or preventing the cause. Other 
branches of enquiry liave also probably borrowed ideas belonging to the 
concept of cause used by the applied sciences. The notions of agency 
and production thus seem to be fundamental factors constituting the
concept of cause as it is used in the different branches of study.
1 2 .R. 0, Collingwood and Douglas Gasking have argued quite persuasively
that causes are elements within the control of agents, by means of which 
they can bring about or prevent certain other conditions. Collingwood 
refers to them as 'levers' and Gasking calls them 'recipes’.
V/e might, at this stage, anticipate some objections by quoting some 
counter-examples. Such an example could be provided by the case where
1. E.G-. Collingwood, An Essay on Metaphysics, part 3-c, pp. 285-348#
2o D. Gasking, ’ Causation and Recipes’, Mind, vol. 64, 1955, pp* 479-
487#
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the ice of a river, for example, melts in the spring. It is clearly
the heat of the sun that causes the ice to melt in the spring. Yet
neither the ice nor the sun is within the control of man. Y/e cannot
say that we can bring about or prevent the melting by producing or
that
preventing the heat of the sun. And unless we can d<^ we cannot use
the term ’production’ either in this context. Again, imagine that
some inhabitants of a particular place suddenly became ill, and that
subsequent research found that this illness was caused by certain
unusual solar radiations. Ytduld we say that those radiations were not
t
the cause since they cannot be controlled by human intervention? I 
would rather think that such arguments are missing the point. Vdiat is 
really meant here is that the situations are called causal situations 
if they are in principle subject to human control and not that they are 
so designated only if they are actually under human control. It is 
thus a necessary condition (only) of something's being a causal 
situation that is controllable by human beings.
The language of 'production' or ’bringing about* is thus stipulated, 
income sense or other, to be applicable to every case of causation. The 
realization of the inseparable connection between the concepts of 
’production’ and’causation’ helps us to solve a major problem about 
causation. This is the problem about the temporal relation between the 
cause and its effect. T,hat sort of temporal relation should there be
1» These two examples are from the article on ’ Causation’ in the 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol. II, p. 64.
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between a cause and its effect? We have already seen that Hume 
suggested in many places that we can stipulate that the cause must be 
temporally prior to the effect. Such a suggestion is apparent in his 
definition of a cause as "an object precedent and contiguous to another"; 
"an object followed by another." ^ Yet, in spite of that, he discussed 
the possibility of the simultaneous existence of causes and effects.^ 
However, there is one question which he has never discussed. This is 
whether an effect could possible be temporally prior to its cause. I
suggest that the essentially productive character of a cause seems to
make it clear why a cause cannot, under any circumstances, temporally 
succeed its effect.
We must admit that in a moment of deeper reflection the question 
can indeed arise in our mind whether an affect can precede a cause.^
It is, for example, not absurd to ask whether it is possible to form, a 
concept of a * quasi-cause’, like that of cause in every respect except 
that, unlike a cause, it always follows its ’quasi-effect’.
It is true that a question like this one cannot be answered merely
1. See Ch. I, p. 5*^ , .
2. Treatise, p. ?6. This possibility is not discussed in the Enquiry#
3. For an account of the controversy as to whether a cause can succeed 
its effect, the following sources can be consulted;
(a) Dummett and Flew, FAS. Supplementary Vol. XXVIII, 1954,
pp. 27-60.
(b) Scriven and Flew in Analysis. 1956-1958, pp. 5-9 and 
81-86;
(c) Pears and Flew, Analysis. 1958, pp. 54-63#
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by pointing out that, according to the ordinary usuage of the word 
* cause’, nothing is designated a * cause* of any event that precedes it. 
One can still ask, why is the word ’ cause’ so used? Y/hat is the 
principle which people have in mind when they use the w ord in that way?
The question whether a cause can succeed its effect could probably
arise in our mind from such a consideration as the following. A
given change that is caused could be said to occur under a set of
numerous conditions. Among these conditions there are some which are
such that, presuming that the other conditions remained unaltered, the 
chanf?e cannot fail to occur in their presence. Some conditions again 
are such that the change could not have occurred had they not been 
•present, given that all other conditions remain what they are. The 
first set of conditions could be called • su^i’icient conditions and the 
second set - necessary conditions . Using this vocabulary'' of ’ necessary 
and sufficient conditions', some contemporary philosophers have tried 
to define the cause of an event either as being a necessary condition, 
or a sufficient condition, or both. Now, we can see that if a is a 
sufficient condition of ^  b is a necessary condition of If the 
beheading of Anne Boleyn is a sufficient condition of her dying, then 
her dying in the particular way she did is a necessary condition of her 
beheading. She could not have been beheaded if she was not to die in 
that particular way. Similarly it could also be shown that if a is a 
necessary condition of ^  ^  is a’s sufficient condition# Now, from 
this it follows that if a particular event is a necessary as well as
3? 4
a sufficient condition of another event, then the other event is a 
necessary as well as a sufficient condition of that event. If, in 
certain circumstances, a projectile's striking the wall from a particular 
angle and with a particular velocity is "both a necessary and sufficient 
condition of its rebounding at a given angle with a given velocity, then 
its rebounding in the way it did is also both a necessary and sufficient 
condition of its striking the wall with the particular velocity and 
from that particular angle.^ from this it follows tliat if an earlier 
event is a necessary as well as a sufficient condition of a later event, 
then the laj^r event is also in its turn a necessaiy and sufficient 
condition of the earlier one. Thus, if a cause is equivalent to the 
necessary and sufficient conditions, it seems quite arbitrary to reserve 
the title of 'cause* for the earlier event only There is nothing in 
the concepts of necessary and sufficient conditions as such which 
necessitates their application to the earlier, rather than to the later 
event. Tlie later has an equally good claim to it. Logical equivalents 
are also necessary and sufficient conditions of one another. Yet one 
logical equivalent is not earlier than the other. X's being equilateral 
is both a necessary and a sufficient condition of X* s being equiangular; 
and of course X's being equiangular is both a necessary and a sufficient
lo This example is taken from Ayer's The Problem of Knowledge. Pelican 
Series, p. 172,
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condition of s being equilateral. Yet X's being equilateral is not 
earlier than X* s being equiangular. ^
Take the example of the * quasi-cause* which Dummett has given. ^
A * quasi-cause* resembles a * cause* in every respect except that it is 
stipulated to succeed its effect* Such a * quasi-cause* must, according 
to Dummett, satisfy three conditions. Firsts the occurrence of the 
earlier event, which was to be explained by reference to that of the 
later event, would have to be incapable of being (causally) explained 
by reference to simultaneous ûr preceding events. Secondly, there 
must be no discoverable way of representing the earlier event as a 
causal antecedent (a remote cause) of the later. Thirdly, we should 
liave to be able to give a satisfactory (causal) account of tiie 
occurrence of the later event which contained no reference to the 
occurrence of the earlier. ^
Having these conditions in mind, Dummett constructs the f ollowdng 
example of the * quasi-cause*. Suppose a certain man regularly wakes 
up three minutes before his alarm-clock goes off. This regularity is 
maintained even when he does not know that, and for what time, it has
1. neither is, for that matter, the fact of X* s being equilateral uw-a&cL 
causally related to that of its being equiangi.ilar. See also pp.
op. cit.,
2. Dummetty/p. 32.
3. It seems that Dummett has here just taken it for granted that the 
later event must be capable of being causally explained. He has 
not taken into consideration the possibility that one may not, 
after all, be able to give a causal account of the later event.
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been set. He sleeps veij" late on those occasions v/hen the clock fails 
to ring* Suppose also that one day the nan forgot to v/ind the clock 
and the following morning he wakes up early. A friend of his, who knew 
nothing about this strange phenomenon, happened just to walk into his 
room and inadvertently set off the alarm-clock just three minutes after 
the man woke up. Could it not be reasonable to s ay in such a case thàt 
* the man wakes up because the alarm-clock is going to go off*? ^ This 
example satisfies all the conditions mentioned above.
V/e shall try to point out the contradiction involved in speald.ng
of a cause succeeding its effect with the help of the notion that a
cause is essentially a producer. In order tliat a later event might
cause an earlier event, the later event has to be able to briny about
an event in the past. But past events have, by definition, already
happened. So the only xie.y to bring about an event in the past is to
alter v/lxat has already happened. Everybody would object to such an
abs’ord suggestion. The pa4t is unchangeable, closed. One might recreate
events similar to what has cl ready happened, bit it makes no sense to
about
speak of now bringing/'what has already happened. But the question 
could still be asked, what makes it impossible to speak of bringing 
about an event that has already happened? Does it reflect some 
arbitrary choice on our part to restrict the use of the expression 
'bring about* to events that have not yet happened? Or is there some
1. Dummett, op. rit., p. 32.
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genuine difference between the past and the future which induces us 
to speak of bringing about only future events?
Professor Ayer has tried to explain the reason why we cannot speak 
Oi bringing about past events, with reference to our knowledge of the 
past. "The reason, then, why we do not allow ourselves to conceive of 
our actions as affecting past events is, I suggest, not merely that the 
earlier events already exist, but that they are, for the most part, 
already lonywn to exist. Since the same does not apply to the future, 
we come to tliink of human action as essentially forward moving”. ^ 
horiaally, when one tries to bring something about, when one acts in a 
certain way in order tnat some ciesired results may be achieved, one is 
not certain oi their happening. Because the future seems to us 
uncertain we think that we must strive to bring things about, we must 
work in a way that is likely to bring the things about. The past, on 
the other hand, is not unknov/n to the same degree; and especially not 
the immediate past.
i'Ow this, to me, does not appear to be the whole stoiy. Our
knowledge of any atate of affairs does not make us mere spectators of
the drama of existence. Even if I know that I am going to Covent
Garden tomorrow, that does not make my going there redundant or fruit- 
2
less. And if I sit idly in my room doing nothing, then I cannot
1. Ayer, The Problem of Knowledge, p. 175. Italics as in the original.
2. Cf. flew, p. 6l. PAS Supplementary vol. XXVTII, p. 6l.
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be said to have known it really,
Moreover, our knowledge of the past is really not so certain as 
Professor Ayer suggests. Even with regard to the immediate past, 
we can make mistakes about what we claim to Icnow about it. So it 
cannot be true that we do not try to produce something in the past 
because we are absolutely sure of what happened in the past. There 
are many instances where we are not sure whether something has happened 
in the past, V/hy do we not make any effort in those : cases to find 
out whether the event has taken place by trying to bring it about?
I suggest, rather, that efforts cannot be ascribed to an agent 
to bring about something after the product is already in existence. 
Before some state of affairs comes into being, it could be said to be 
potential. Potentiality or possibility makes sense only in the case 
of the existence of alternatives (of existence), d/hen a potential 
becomes actualised, the alternatives of its existence are destroyed or 
closed. V/e then make no efforts to bring it about, we do not perform 
any action intended to produce it, because efforts make sense only in 
the presence of alternatives. Thus we make no effort to bring about a 
past event as the alternatives of its being and non-being are destroyed. 
But in the case of a future event we make efforrs to bring it about 
because there are alternatives to the existence of that event. Unless 
we make efforts to bring it about, unless we perform those actions that 
are intended to bring it about, it may not come into existence at all.
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Thus the reason 7ihy v/e make efforts to "bring about a future 
event and do not do so to bring about events in the past is not because 
we are uncertain about the future but certain about the past. We 
could be equally uncertain about the past, especially if it is not the 
immediate past. But we would still not try to bring those events about, 
as there are no alternatives to their existence. On the contrary, the 
reason why we are not so sure of future events (as Ayer points out) is 
that there are alternatives to their existence, and we do not know 
which of the alternative courses they are going to take. And the reason 
why we are more certain of past events (as Ayer points out) is that 
there are no alternatives in the case of past events. But Dummett may 
point out here that the reason why you maintain that you cannot bring 
about a past event is that you think of the past as being determinate. 
You thinlc that the past event either did exist or did not exist. If it 
did exist then you cannot bring it about. But is the same thing not 
true of future events? future events either will exist or will not 
exist. If they will, then you cannot bring them about either, (i.e. 
they are going to happen irrespective of your efforts).
In answer we can say that the very nature of the concept of 
production rules out the possibility that a cast event may be brought 
about, tie get instances of production primarily ^ in the realm of human
1. V/e find instances of production in the animal and insect-worids also. 
But we tend to endow these man-human agents with some anthrop­
omorphic qualities. Moreover, even these agents provide us with 
instances of bringing something about in the future.
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activities* Here all the instances are cases of agents producing 
something in the future. There is no instance to the contrary of 
an agent producing something in the past.
But Dummmett may come forward with his example of the alarm-clock 
and argue tliat here is a perfect instance of a cause producing its 
effect in the past. In answer we can say that we do not even under­
stand what is meant by saying, * the man’s making up is produced by 
the alarm-clock’s going to go off#’ Our concept of production is 
primarily formed from our observations of the situations in which 
human agents produce effects in the future. This being the case, we 
would not even understand what is meant by saying, ’Xbrin^ about Y 
in the past. ’ V/e can very well understand what is meant by saying,
’2L a present event, is a necessary and sufficient condition of Y, a 
past event’. But we fail to understand what is meant by saying, 
a present event produces Y, a past event.*
Perhaps the question may still be asked, how would you then 
e:{plain a case like the whking up of the man and the subsequent going 
off of his alarm-clock? V/e could argue that in those cases where the 
man himself sets the alarm the night before, he makes up regularly 
before the alarm goes off because of the expectation of the alam, We
1. See ip.
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could then say that the man* s waking i:p in cases where he is ignorant 
01 the setting of the alarm, and where his friend inadvertently sets 
off the alarm-clock,^ ..just coincide with the subsequent ringing of the 
clock# Dummett may ask, would these not be very strange coincidences?
In answer we may ask, is it not also very strange that the ringing of 
the alarm-clock in the future produces the state of wakefulness in the 
past? If one can admit such a strange phenomenon, v/hy can one not also 
admit the possibility that a mysterious cause operates by waking him 
up via his watching the television every evening
The difficulty in proving our normal intuition that causes are 
prior to effects serves as a pointer# This difficulty probably arises 
because of the inadequate analysis of causation in terms of necessary 
and sufficient conditions© Causation cannot be properly analysed in 
this way# V/e shall mention a fev/ possible objections to such an
analysis# The first objection has already been hinted at in discussing
the necessary and sufficient conditions on page Si:ppose that a is 
the cause of b. This means, according to that analysis, that a is both 
a necessary and sufficient condition of b. According to that very 
analysis, it also logically follows that b is also a necessary and
sufficient condition of a. Now one of the difficulties involved here
is that logical equivalents are also necessary and sufficient conditions 
of each other# Yet neither of them is the cause of the other# The
lo See p. .
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relation of logical equivalence is non-temp oral, v/hereas the relation 
of cause-effect is a temporal relation.
V/e should he faced also with the following difficulty if we 
adhere to the analysis of causation in terms of necessary and 
sufficient conditions: let us suppose that a cause, x, is nothing hut 
a necessaiy and sufficient condition of its effect, y© According to 
the analysis shown in the preceding paragraph, y v/ould, in that case, 
also he the necessary and sufficient condition of x. How if we under­
stand hy the necessary and sufficient conditions of an event its cause, 
then we would he forced to regard y also as causing x. Yet nc^ne in 
his senese would allow that the accident of the car caused the icy 
patches on the road; that the death of President Kennedy caused the 
shooting; that the fire in a room is the cause of someone’s dropping a 
cigarette-butt in the waste-paper basket!
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Section ii
Denial of Production led to Denial of Causation Itself in 
* Mâdfa^mika’ Philosophy
Ae have seen that the * Tlierarada' and * Sarvastivada* schools causat xon
tried to explain/solely by the notion of condition. V/e have also 
2
seen that Buddhist logicians like Santaraksita and Kamalasila tried 
ta give an account of causation without the concepts of efficacy and 
production • Yet it is in fact impossible to explain causation 
without bringing in the concept of production • That is probably the 
reason why the Absolutist philosophers of the 'Mâdhyamika* ^ school of 
Buddhism argued that the concept of causation is unreal from the 
absolute standpoint. They are unanimous with the * Theravada’ and 
*Sarvâstivâda’ schools in explaining away production. But whereas 
these schools tried to give some explanation of causation even in the 
absence of the concept of production , the Absolutist ’Madhyamika* 
philosophers argued that the concept of causation itself is invalid 
from the absolute standpoint. The * Theravada’ and ’ Sarvâstivâda* schools 
claim that the ’doctrine of dependent origination’ (’pratîtya-samutpâda’’^
lo See chapter II and IV above.
2. See chapter IIlaboveTl^H^j
3. I.e. the 'SÛnyavâda’o
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conveys the idea that everything in the phenomenal world comes into 
being through its dependence on certain conditions. The *Madhyamika' 
philosophers on the other hand argued that the doctrine is meant to 
show only that everything in the phenomenal world is dependent on 
others and hence unreal from the standpoint of the Absolute. The 
expression ’pratitya-samutpada* ('dependent origination*) does not, 
in their system, refer to the objective fact of causation. On the 
contrary, it refers only to the fact of the essentially relative nature 
of the entire phenomenal existence (i.e. of empirical reality).
The 'Mâdhyamikas' argue that no empirical entity could be said 
to 'produce' another from the standpoint of the Absolute. Firstly, 
production implies the coming into existence of a particular thing 
which did not exist before. From the Absolute standpoint, however, 
nothing can be said to 'exist', in the real sense of the term, which 
does not exist in its own right (i.e. which is not 'self-existent%).
But if anything is self-existent, then it must exist always. Only 
that which depends on others for its existence can be said to 'begin 
to exist'. Hence, there will be no truth in the proposition that 
something which did not exist before comes into existence. Moreover, 
production requires that both the producer and its product must be 
real and self-existent entities. Yet no phenomenal thing can be 
self-existent from the standpoint of the Absolute. If anything were 
so, the Absolute would be contrasted with a self-existent being and 
hence lose its absolute character. Nagarjuna^ in fact argued against
1. Nâgâijuna gave shape to the Mâdhyamika' ideas in such a way th&t 
he can be called the founder of the school.
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the production of a self-existent thing in his Madhyamakarikas in 
the following way;
I
"The production of a self-existent thing by a conditioning cause is
not possible,
[For] being produced through dependence on a cause, a self-existent 
thing would be 'something which is produced' ('krtaka')."
II
"How, indeed, will a self-existent thing become 'something which 
is produced?
Certainly, a self-existent thing [by definition] is 'not produced' 
and is independent of anything else", ^
The argument implied in the above verses is that if anything 
is produced by something else, then it is dependent on the latter 
and not, therefore, self-existent.
1. MMK, ch. XV, verses 1 and 2. Translation by Strong in Emptiness,
p. 44, 199. The original Sanskrit verses can be found in De La Vallee 
Poussin*^8' 6(1.Madhyamaka^Zvrtti (MKV), pp. 259» 260, 262 as follows:
Verse I 'Na sambhavah svabhavasya yuktah pratyaya-hetubhih.
Hetu-pratyaya-sambhutah svabhavah krtako bhavet.*
Verse II. 'Svabhavah krtako naraa bhavisyati punah katham.
Akrtfimah svabhâvo hi nirapeksah paratra ca.*
Compare Strong's translation with that of Schayer in 
AusgewKhlte Kanitel aus der Prasannapadâ. pp. 59, la and b, Ila; 
p. 62. Ilb.
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Having denied production from the absolute viewpoint, the 
'Madhyamika' philosophers took a further step and denied causation 
itself from that viewpoint.
Nagarjuna tries to prove the unreality of the concepts of 
cause and effect by refuting the views of those opposing systems 
which take these concepts to be real. He proceeds by first introducing 
the vocabulary these systems use in propounding their theories of 
causation, and then trying to show what absurd consequences we are 
led into if we adhere strictly to their terminology. Consequently, 
the standpoints of the theories Nagarjuna is criticising may, as he 
represents them, appear to be both somewhat unintelligible and even 
absurd to a modern reader. If my representation of the views of those 
systems which take cause and effect to be valid concepts appears 
to be rather strange, that may be, I am afraid, dûs to the fact that 
I have mostly, even verbally quoted Nagarjuna's arguments (and 
Candrakirti's commentary on them). Let us now look at the arguments.
Since, on the one hand, the concepts of cause and effect 
depend on one another, and, on the other hand, they are incompatible 
even with each other, it follows that they are invalid. (Cf. E. 
Wollheim's F.H. Bradley, p. 112. "Bradley here ^ must be using a 
familiar kind of philosophical argument which moves from the fact
1. The context Wollheim is referring to is Bradley's discussion of
'Eelation and Quality' in his Appearance and Eeality, chapter III, 
pp. 21-29*
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that two concepts are both mutually dependent and mutually 
incompatible to the conclusion that the concepts are invalid or at 
any rate invalid when used on the same level in the same context.")
This argument is well illustrated in the verses of Nagarjuna's 
’Karika':
(The cause and the effect cannot be absolutely independent of 
each other.) "If the effect which dods not exist in the causes 
nevertheless appears from them, why does it not appear from the 
non- c.auses?" ^
2
But if the cause and the effect are related, then neither of
them has any self-supporting independent nature ('asvayammaya'). ^
And since according to common conception things that enter into a
4
relationship with each other have self-sufficient beings, things 
which do not have any independent nature cannot be related to each 
other. The cause and the effect would thus be incompatible even with 
each other. "The effect is caused, but the causes do not have any 
essence. How can the effect be caused, if it comes from (causes)
1. MKK, ch. 1, verse XII, as presented in MKV, pp. 87-88. Cf. CBN,
p. 178.
2. The word 'related' in this context should be taken as meaning 
'essentially related*, i.e. such that they cannot exist without 
one another.
other
5. For/translations of the term 'asvayamraaya' see Cm, pp. 178-179; 
Emptiness, p. l84.
4. two apples co-existing in a basket are two self-supporting
objects.
which do not have any essence?"
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1
Causation is explained in different ways by different 
non-Buddhist schools such as the 'Sankhya', the 'Nyaya-Vaisesika',
as well as some Buddhist schools like the 'Theravada* and the
—  . —  2 — -’Sarvastivada'• As we have shown before, the ’Sankhya’ philosophers
argued that the effect already exists in an unmanifest form in its 
material cause. The effect is substantially the same as its material, 
cause. The 'Nyaya-Vaisesika' philosophers, on the other hand, argue 
that the effect cannot be substantially the same as its material 
cause. The 'Theravada' and the 'Sarvastivada' schools largely a^ree 
with these philosophers. The effect does not pre-exist in its material 
cause. The appearance of the effect marks a completely new beginning. 
According to the 'Carvakas' or the 'Lokayatas'', however, things are 
merely produced at random without any causal laws.
The 'Madhyamikas' deny all these alternatives and say:
"Never and nowhere are there any entities which are 
produced, either out of themselves, or out of others, or
1, M K , ch. I, verse XIII, as presented in MKV, p. 88. The 
translation is our own. For other translations see CBN, p. 1?8 
and Emptiness, p. l84.
2. See ch. II, pp. ^
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out of both, or out of no causes whatever." ^
The 'Sankhya' theory o^ ’satkarya-vada’ is repudiated by 
- 2
Candrakirti in the following way:
"Entities are not produced out of themselves; since such 
production is useless ('utpadavaiyarthyat')." ^ "We c\o not see 
the need of the production of what already exists. We also see an
4
infinite regress." (if the effect y is only a new m a n i . f  estât ion 
of the cause x, then the cause x and the effect y have th % same 
essence. Now since x is essentially the same as y, then y is also 
the same as x. Thus as long as we have x, we have y , as long as 
we have y we have x, and so on ad infinitum).
The 'Theravada' and 'Sarvastivada* schools of Buddhism and
1. MiK, ch. I, verse I, as presented in MKV, p. 12. Translation 
ours. For other translations see CBN, p. 93 and Emptiness, p. I83) 
By the phrases 'produced out of themselves' and 'produced out
of others' Nagarjuna is referring to (i) the 'Sankhya' and 
(ii) the Nyaya Vais^esika' (as well as the'Theravada'and 
'Sarvastivada') theories of causation respectively. The phase 
'out of both' refers only to a fictitious theory which would 
combine the alternatives suggested by these two theories. The 
phase 'out of no causes whatsoever' obviously refers to the 
'Lokayata' ('i.e. 'Cârvâka') theory. We must point out that the 
'Theravada' and the 'Sarvastivada' philosophers did not really 
believe in production. But they did believe in causation and 
intended to analyse it ir^ i^^ erms of conditions. The 'Madhyamika' 
philosophers want to shovre/en the concept of - causation is 
invalid from the absolute standpoint.
2. Candrakirti is here commenting on Nagarjuna's argument by 
quoting Buddhapalita's opinion on this issue.
3. p. 14. Cf. CM, p. 94.
4. MKV, p. 15. Cf. CBN, p. 95.
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the Nyaya-Vaisesika' school take the cause and the effect to 
be essentially different from each other. They recognise the 
logical difficulties connected with analysing causation as a 
process of the manifestation of an effect already existing in an 
unmanifest form, in its cause. Causation is explained by the 
'Sarvastivada' philosophers as the appearance of an effect 
depending on several conditions ('pratyayan pratitya'). The 
scholastic 'Sarvastivadins' enumerate four kinds of conditions, ^ 
depending on which the effect appears. This theory, which 
explains the effect as the appearance of a thing or event under 
several conditions, the 'Madhyamikas' contend, is equally unable 
to explain causation. The gap between the two entities, the 
cause and the effect, is widened if we accept this theory, and 
no amount of argumentation can bring together entities which 
are essentially different from each other.
If the effect were 'an other' then, in principle, everything
could be produced from anything and anywhere (otherness being
equally present both in what is and in what is not the cause of
2
a thing). Candrakirti says in his Prasannapadâ, "entities 
cannot arise out of something (essentially) different from them, 
since it would follow that everything could then arise out of
1. See ch. IV, pp.
2. Candrakirti here quotes Buddhapalita.
291
anything."  ^ "Why then is a piece of cloth (linen or silk) 
neve^roduced out of straw and other things which admittedly are 
not its causes? From the standpoint of Ultimate Reality we 
deny the production of effects altogether." ^
The early Buddhist schools analysed different perceptions
as originating due to the 'correlation' of the different sense-
organs and their corresponding objects. The sense-organs and their
corresponding objects are considered as 'conditions' which cause
the different perceptions. But it is evident that before a
particular perception comes about, the particular sense-organ which
is supposed to cause it is a non-cause. If that is the case,
then that particular sense-organ cannot, according to a 'Mâdhyamika'
philosopher, bring about any perception. Candrakirti says, suggesting
such a point, "nothing can be produced out of non-causes, e.g. oil
4
cannot be pressed out of sand."
If and when we want to produce an entity from another, it 
is obvious that they both rav.st be self-supporting. If the effect
is not, in a way, present in the cause, then we cannot, by any
1. MKV, ch. I, p. 36. Translation, CBN, p. 120.
2. 'Svarupatah* = 'tattvatah'. See CBN, p. I78, n. 2.
3. p. 88. Cf. CBN, p. 178,
4. MKV, p. 81. Cf. CBN, p. 170,
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means whatsoever, produce it out of that cause. Yet if, on the 
other hand, the effect is already present in the cause (e.g. as 
claimed by the 'Sankhy^ists'), if it is already an existent 
fact, why should we bring an additional entity to produce it?
If a particular perception is already there, what is the use of 
introducing a visual sense-organ as its generator? ^
Neither could we bridge the gap between tv;o entirely different
entities, the 'Mâdhyamika' philosopher shows, by introducing a
/
third entity between the two as the 'energy' (' kriya'), or the 
'causal operation* exercised by the cause on, the effect. It 
could be argued that the cause of a visual perception does not, 
as a separate entity, produce that perception. Its real producer 
is a corresponding 'energy', inherent in its cause. A similar
2
energy is the physical energy of heat which produces cooked rice.
This additional 'energy', the 'Mâdhyamika' philosopher shows, 
will complicate matters further. V/e will then be tempted to ask, 
when does this'operation' come into being? Does it appear when 
the effect already exists, or before it, or simultaneously with it? 
Vve cannot say that it arises after the effect has emerged, for its
1. Cf. "But if a thing is really existent, if it is present.... it
is absolutely useless to imagine some causes producing it." (See 
MKV, p. 82 and CBN, p. 1?1.
2. MKV, p. 79. Cf. CBN, pp. 178-179.
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presence would be perfectly useless then* Nor would we say 
that it arises before the effect emerges; for the effect is bound 
to be there when the 'causal operation' is there. Nor can the 
'operation' exist when the effect is being born; "because a thing 
is either produced or not-produced, there is no existence between 
(the two)." ^ Besides, as an action it must belong to a thing. It 
cannot belong to the cause, the seed; for the seed, ex hypothesi, 
no longer exists when its effect, the sprout, comes about.
An elaborate refutation of the possibility of each of the 
conditioning causes separately causing the effect is also given 
in Candrakirti's Prasannapadâ (based on the same principle that 
the two entities in relation cannot remain isolated, and yet if 
they are united, they cannot be related):
1» MKV, p. 80. Cf. CBN, p. 168. Candrakirti clarifies his 
statement with the following verse:
"Because what iS being born is half-born, it is. not 
(really) produced.
Otherwise the state of being born would attach to 
everything."
(MKV, p. 80. Cf. CBN, p. 168 and n. 7).
The intended meaning is probably this. An entity that is in 
the process of being born does no^have any real existence. If 
it does, then one will have to admit the identity of what is 
being born and what is in existence. But if we admit such an 
identity, then we shall have to grant that all the existing 
things are only half-born (because an entity that is bein^jborn 
is only half-born). If all this is true, then it follows that 
the 'operation' cannot belong to an entity that is in the state 
of being born. For such an entity does not have a real existence.
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The 'Sarvastivadins' introduced four causal conditions.^
(The 'Madhyamika' philosophers Nagarjuna and Candrakirti do not 
represent them as they are actually analysed in the 'Sarvastivada' 
system. They sometimes misrepresent them to a certain extent).
"Among them the 'cause-condition' is", in the language of the 
^Mâdhyamika'philosopher, "that which turns out" ('nirvartaka')
(For example, the seed turns out the effect, the sprout).
Candrakirti gives the following account of the remaining three 
conditions:
"If something is supported by [something else] in its 
coming into existence, then the latter is called its 'supporting 
condition' or 'object-condition' ('alambana-pratyaya')." ^ (For
4
example, the 'supporting-condition' of a perception is the object ' 
on which the perception depends). "The immediately-preceding condition 
('samanantara-pratyaya') for the emergence of an effect is the 
evanescence of its material cause." ^ (Candrakirti gives the
1. V/e have discussed these four conditions in ch. IV, pp.
2. MKV, p. 77. Cf. CBN, p. I65. Behind the metaphor of 'turning
out' is the meaning that a 'cause-condition' is that which is 
directly responsible for the coming into existence of the effect. 
The phrase 'turns out' refers to a transitive verb here.
3. M^, p. 77. Cf. CBN, p. 165.
6. p. 77. Cf. CBN, pp. 165-6.
-4. One should not confuse this 'object' with a sense-datum. The 
object of sensation, sense-datum, is usually referred to as 
'visaya'. The object of a perception ('alambana') contains a 
conceptual aspect.
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example of the preceding destruction of the seed as the
'immediately-preceding condition'.for the production of the
sprout* This grossly misrepresents the position of the
'Sarvastivadins' in whose analysis an 'immediately-preceding
condition' is necessarily a mental state. See ch. IV, pp.169-176
in this connection). "If something appears because something (else)
exists, then the (latter^ is the predorainant-condition ('adhipati-
pratyaya) of the (former)." ^ The 'predominant-condition' is
thus that factor which being present the effect inevitably appears.
IS
As such this really stands for the condition that^in a general 
way responsible for the emergence of an effect.
The 'Mâdhyamika' philosophers show that the first condition, 
the 'cause-condition', is an absurdity. The so-called 'cause- 
condition', the seed, cannot be said to 'turn out' (i.e. 'produce') 
its so-called effect, the sprout, either in the presence or in 
the absence of the sprout. If the sprout already exists, then there 
is no need to produce it with the help of something else. When the 
sprout appears we do not require the seed to produce it once again.
On thither hand, as long as the sprout is absent, we cannot say
1. p. 77, cf. CBN, p. 166.
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that the seed produces the sprout.
The same logic applies to the 'object-condition' and its 
corresponding perception. If the perception is present then 
there is no need to bring it into being with the help of something 
else. If the perception does not exist, then we have to imagine 
the absurd situation that a non-existent perception already has 
an object. The same dilemma exists if we take up the object. If 
the object is there, its corresponding perception is bound to be 
there (because an object is, by definition, the object of a 
perception). In that case, there will be no need to bring the 
perception about. On the other hand, if the object is absent, then 
we shall have to answer the following question: If the perception 
begins by having no object, how can it get one afterwards? ^ In 
other words, we shall be faced with the difficulty of showing how 
two objects, which are basically unrelated, can somehow enter into 
some sort of relation.
The 'immediately-preceding condition' must disappear before 
the effect appears. Eut "if it disappears, how can it be a cause?" ^ 
The cloth does not exist either in the threads ('adhipatipratyaya') 
or in the weaver's brush, or in the loom, or in the shuttle. If
1. MM, ch. I, verse VIII; p. 84; cf. CM, p. 173®
2. MKV, p. 86; cf, CBN, pp. 175-176.
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it did, we should be able to perceive it. Moreover, from a 
multiplicity of causes a multiplicity of effects would be expected.
And since the cloth does not exist in any of its parts taken singly, 
neither does it exist in all of them together. Besides, (as stated 
on p. above) if the effect appears even from things in which it 
does not exist, why does it not appear from the non-causes? ^
Moreover, it will be difficult even to establish the reality 
of the piece of cloth. The cloth would be real only if the threads 
had any reality. But the threads themselves consist of parts. 
Consequently, the threads themselves are dependent on somthing else 
and not self-sufficient, and hence not real. Therefore, how can we 
maintain that the piece of cloth which consists of these threads 
is self-sufficient and real?
From all these considerations it follows, the 'Mâdhyamika* 
philosophers contend, that both thç alternative theories of causation 
advanced by the 'Sankhya' philosophers on the one hand, and the 
'Sarvastivada' and 'Theravada' philosophers (and the 'Nyâya-Vaisesika')
1. MK, ch. I, verse VII; cf. CBN, p. 178,
298
on the other, suffer from some major defects. A theory that 
would try to combine the alternatives suggested by these opposing 
theories would naturally be falsified by the defects associated 
with each of these alternatives taken separately.
The fourth theory, that things are uncaused, is, in the
language of Candrakirti, "absolutely poor" (’ekanta-nikrsta iti').^
What Candrakirti means here is probably that if it is argued that
'there is no cause of anything whatsoever' then (presuming the
identity of 'cause' and 'reason'), it follows that there is no
reason for anything whatsoever. And the statement, 'things are
2
uncaused' would then have no reason behind it either.
The above discussion shows that the 'Mâdhyamika' philosophers 
maintain that entities designated as 'causes' and 'effects' 
cannot exist by virtue of their own being. As causes things are 
dependent on their effects in much the same way as their effects 
depend on them for their coming into existence. And even if they 
did exist by virtue of their own being, there could not be any
1. MKV, p. 76; cf. CBN, p. 165.
2. It is however doubtful whether the words 'reason' and 'cause' 
can be identified in this manner. One has to I - recognise 
that the concepts cause- and effect- are temporal concepts, 
and hence they must be recognised to be different from the non- 
temporal concepts like -reason-, -ground-, and -consequent-.
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causal relationship between such self-supporting entities*
It might be asked then, if there are no causes and effects, 
how does the ’Mâdhyamika' philosopher in that case interpret the 
principle of ‘dependent origination’ (’pratitya-samutpada’), the 
principle by which all Buddhists explain the world?
The ’Mâdhyamika’ philosopher maintains that when the phrase 
'dependently originating entities (’pratitya-samutpanna ’) is 
applied to the things in the phenomenal worW, it only expresses 
the idea that these things are devoid of any essence of their own, 
they are realtive*^ In the technical terminology of the 
’Mâdhyamika' system, they are said to be’devoid’ (’sunya), of the 
dual concepts of ’beings’ and’non-being’ in terms of which we define 
every entity. They cannot evidently be characterised as being, as 
only self-supporting entities can, properly speaking, be said to 
have any being of their own. Yet they cannot be said to be 
absolutely non-existent either; because they have some sort of 
relative being. The word ’pratitya-samutpada’ in their system is 
interpreted as mârtning only ’relative origination’. Everything in 
the phenomenal world can thus be said to have ’relative origination’ 
only in the sense that everything has a ’relative existence’.
1. "Yah pratitya-samatpadah sunyatam tarn pracaksmahe". #1K, 
chapter XXIV, verse l8,"presented in lOT, p. 503- See also 
CBN, p.43, n.l.
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Just as the word ’long’ is essentially relative to the word 
’short’ with regard to its meaning, in the same way effects are 
essentially relative to their causes. Since every phenomenal 
thing is conditioned by causes, every phenomal thing is 
relative. In the words of the Prasannapada, ’’Thus it is that 
Buddha wished to put in a strong light (the principle of 
Relativity) the fact that entities are produced only in the 
sense of being relative to others. He therefore maintains that 
they are produced neither at random nor from a variety of 
causes... By this negative method he discloses the true relative 
character of all entities... This is the relative existence or 
dependent origination, because nothing really new is produced.’’ ^
Considered from the standpoint of absolute truth ’originating 
dependently’ loses its meaning as the ’link' between things; rather
1* However, we must point out that such a line of arguing is
based on presuppolitions like, the effect could not be whatit 
is (i.e. effect) unless it were caused, the cause could not be 
what it is (i.e. the cause) unless it did cause the effect.
Hence such a line of arguing is dependent on describing the 
effect solely as an ’effect’. The sprout is essentially dependent 
on the seed if we decide to describe the sprout as an ’effect’ 
of the seed. In the same way, the cause is necessarily related 
to the effect if we decide to describe it as the cause. But 
there are other ways of identifying the cause and those other 
ways are not essentially related to the descriptions of the 
effect. Thus one can say that ’smoking causes cancer’ and such 
a proposition is undoubtedly a synthetic one. But if we decide 
to describe the cause in terms of its causal property, then we 
can of course convert the above proposition into the analytic 
propisition. ’The cause of cancer causes cancer’.
2. MKV, p. 10; CBN, p. 90.
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it indicates that the process of ’phenomenal becoming’ is 
devoid of independent reality. If all this is true then,
(according to the ’Madhyamika’ philosophy), without real 
entities, and consequently, without real causes, the so-called 
causal chain is a mere mental fabrication.
The 'Kahdyamika’ philosophers regarded causal relations, as 
conceived in ’Theravada’ and ’Sarvastivada’ Buddhism, as real only 
from the practical, the conventional point of view. Processes such 
as origination, production, and causation are thus not deprived of 
their reality from the empirical point of view in 'Mâdhyamika' 
philosophy. The 'Mâdhyamika' philosophers even admit that the 
early Buddhist analysis of causal relations also serves some useful 
purpose. It accounts for phenomenal ’becoming’ and at least serves 
to turn a person’s attention away from ascribing independent reality 
to mundane things. From the ultimate point of view, however, the 
realisation of the principle of 'dependent origination’ is, 
according to them, only the realisation of the ’emptiness’ of the 
categories of thought and external reality (e.g. cause, substance 
etc.).
The ’Mâdhyamika’ philosophers thus denied production from the 
standpoint of the Absolute. They probably realised the futility 
of the attempt to retain the concept of ’causation’ after having 
denied that of production . This probably is the reason that 
prompted them to deny even the concept of causation from the 
absolute standpoint.
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CHAPTER VII 
REASONS AND CAUSES
*She married him because of his money** *He killed X out 
of sheer jealousy** *He shot X because X*s remarks about his 
wife made him extremely angry** Statements like these express the 
various ways in which we explain actions by quoting motives* like 
gretd* jealousy, and anger* And it is quite common to speak of 
motives and intentions as the causes of our actions* But a group 
of British (and American) philosophers have recently been inclined 
to deny that motives, intentions, volition etc* can be causes of 
©ur actions* Since by quoting motives, intentions etc* of actions 
people also state the reason why they perform those actions, these 
philosophers prefer to cell motives, intentions etc* reasons for 
actions* These philosophers also often make a distinction between 
what they describe as *his reason* and *the reason** ^ Such a 
distinction is noticeable in the way we sometimes say of somebody,
*his reason might have been X but the reason why he did it was T* *
Thus we may argue that although Jones said that he crossed the road 
in order to biQr some tobacco, the reason why he crossed it was that 
he wanted to have a closer look at the pretty girl serving at the
1* See R.8. Peters, The Concept of Motivation, pp. 8-9o
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counter* Whereas talk of *his reason* entails that a is 
conscious of his objective, talk of *the reason Ydiy he did it* does 
not*
Now the question whether there is a distinction between 
reasons for actions and causes is very important for the comparative 
study we have undertaken* The group of philosophers we have 
mentioned just now argue that reasons for actions are fundamentally 
different from causes* It is true that the empiricist philosophers 
like Hume and Mill did not explicitly distinguish between these two 
concepts* Yet those philosophers who advocate a distinction between 
reasons for actions and causes might argue that this distinction is 
so fundamental that even though philosophers like Hume and Kill did 
not explicitly make it, their discussion of causes must nevertheless 
have had implicit reference to it* Now it is possible that there is 
no corresponding distinction in Buddhist philosophy between reasons 
for actions and causes* Let us, at this stage of our investi[gation, 
just presume that there is no such distinction* The question would 
then naturally arise, to what extent can we really compare the concept 
of cause as found in Buddhist philosophy with that found in the 
philosophy of empiricists like Hume, Mill ?
But we contend that there is no essential difference between 
reasons for actions and causes* In the following pages we shall 
examine some of the arguments put forward ty some philosophers in view
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of their thesis that the reasons which explain actions cannot he 
said to cause actions* In the course of the examination we shall 
also try to make it clear that reasons for actions really constitute 
a species of the genus cause* After the examination of these 
arguments we shall try to show that Buddhist philosophers did not 
maintain a fundamenteil distinction between reasons for actions and 
causes* But we shall, by then, be in a position to argue that this 
is no reason why we cannot make the comparative stucfy we have under­
taken# The distinction between reasons and causes is not fundamental* 
Philosophers like Hume and Mill dTd not make any ea^licit or implicit 
reference to such a distinction* In fact it is hardly surprising 
that they did not do so for, as we shall show in the following 
pages, reasons and causes are not essentially different*
The arguments against treating reasons for actions as causes 
have been very lucidly and succinctly analysed by Donald Davidson in 
his article^'Actions, Reasons, and Causes*^ We shall, in our 
examination base ourselves to a large extent on his analysis*
1* Published in Journal of Philosophy. 1963, pp# 685-700*
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Section i
Examination of Arguments Against Considering Reasons for Actions 
as Causes.
One of the arguments is to the effect that since reasons consist
of motives (greed, jealousy, anger etc.), which are states or
dispositions, and not events, they cannot therefore be causes.^
That motives and intentions do not stand for any happening or
experience, has been pointed out by various philosophers in various
ways. In one form or another this has been pointed out by
2
philosophers like Wittgenstein, Melden, and Peters.
The first thing to be pointed out in answer to such an argument 
is the fact that the entire set of antecedent conditions wich causes 
an effect consists not only of events but of static states and 
conditions as well. We have seen in <x . previous chapter ^ how 
Mill himself has pointed this out. To give some examples of static 
causal conditions: the boat capsized because it had a hole in it, 
the bridge collapsed because of a structural defect. But the 
question can still be asked, does not the mention of such static cewA'Aiciis
1. Davidson, J P. p. 693*
2. For Melden see Free Action, pp. 86-87, 90-97# For Wittgenstein 
see Philosophical Investigations, sec. 645. For Peters see 
The Concept of Motivation, pp. 37-40.
3* See ch. ITT,pp. Uo-v-îi
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qualify as giving causal explanations only on the assumption that 
somewhere in the causal situation there was also a preceding event?
And what sort of events can be counted as causing actions?
Now it is really riot difficult to point out events that are
closely associated with reasons for actions like motives and
intentions. States and dispositions are certainly not events© But
-1
then that which Davidson describes as the 'onslaught' of a state 
or disposition is undoubtedly an event. And these 'onslaughts' can, with 
full propriety, be given causal roles in bringing about actions.
I become angry the moment someone insults me. Sheila becomes 
jealous the moment her boy friend pays attention to another girl in 
the party. And these 'onslaughts' are certainly events.
Melden, in discussing the case of a driver raising his arm in
order to signal that he is approaching a turn, challenges his readers
to point out any event, any particular feeling or experience, that
is 'common and peculiar' to all such cases of signalling. Is there,
he asks, any event, perhaps a motive or an intention that can be
identified as causing the action of raising the arm by way of 
signalling? ^ But of course we can point out such an event. At a part­
icular moment the driver becomes, aware of the fact that he is
1. Davidson, J P , p. 694.
2.^ Free Action, pp. c5,o7«
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approaching a turn* And whether we can call such an awareness an 
experience or not, that is what causes him to signal. Melden is of 
course right in saying that we cannot specify any event that is 
'coœmon and peculiar* to all cases where a man intentionally raises 
his arm to signal. But then caniwe specify any 'common _and. 
peculiar' cause of all cases of collapsing of bridges, capsizing of 
boats either? ^
Sometimes the objection to treating reasons as causes comes
from the observation of the nature of our knowledge of reasons. How
do I know that this motive or this intention relates to this action
or that? Not by observing any correlation between reasons and actions.
I know my reasons in acting infallibly. Yet this is not the way I
become aware of causal processes. I become aware of them through
2
observation and induction.
No doubt our knowledge of our reasons in acting does share some
of the oddities peculiar to the first person knowledge of one's pain,
desire etc. Yet our knowledge of our own reasons is not as infallible
as we may think. I may, for example, have two reasons for performing
o»e
a particular action^of which pleases me and one of which does not.
And I may be mistaken about which of them is the reason why I did
1. Davidson, JP, p* 693*
2. See Davidson, JP, p. 699, and Macintyre, 'Antecedents of Action' 
published in British Analytical Philosophy, ed. Williams and 
Monte fiore, p. 2l6.
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what I dido I may, for example, think that I am poisoning Charles 
because I want to put &n end to the terrible and incurable pain he 
is suffering from.My citing of this reason would be citing my reason 
for what I am doing. But it may be that I am really poisoning him 
because I want him out of the way. In that case, my wanting him 
out of the way would be the reason why I am poisoning Charles, And 
I may be wrong about which particular motive was the one from which 
I am poisoning him.
But of course the fact that I may sometimes be wrong about 
my motives and may accept public evidence as correcting my knowledge, 
does not mean that in general it makes s®nse to ask 'how do I know 
what my reasons for acting are?'. We do not generally need any 
evidence for knowing what motives are the ones from which we 
performed particular actions. Yet this fact in itself does not 
prove that our knowledge of our own reasons is not knowledge of 
causes. Perhaps what is suggested by this argument is that we do 
not need any evidence precisely because of the fact that there is 
a logically necessary connection between the reasons for particular 
actions and the actions they explain. However, we shall show, with 
the help of the arguments D.F. Pears uses in an article, that this 
peculiarity of the knowledge of one's own reasons is explicable as 
being due to the special character of the concept of a reason for an
1. See 'Reason, Causes, Actions' by D.F. Pears, published in 
Epistemology, ed. A. Stroll, pp, 204-228*
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action. This peculiarity need not be due to any entailment between 
a statement concerning a reason and that regarding the performance 
of the action it explains.
Let us take the agent's desire as his reason. If he wants
to determine whether a particular desire of his caused a particular
action, he will be immediately aware of his desire as the desire to
act in a particular way. Now this awareness of his particular desire
implicitly ^ includes the awareness that it is a kind of desire which
is nearly always followed by the action desired under certain
appropriate circumstances. This is so precisely because of the fact
that unless people nearly always acted according to their genuine
desires under certain appropriate conditions, we could not communiacte
with each other about our desires to act. Owing to this special
feature of the concept of a desire to act, the agent has a kind of
immediate knowledge of his desires as causing his actions. The case
is different with regard to the concept of a non-human cause. Although
the concept of physical impact does in some way include the idea of
such usual effects of impact as movement and fragmentation, yet there
are other ways of identifying impacts, both as kinds of impacts and as
2
specific impacts, even apart from referring to its usual effects.
1. i.e. the agent is only explicitly aware of his desire as the desire 
to act in a particular way. But this description in fact entails 
the description, 'it is a kind of desire which is nearly always 
followed by the action desired in certain appropriate situations',
2, See Fears, op, cit., p. 210,
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Hence one has to depend on inductive evidence if one wants to prove, 
for example, that a physical impact caused a movement oh a fragmentation*
Those who bring forward the argument regarding the immediacy of 
an agent's knowledge of his reasons possibly want to say that this 
immediacy is due to the fact thàt the identification of a reason entails 
a reference to the performance of the action it explains. If this 
were really so, then they could legitimately claim that a reason 
cannot cause an action*^ They would argue that the application of 
the description, 'desire to act' to anything entails the application 
of a certain other descritpion about its being followed by the action. 
They would not simply claim that identifying something as 'a desire 
to perform a certain action' entails the preposition, 'this desire 
will be followed by the action'. They would rather make qualified 
claims in the following way*
They would say that it is obvious that the agent would hot 
simply perform the desired action if he suddenly discovered that the 
appropriate time for it has arrived. He would perform it only if 
the action were feasible, and he believed it to be so. Moreover, if
the desire refers to an action that is to be performed at a later
time, then there is the likelihood that the desire may fade away,
either due to change of circumstances, on of itself. Keeping in mind
1. The identification of a cause must not entail a reference to its effect,
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complex situations like these, they would claim that the agent's 
statement that he wants to perform a certain action entails a 
disjunctive set of propositions* It entails that (i) the agent will 
act in the desired way, or (ii) the agent does not think it feasible, 
or (iii) his desire has decreased in the meantime, or (iv) ......
Now we do admit that the concept of desire to act has some
connection with the concept of the action that follows this desire.
2
Otherwise we could no communicate with each other about our desires 
to act. Yet talk of desires need not entail talk of the actual 
performances of the actions. Successful communication about desires 
to act merely requires that the disjunctive set of propositions is 
nearly always true when the agent says that he really wants to perform 
a certain action.
It is very rarely the case that an agent's statement that he 
really wants to perform a certain action is true and the disjunctive 
set of propositions is false. Neither does the agent's statement 
entail the disjunctive set. If the agent's statement really entailed 
the disjunctive set, then not only could there be very few cases in 
which his statement be true and the disjunctive set false, there 
could be none. Yet it is highly unlikely that there are no cases
1. The list of alternatives is not complete. It should merely give
us a rough idea of what sort of alternatives are needed See P e a r s ,op.cvt.
p. 211.
2. See p. 3o«i
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whatsoever in which his statement is true and the disjunctive set 
1
false.
But although we have tried very hard to show that the
peculiarity of our knoweldge of our reasons is not due to any entail-
Mcnt between the identifications of reasons and references to the
actions performed, some philosophers have gone^some way towards
establishing that identifications of reasons ^  entail descriptions
of actions explained. And they claim that since the notion of a
causal sequence implies that cause and effect are intelligible without
any logically internal relation of the one to the other^ reasons
2
cannot, therefore, be causes of actions.
There are various ways in which it is claimed that statements 
of reasons entail those about actions. One important way is just to 
claim that citing the motive or intention is not citing a mental 
event separable from the action, but only giving a fuller description 
of the action. Some one may, for example, fail to understand why the
driver raised his arm when he approached a turn. Here we may try to
explain the action by quoting the motive or intention; 'He raised 
his arm because he intended to signal that he is taking a turn.* This
is in effect the same thing as saying that 'he raised his arm as a way
1. See pp. Siu-Si'i
2. Melden, Free Action, p. 52« See also p.
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of signalling that he was preparing to make a turn. ' Thus by
citing the motive we only explain the isolated action of raising the
arm by relating it to the wider context in which the raising of his
arm is to be understood as signalling* Moreover, there are ways of
checking the truthfulness of declarations of intentions with
reference to the further actions of the driver, his further avowals
and disavowals, the feelings he betrays etc* This also shows that
having an intention is not a matter relating to a single mental event,
but to "the whole character of the proceedings that surround the
2
action performed." And what we do when we cite a motive or an intent­
ion is only to direct another man's attention to the wider surrounding 
in which an action is placed. These are the points Wittgenstein had
rt
in mind when he remarked, ' 'I am not ashamed of what I did then, but 
of the intention which I had' , - and didn't what I did include the 
intention? What justifies the shame? The whole history of the 
incident. " ^
Citing the reason for an action is thus in the opinion of some 
philosophers, only giving a fuller characterisation of that action.
The reason and action are not, therefore, two separable events.
lo For a further account of such checks see Anscombe's Intentions, sec, 
23.
2. Free Action, p. 100*
3 ,  P h i l o s o p h i c a l  I n v e s t i g a t i o n s ,  sec. 644.
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Description of the action and statement of its reason are thus 
really different descriptions of one and the ssime phenomenon# The 
former is in fact entailed by the latter. Actually, no appropriate 
description of the intention or motive is in fact possible without 
bringing in any reference to the action which it explains. ^ V/e 
can, for example, explain our driver's action of raising his arm, 
by referring to his 'intention of informing others that he is 
approaching a turn.' But how does he 'inform others' except by 
raising his arm? The statement of the driver's intention thus 
logically implies a reference to his action of raising his arm*
The first observation that we can make with regard to the
objection discussed above is this. Even when we give a causal
explanation of a phenomenon we redescribe the phenomenon in terms
in
of its cause. Yet this^itself does not imply that the description
IVie
of the phenomenon and^statement of its cause are in fact different 
descriptions of one identical phenomenon. We can explain an 
accident, for example, by saying that 'the accident was caused by the 
driver's ignoring the traffic signals.' Yet by doing so we do not 
identify the accident with 'the driver's ignoring the signals.* In 
the same way, I can explain why I flipped the switch by saying 'because 
I wanted to turn on the light.' Now this explanation is also
1. Davidson, JP, p. 696, and Macintyre, op. cit., p. 2l6. "The
intention contained a description of the as yet unrealized action."
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expressible in the words, 'My flipping the switch was caused by my 
wanting to turn on the light'. And yet the latter propo^^ion and the 
statement, 'I flipped the switch' do not describe the same phenomenon. 
Nor does the statement of the motive behind my action of 'flipping 
the switch' necessarily imply the description of the action. V/hat 
sort of logical connection is there between the phrases, 'my wanting 
to turn on the light' and 'my flipping the switch'? ^ But someone may 
ask at this stage, although it is possible to describe the reasons 
in some ways which are not necessarily connected with the descriptions 
of the actions they explain, is it possible to identify (i.e. specify) 
such reasons as reasons for actions without referring to actions?
How can I, for example, identify a kind of desires as 'my desires to 
turn on the light' if these desires are never followed by actions that 
can be interpreted as ways of implementing these desires? We can
2
answer such an objection, again with the help of Pears's arguments, 
in the following way.
Firstly, we would like to point but that there is no contradiction 
in saying that we cannot, at least in the present state of our 
knowledge, identify the desires to act without also referring in some 
ways to the actions desires; and saying that alternative identifications
lo There are other ways of turning on the light besides flipping the 
switch. For example, I may turn it on by joining some wires 
together and thus completing the circuit.
2. See Pear's, Epistemology, pp. 214-220,
316
of desires may one day be discovered. In fact, Pear's has pointed 
out that it would not be unwise to expect, presuming that some form 
of physicalism is true, that some specific physical descriptions of 
states of desires in terms of neurological processes will one day 
be available* And such descriptions of desires would not entail 
references to the actions that follow.
Secondly, even if there were no other way of identifying a 
desire except by referring, in some way, to the consequent performance 
of the action, yet it is difficult to establish it beyond doubt that 
a statement like 'I desire to do X' entails 'either I do X, or I do 
not think it feasible, or my desire has decreased, (i.e. the disjunctive 
set of propositions ).
If the entailment does hold, then we can certainly use the 
'disjunctive set of propositions' as a check on the truth of a 
person's statement that he really wants to perform an action. But is 
that really possible? Suppose that I myself make that statement 
with all sincerity. Let us also suppose that the opportunity to 
perform arrives, to my surprise, immediately and I believe that 
it is feasible to perform that action. Would I be forced to admit 
that I had not really wanted to perform that action if no 'disjunctive
1. See Pears, Epistemology, p. 215.
2. See p.
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set of propositions' like the one mentioned on p. can be used to 
describe what happens? Should not the sincereity of the agent's 
statement sometimes be powerful enough to force us to admit that 
he really desired to do something?
But we must admit that although we can sometimes insist that 
the person who has a clear conception of desires to act and who 
is being sincere about his desire is the final arbiter in a dispute 
like this, it will be difficult to insist like this in every case.
Cases where we can insist in this way are exceptional.
But even if we presume, for the sake of arguemnt, that 'I 
want to do X' entails the disjunctive set, we can still show that 
the central and major part of the concept of a desire to act consists 
of the concept of a 'state* whose application does not entail the 
application of any such disjunctive set of propositions as the one 
referred to above. Such a state corresponds to a state of genuine 
craving or longing^together with its associated feelings and emotions. 
Pears (possibly) has in mind the concept of such a 'state' as the 
'core' of the full concept of a desire to act.^ This state can 
certainly be regarded as the cause of performing the action the agent 
wanted to perform. The description of such a state does not entail 
any disjunctive set of propositions connecting the desire to act with
1. See Pears, Epistemology, pp. 219-221. The 'full concept' of a
'desire to act' would perhaps include such factors as the agent's 
conviction that he wants to perform the action concerned.
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the consequent acting. We can conceive that the agent is in that 
state and still none of the disjuncts applies to what follows. Since 
this state is the central and major part of the concept of a desire 
to act, we need not worry about the success of the present defence 
of our thesis against the entailment-argument if the concept of 
the 'state' is perhaps a little less than the full concept of desire 
to act.
However, we have already remarked ^ that unless people nearly 
always acted according to their genuine desires under certain
appropriate circumstances, the concept of desire to act would be
unintelligible. Someone may point out that in that case there is ^
entailment between the statement, 'I desire to do X' and a proposition
about the performance of the action. ^ One can claim that 'I (now)
desire to do X' entails 'when I desire to do X', usually I do X or
the disjunctive set of propositions is true'. We can of course show
that the entailment need only be a weaker one, if the concept of
desire to act is to be intelligible. Thus we can show 'I (now) desire
to do X' entails only the proposition 'usually when people desire to
do things either they do them, or the disjunctive set is true'.
The issue would then be, is this conceptual link between the 
concept of desire and that of action weak enough to allow causality? 
(Both a strong and a weak conceptual link can be expressed in the
1. See p.
2. See p.
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form of ^  entailment).
Suppose we say that the condition a cause must s&tisfy to be
cause is that it must be logically conceivable that it occurs without
its effect. Now if it is essential to understanding what a desire to
do X is that we describe it as 'that which, in given circumstances ^
is always followed by X'; i.e. if we define it in this way, then
presumably we could not conceive the desire occurring,in the relevant 
2
circumstances, without X happening. On the other hand, if we replace 
'always' by 'usually' in the definition, then we could conceive this.
Perhaps it would be a bit clearer to write the absence of the 
disjunctions referred to by (ii), (iii), ... on p.^" into the desire 
itself and say something like 'that feasible, ühd'irainished, » 
thing which is always (or usually) followed by X*. Then the 'usually' 
version, but not the 'always' version, allows us to conceive that one 
day we shall be able to say 'here is a case of the feasible, 
u n d i m i n i s h e d . , thing, without there being any X following'.
If all this is acceptable, then, the substitution of 'usually' 
for 'always' does seem to enable the desire to fulfil the condition
that it is necessary for it to fulfil if it is to be a cause, amd
which it cannot fulfil without this subsistitution.
1. Namely, the absence of the disjunctions referred to by (ii), (iii) ..., 
on p. 3ii
2. Namely, the absence of the disjunctions referred to by (ii), (iii), ... 
on p.
320
Perhaps it is a little artificial to put the absence of the 
disjunctions into the description of the desire. But then those 
who bring forward the entailment-view are also guilty of introducing 
artificial means. They claim as if we can easily pick out a 
specific desire to act as we can pick out a physical object, and 
then show that talks of such a desire entail a disjunctive set of 
propositions about the consequent acting. They give the impression that 
it would be very easy to specify the disjunctions, where as in 
practice such a specification involves a certain amount of 
artificiality. Our use of some artificial means of describing the 
desire can thus be regarded as a tactical concession.
One may also object that it is not very clear how one could 
pick out "the feasible, uudiminishedp.. thing’ on occasions where 
X did not occur. If one could, why is X relevant in any of the 
cases? We can answer this by saying that if one could pick it out, 
one could not describe it as 'a desire to do X' unless it was 
usually followed by X; and that is why the ’usually' clause is needed.
Another objection to treating reasons as causes stems from 
the Humean definition of a cause. Hume has, as we have seen, ^ 
defined a cause as "an object, followed by another, and where all 
the objects similar to the first are followed by objects similar to
1. See chapter I, p. « See also Enquiry, p. ?6.
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the_seco^." Now such a definition of a cause implies that a 
singular causal statement inevitably implies a general statement 
connecting events of a particular kind with events of another kind.
By contrast, if we say that one man acted in a particular way 
because another threatened him, (thereby explaining what he did in 
terms of the reason), it would be absurd to claim that generally he 
or other persons comply when they are threatened. "The assertion that 
he acted because of the threats carries no implication that, given 
similar circumstances, he would act again in this way or that, in 
similar circumstances, he or other persons had always acted in that 
way." ^
We can answer such an objection in the following way. We can 
say that there ^  exist certain rough generalisations connecting 
reasons and actions. People do tend to behave in a more or less 
uniform way when motivated by reasons of certain kinds. It is true 
that threatened people do not always comply with threats. But then we 
must always distinguish between different sorts of threats and 
different agents. Some agents may have a weak personality and may 
easily give in to threats. Others may have certain guiding 
principles due to which they may ignore a threat even involving their 
own lives. We must consider counteracting circumstances.
1, Hart and Honore, Causation in the Law, p. 52.
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We can, following MacIntyre, put forward a good example of a 
causal generalisation connecting a reason and a particular 
behaviour. I am puzzled why I lose my temper while playing cards 
and behave angrily. Others and I myself notice that I do so 
pretty soon after I start losing the game. People who wish to 
make me angry will very happily rely on this correlation between 
my losing the game and my performing angry actions. This is a very 
good case of Humean causation and nothing is affected if I manage 
to change my behaviour on discovering its cause. For the generalisation 
required will take the following form: ’whenever I am losing at cards, 
and so long as I do not know what is going to happen to my 
behaviour as a result, I shortly after behave angrily.’ ^
So far we have dealt with different arguments trying to prove 
that since actions are to be explained in terms of motives and 
kindred concepts, they cannot therefore be explained causally. But 
a group of philosophers make the claim that causal explanations are 
out of court ^ together so far as actions are concerned. There are 
various arguments in support of this claim.
One argument runs like this. Causes can explain bodily movements. 
But since the word 'cause' is applicable to bodily movements, it
oÇ
1. MacIntyre, 'AntecedentsMction'. British Analytical Philosophy, 
p. 222.
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cannot, for this very reason, be applied to human actions (or 
behaviour)a The logic of the language of movements is different 
from that of the language of actions, (Talk of actions, for 
example, is unintelligible without concepts like ’••purpose', 'meaning', 
and 'goal'* No such concepts are however necessary for under­
standing any talk of movements). Thus in so far as we are talking 
of 'causes', we are restricting ourselves to the domain of movements.
We cannot, therefore, apply the word 'cause' any longer to actions,
which belong to a different domain. This argument has been advanced 
by both Melden and Waismann* ^ Waismann, for example, makes his 
point in the following way.
The word 'action' is ambiguously used. It is sometimes used in 
the sense of 'bodily movements' and sometimes in the sense of 'human
behaviour'. Thus, "an action may be viewed as a series of movements
caused by some physiological stimulus.... or as something that 
has a purpose or meaning.... An action in the first sense is determined 
by causes, an action in the second sense by motives or reasons. It 
is generally believed that an action is determined both by causes 
and by motives". But, Waismann says, if we talk of 'causes' of 
actions then we are limiting ourselves to the sphere of 'bodily 
movements'. We cannot then also speak of 'motives' of these same 
actions; because the words 'motives' or 'reasons' refer only to
' " " / Jct i op.cit. pp.iié-17.
1. For Melden see Free Actions, pp.IC-V^ Tj/or Waismann see Language 
Strata, pp. 30-31. /
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* behaviour'* Similarly, if we speak of 'motives' then we 
cannot also speak of 'causes' of actions* Hence if we claim that 
both causes and motives determine actions, then we will be guilty 
of using the word 'actions' in an ambiguous way*^
Now we grant that actions cannot, in the same way, be said 
to be determined both by causes and by motives, the word 'causes' 
referred only-to bodily movements and the word 'motives' only to 
behaviour* But are the words really restricted in this way in their 
references? It i^rue that the word 'cause' is generally used in 
statements about bodily movements* It is also true that the 
language of bodily movements has a different logic from the 
language of behaviour. But it does not follow from this that the 
word 'cause' cannot therefore be used in discussiohs of behaviour as 
well.
There i^o reason to think that since a word is generally 
used in statements belonging to one particular logical order or 
stratum, it must therefore be confined to such statements. And one 
of the words which cannot be so confined is the word 'cause' and its 
logical kith and kin. We can, for example, say that the notion of 
colour is of a different logical order from that of a wavelength of
1. Waismann, Language Strata, pp. 30-31, quoted by Macintyre in his 
article, 'The Antecedents of Actions', in British Analytical 
Philosophy, p. 220.
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light. "But we unhesitatingly explain alterations in colour as 
caused by changes in the wavelength of light. So that although 
the notion of bodily movements may be of a different logical order 
from that of an action, it certainly cannot follow that the word 
'cause' is restricted to the stratum to which bodily movements belongs, 
and denied to the stratum to which action belongs." ^
An attempt has been made to establish the point that actions
cannot have any causal explanations with the help of another
argument as well. This argument emphasizes the point that causes
explain only 'happenings'. Since actions are more than 'happenings',
causes cannot explain them. This is what Melden means when he says,
"It is futile to attempt to explain conduct through the causal
aU
efficacy of d e s i r e that can explain is further happenings, not
actions performed by agents. The agent confronting the causal
nexus in which happenings occur is a helpless victim of all that
2
occurs in and to him."
The statement that causes can only explain 'happenings' seems 
also to be the presupposition of another argument against the causal
1. Kacintyre, British Analytical Philosophy, p. 220. Italics ours,
2. Melden, Free Action, pp. 128, 129. Italics as in the original.
explanation of -actions' brought forward by R.S. Peters. He 
argues that it is impossible to give a causal explanation of 
human 'actions', although such an explanation is possible of 
'what happens to a man' or 'a breakdown of his actions', because 
we cannot "specify an action exhaustively in term of movements 
of the body or within the body." ^ There are indefinitely many 
ways in which an action, for example, the signing of a contract 
can be performed. And while there may be a general range of 
movements which must occur if a contract is to be'signed, there 
are no specific movements of the^muscles, limbs or nervous 
system, which must occur before it would be conceded that a 
contract has been signed." ^ But someone may ask, 'is not the same 
thing true of events which are not actions'? For example, a 
man may 'fall down' (not an action) in an indefinite number of 
ways,; But peters informs us of a certain character of an 'action" 
which helps us to understand the difference between an action and 
a happening. He says that action descriptions imply norms. ^
What he means is probably that we call something an 'action*, only 
when it occurs withint the context of certain institutions with 
rules, standards, or values. For example, the signing of a 
contract must occur in the context of certain social and legal
1. Peters, The Concept of Motivation, p. 12.
as
2. Ibid., p. 13. Italicsxin the original.
3. Peters, Concept of Motivation, p. l4.
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institutions only, whereas any number of movements may happen 
outside these contexts which would not be called 'signing of a 
contract'. Peters concludes, "we could never give a sufficient 
explanation of an action in causal terms because we could never 
stipulate the movements which would have to count as dependent 
variables." ^
The whole of the argument quoted above rests upon the 
presupposition that causal explanations are possible of happenings 
only. Why can't we give direct causal explanation of human 
actions? Why do we have to trace them through bodily movements? 
This is because a happening alone can be causally explained.
But why should what is caused necessarily be a happening 
and not an action? The reason is possibly this. An action is the 
action of a free agent. The agent may, if he so wishes, not 
perform it and perform a different action instead. But what is 
caused us a mere happening. Once the causal processes responsible 
for its production are started, there is no way of stopping them 
from bringing this about. If an action is caused, the agent will 
then no longer remain free not to do it. He will be a'helpless 
victim' of a mere happening which he can not alter.
1. Ibid., p. l4.
3 28
Peters and Melden are both arguing that if human actions 
are caused by anything whatsoever, then they become a mere 
happenings. In this way, even if desires etc. cause a man's 
actions then that man becomes these philosophers would suggest, 
a''helpless victim' of a mere happening. But such a suggestion 
rests upon a false assumption that desires etc. are not part of 
an agent's being and that they are something which 'bypass' him.
We would try to establish our point with the help of an example. 
Suppose a man has a raving passion to murder someone. Let us also 
suppose that this passion actually causes him to commit a 
murder. He could, to give an unlikely example, might have said 
to himself, 'Good, Lord, I have this terrible passion to commit 
a murder, what shall I do?' This would then possibly be a case 
where his desire would 'bypass' this man. But let us suppose 
that immediately after he has this raving passion, this man has a 
second desire of curbing the passion and not acting according to 
its dictates. Let us also suppose that he actually succeeds in 
curbing his raving passion with the help of his second desire.
Now the second desire is as much a cause as the first murderous 
passion. Yet the second desire is not something that is 
'bypassing' him#
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Section ii
^ Distinction in Buodhist Philosophy Between Reasons and
Causes?
Buddhist philosophy abounds in discussions about what is
generally known in Western philosophy as springs of actions'. In
the Anguttara Nikaya, for example, perception ('phassa') is
described as the cause (i.e. 'nidana') of behaviour.^ This
suggests that perception normally arouses desire in men, and this
desire prompts them into different actions. If, for example, I
perceive an agreeable object, then my desire for the object grows
2
and I strive to grasp that object. Perception can, in this sense, 
be said to set a man into action.
Causes are more directly assigned to actions, e.g. in the 
Anguttara Nikaya by saying that three factors, namely, greed ('lobho'), 
hatred or aversion ('doso'), and delusion ('moho') are causes of 
actions. ^ It is of course demeritorious ('akusala') actions which
1. "Phasso....kamraanam nidanasambhavo." A N ., Ill, 415. Italis ours*
2. This is possibly what is implied in such Anguttara Nikaya statements 
as: the cause of craving is an agreeable object. In the case of
a person who reflects wrongly on an agreeable object, craving 
which has not yet arisen arises. See A N., I, 200. Of. Gradual 
Sayings, I, p. l8l.
3. AN., I, 134, "Tin'imâni....nidânâni kamminam samudayaya,
Katamani tini? Lobho, doso, moho...."
3 30
result from such evil motives* Meritorious (*kusala*) actions 
are, on the other hand, re3ults,nts of the contraries of the 
motives mentioned above, viz* absence of greed, absence of 
aversion, and absence of delusion*
^ 0  Phammasangani discusses the function of these three 
motives in detail* This work discusses not only the actions which 
ensue from these motives, but also further mental tendencies and 
qualities which ensue from them* But since our main concern 
here is with the causes of actions, we shall therefore confine 
ourselves only to the account of actions performed from these 
motives* We can gather the following information about actions 
issuing from these motives, basing ourselves on the commentaiy 
of the Dhammasangani. the AtthasalinT*
Grred makes people madly chase sensuous objects in order 
to gratify their desires* They attach themselves to sensuous 
objects in the way a piece of fresh meat thrown into a heated 
utensil sticks to it, or the way the pigment from oil lamps sticks 
to certain objects. As a result individuals madly rush after some 
objects by letting go others. In this way their greed, increasing 
continuously with its progress, carries them to a veiy low sphere 
of existence just as a stream carries any object fallen into it to 
the great ocean*^
1* AtthasâlinT.p. 249* "Tesu lobho arammanagaha^akkhano**.• 
apayam eva gahetva gacchati ti dat'^abbo* ”
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Hatred or aversion makes a man behave offensively, rudely, 
and agrily. Due to hatred or malevolence an individual offends or 
injures another like an enemy. Hatred is usually accompanied 
by states like envy (‘issa*, Sanskrit, *îrsy2î) and meanness 
( *macchariya*, Sanskrit *matsaiya*). As a result a malevolent 
man cannot endure the prosperity of others and turns his face 
away from such prosperity.^
Delusion is really another name for *avijja7 or *ahnâna*, 
the primary cause of all evils, the .primary cause of the ‘vicious* 
worldly existence. It covers the intrinsic nature of objects 
and acuses us to revel in all sorts of demeritorious actions. It 
is in this sense described as the root of all evils*^ Because if 
we could see through the worldly objects as they are in themselves, 
we should feel no desire for them and should not consequently 
indulge in actions set after procuring them.
The contraries of these three motives, absence of greed, 
absence of hatred, and absence of delusion are, however, conducive
1. AtthasâlinT. p. 257. "Tesu issati ti issa....parasampatti- 
padatthânâ samyojanan ti datthabbâ. "
2. It is the first member of the * twelve-membered dependent 
origination*.
3. AtthasâlinT. p. 249. "Moho.... sabbâkusalânam mûlan ti 
datthabbo."
3 3 2
to the following meritorious actions.
To start with, absence of greed helps an individual to
behave in an unattached way. He remains unattached to sensuous
objects. Just as water drooped on a lotus leaf does not cling
to it, so he does not cling to sensuous objects. Like a saint
who has renounced worldliness, a non-greedy man does not strive to
acquire worldly possession. Above all 'alobho' helps a man to
be generaous. It prompts a man to charity ('danahetu').^ Through
absence of greed one does not, as opposed to the greedy one, take
more than is necessary. Again,absence of greed helps a man to
disclose a defect whenever he detects it. But a greedy man is
2
always very eager to cover and conceal defects.
Absence of hatred ('adoso’) or amity is conclusive to 
pleasant and charming behaviour. It stops a man from behaving 
rudely and resentfully with his fellow beings. It helps and 
individual to lead a harmonious life with all others. ('Sabbesam 
sukhanam samvasata hoti'). Absence of hatred makes us disclose 
virtues when we detect them. But a person ruled by hatred will 
reject virtues and belittle them.
Absence of delusion is really another name for 'analytical'and
1. Atthasalini, p. 127»
2. Ibid., p. 127. " A l o b h e n a  c'ettha....dosam paticchadeti".
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appreciative understanding (*pannâ*, Sanskrit *prajnâ*).^ It is 
responsible for the actual practice of all that leads to self- 
perfection and ultimately to Liberation* Absence of delusion 
operates especially among recluses and allows them to live 
happily*^ This is because it is they who have perceived the non- 
substantiality (*anatta‘) ^ of worldly thihgs and taken to the
5
right path* Finally, absence of delusion prompts a man to reveal 
things as they really are, while a man dominated by delusion 
perceives true as false and false as true*
We have briefly described how men behave under the influence 
of motives like greed, hatred and delusion, and their contraries, 
in some Buddhist texts. The question can be asked now, do the 
Buddhist texts analyse such motives as something different from 
causes? Of course we cannot find any extensive discussion in 
Buddhist literature about the distinction between a * reason* and 
a * cause* comparable to the one we have reproduced in this chapter* 
The question of the distiction between &reasons* for actions and 
* causes* is possibly of a veiy recent origin* But the question
1* Atthasalini. p* 129»
2* Ibid., p. 129.
3* Ibid*, p* 128.
4* Ibid*, p. 129.
5* * Right Path* = * the Middle Path, * Atthasalini. p. 128.
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whether the Buddhists understood hy these motives * causes* for 
actions or something else (i#e* * reasons* ) can still he answered 
in an indirect way* It can he answered, for example, hy asking 
whether the Buddhist texts used one word to refer to what is 
generally known as * causes*, and a completely different one to refer 
to * springs of actions* or motives* If they used two different 
words on these two occasions, then one can possibly argue that the 
Buddhist philosophers made a distinction between * motives* and
* causes*.
By looking at the word the Anguttara Nikava chooses to refer 
to motives of actions one may, at the outset, fonn the opinion that 
the Buddhist philosophers understood by motives something different 
from * causes** The Anguttara Nikaya has referred to these motives 
as *nidanas* of actions (*kamma*),^ whereas the standard word found 
in Buddhist texts^refer to causes are words like *hetu* and *paccaya*
( * pratyaya* )* Is this merely a coincidence, or is it indicative of 
a fundamental distinction these texts made between a * reason for action* 
and a * cause’? We can answer the question in the following way*
It is true that the Anguttara Nikaya refers to these motives as
* nidanas* * Yet other texts belonging to early Buddhist schools refer
1* See notes 1 and 3 , of the present chapter*
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to them as * hetu-paccayas*. And althou^ a * hetu-pacoaya’ is 
undoubtedly different from the other ’paccayas*, it is nevertheless 
a species of the hi^er class, ’ paccaya* # Referring to motives as 
'paccayas* is thus indicative of the fact that motives foim a 
âpecies of the higher class of causal conditions (’paccayas*)*
There are different species of causal conditions, and they condition 
their effects in different ways* One such species is exhibited by 
the class that is generally known as motives for actions*
The Vi3uddhimagga has, for example, referred to the motives of 
actions greed, hatred and delusion as *hetu-paccayas* (’root- 
conditions* )• It explains the compound word *hetu-paocaya’ in the 
following way. The word ’ hetu* signifies root and the word 
’paccaya* means ’that which helps another* (*upakaraka*)• *Eetu-
paccaya * thus means ’ that which helps another as a root* ’ ^  The 
Visiddhimagga speaks of three ’ dhaimnas* as being roots of meritorious 
(’fcusala*) actions and three ’dhammas* as being roots of demeritorious 
(’akusala*) actions*^ Since the triplets greed, hatred, delusion and
1* W ,  p* 533* "Iti mulatttiena hetu* •. mulatthena upakârako dhammo 
hetu-paccayo."
a.
2. "ïayo kusalalietû, tayo akusa^ietü ti." VM, p. 532.
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their contraries constitute the roots of such actions,^ they are 
therefore included in the 'hetu-paccaya' by the author of the 
Visuddhimagga. Tîie Patthâna also speaks of these pairs of triplets 
as 'hetu-paccayas'«
The fact that one Buddhist text refers to motives as 'nidanas' 
is thus not sufficient evidence for reaching the conclusion that 
Buddhist philosophers in general distinguished motives from causes, 
because other texts have referred to motives as belonging to the 
higher class of 'paccayas'. We cannot even be sure that the 
Anguttara Nikaya itself maintained a distinction between a motive 
for action and a cause? because according to some Buddhist scholars 
the words 'nidana', 'hetu', 'paccaya' etc. all signify, ih slightly 
different senses, the same thing. Buddhaghosa has, for example, 
said that although the words 'paccaya', 'hetu', 'kârana', 'nidaha', 
'sambhava', 'pabhava' are different in form, they nevertheless mean 
the same thing.^ Hence although the Anguttara Nikaya might have 
chosen the word 'nidana' to refer to motives, it does not follow 
that the Anguttara Nikâya meant by 'nidana' something essentially 
different from 'paccaya'. Of course it m^y be insisted, (as has 
already been remarked) that there must be some difference in the
1, Tlie Digha Nikaya also refers to them as roots of meritorious and 
demeritorious actions. See DN, III, p. 214.
2. See VH, p. 533»
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meaning of these wordsj otherwise why should people use so many
words instead of using one single word? But then the difference
between these words need not be a difference of kind. Just as
the word 'hetu* signifies only a species of 'paccaya' and not
something different in kind from 'paccaya',^ so the word 'nidana'
may also signify a species of 'paccaya'. 'Nidana' may stand for
one particular species of causes, e.g causes of actions. Moreover,
2
in chapter V we have given the reasons why we think that the 
words 'paccaya', 'hetu', ' kârana ', 'nidana', 'sambhava', ' paWa;v«i-' 
were probably all used by Buddhist philosophers to refer to some 
aspect or other of causation. If this is the case, and if motives 
are referred to as 'nidanas', there is no need to suppose that the 
Anguttara Nikaya must have meant by 'nidanas' something different 
from 'causes'.
We can now come to the conclusion that our study of the 
concepts of motives and intentions, as found in Buddhist philosophy, 
does not give us conclusive evidence to prove that the concept 
of cause has been distinguished in it from that of the reason for 
action. Yet the lack of the distinction in Buddhist philosophy 
between a cause and a reason does not stand in the way of our 
comparing the concept of cause as found in Buddhist philosophy with
1. See ch. iV, pp.
2. See ch.
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that found in the philosophy of certain British philosophers. For, 
as we have already remarked, ^ the distinction between a cause and 
a reason is not fundamental, and philosophers like Hume and Kill 
did not, either explicitly or implicitly, distinguish a 'cause* 
from a 'reason- for action.
1. See fp. ‘io^-'Sou-
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER I
FURTHER ATTEMPTS TO PROVE THAT THERE IS A LOGICALLY NECESSARY 
BETWEEN A CAUSE AND AN EFFECT
Although Hume quite persuasively argued that the cause does 
not have any logically necessary connection with the effect, the 
issue as to whether there is any internal logical relation between 
the cause and the effect was not abandoned at this point. It 
survived in Western philosophy for a long time even after Hume.
In fact, even in recent times philosophers like A.C. Ewing ^ and 
B, Blanshard claim that the relation between a cause and its 
effect is a logically necessary one. But it should be noted 
that although the Buddhist philosophers were, just like the 
empiricist philosophers, very involved with questions like 
whether there is in reality anything like ’production* and ’causal 
efficacy', they do not appear to have been involved with the 
question about the logically necessary connection between the 
cause and the effect. We shall briefly mention the sort of 
arguments philosophers like Blanshard bring forward. We do not 
think that these arguments succeed in proving that the cause and 
the effect are connected by a logically necessary connection 
Blanshard bases his view in many important respects on Ewing.
1. See Ewing, Idealism, pp. l66f.
We shall examine here mainly the views of Blanshard. We can 
put his arguments for causal necessity into three main groups®
(a) He appeals first to inferences (in general), 
our
When we infer, /entertainment of the premise or premises is the 
cause (or part of the cause) of the emergence of the conclusion 
in our minds. "VJhen one passes in reasoning from ground to 
consequent the fact that the ground entails the consequent is one of 
the conditions determining the appearance of this consequent 
rather than something else in the thinker's mind."^ Thus since the 
objects of the two thoughts, viz. the entertainment of the 
premise and that of the conclusion, are logically related, our 
entertainment of the premise determines (i.e. compels) the 
emergence of the conclusion in our minds.
But it is doubtful whether his arguments succeed in proving 
that the emergence of the premise and that of the conclusion of an 
inference are logically related®
We very often experience our inability to draw a conclusion 
when presented with a certain premise, even though the premise 
entails the conclusion® Yet, if two things are necessarily related, 
then we expect that if one of them is given, the other will 
inevitably follow it. Even though it is an indisputable fact that
TM
1. /Nature of Thought, II, p. 496.
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in cases of valid inferences the ground logically entails the 
consequent, yet this fact in itself, is not sufficient to 
ensure the necessary emergence of the conclusion in the thinker’s 
mind at the sight of the premise or premises.
Now Blanshard might qualify his previous statement at
this point by saying that what he means by saying causality involves 
logical necessity is only that logical necessity must be one of the 
factors, among many, that determines the effect. In the case of 
inference, he claims, the premise's logically entailing the 
conclusion is such a factor.
But it can be easily shown that the premise's entailing the 
conclusion is not a sine qua non of inferences. We very often 
arrive at a wrong conclusion from certain premises. The thought 
of the premise and that of the conclusion are undoubtedly causally 
related in those cases, yet the objects of the two thoughts are 
not logically related. ^
Another vital objection against Blanshard's claim is to the 
effect that, since logical relations are timeless, how can they 
be elements of causation which is a temporal process? Blanshard's
lo Cf. Nagel, Sovereign Reason, pp. 287-88.
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answer to such an objection is that the events causality connects 
are not bare events, stripped of all sorts of characters. Logic 
deals with characters which are non-temporal entities. Hence one 
can claim that the non-temporal characters dealt with by logic 
can undoubtedly be parts of causal processes. A case in point he 
claims, is the relation of similarity. "It would be idle to deny", 
he says, "that the similarity of content does at times have 
something to do with the appearance of an associate." ^ (By 
appearance he perhaps means here the appearance of the associate 
in the mind).
Now although it is true that the relation of similarity is 
a non-temporal entity, yet this in itself does not establish what 
Blanshard eventually wants to prove, viz., a logical relation can 
be an element of causation. The relation of similarity is not a 
logical relation. A shilling coin may resemble another foreign 
coin in size. But although this shilling coin and the foreign coin 
may be related by way of similarity, it would be absurd to claim 
that they are logically related.
Blanshard made a fresh attempt to prove his point in his 
Reason and Alalysis which he published later than The Nature of 
Thought* There he says that although the common conception of cause 
is based on an arbitrary selection of the conspicuous change
1. The Nature of Thought, II, pp. 497-8.
occurring before the effect, yet the word 'cause' should be 
legitimately applied to the sum of the conditions given which 
alone the effect will occur. And in this sense of the word, the 
necessity linking the objects of the thought cannot be omitted 
from the cause. We do agree with Blanshard that the word 'cause' 
is really a collective name for many factors. Yet there is 
nothing in that admission which requires that a logical necessity 
is one of the factors constituting a causal complex® In fact, each 
of the examples of the necessary conditions he has been able to 
give, in the course of the arguments, except the unique condition 
of logical necessity, is either an element or a thing or its 
character (like the exerting of the normal pull by gravitation, 
density of the air, a particular level of the table).^
Another argument Blanshard brings forward to prove a 
logically necessary connection between a cause and an effect is 
as follows. Unless the premises entailed the conclusion and 
unless this entailment in some way compelled us to accept this 
particular conclusion rather than another, we could never say 
that we arrived at valid conclusions because of entertaining 
certain premises. (Cf. "No conclusions are arrived at because the 
evidence requires them," The Nature of Thought, II, p 498).
Thus in the case of valid inferences at least, we have to admit
1, Cf. Reason and Analysis, p. 45?.
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that our arriving at the valid conclusion is caused, among other 
things, by entailment, a logical relation.
An opponent might say at this stage that granted that the 
inference becomes invalid if the premises do not entail the 
conclusion, there is yet nothing in that admission to prove that 
necessity is involved in the movement of inference. If anything 
does play a part in the movement of inference at all, it is the 
'apprehension of necessity'. Blanshard's answer to such a possible 
objection can be found in his Reason and Analysis.
There he argues that such an explanation of inference 
already assumes what has to be proved. Our task is to explain 
how we arrive at the conclusion. But in order to intuit the 
entailment of the conclusion by the premise, both the conclusion 
and the premise must b^resent at the same time before us, and this 
amounts to 'saying that the conclusion emerged because it had 
already made its appearance
A deeper scrutiny will reveal that Blanshard himself is 
really begging the question here in saying that it is logical 
entailment which is responsible for the emergence of the conclusion 
in the thinker's mind. He starts by thinking that there must be a 
cause for the appearance of a certain conclusion in the mind. The 
human mind is such a complex entity that it is extremely difficult 
to ascertain what is causing what in the mental world. It may be, for 
all we know, that some of the thoughts are not caused at all. But
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Blanshard assumes from the very beginning that the appearance of 
the conclusion in a certain thinker's mind must be caused. And 
since he cannot find any other entity to enact the role of a cause, 
he fancies the logical entailment to enact such a rôle. Moreover, 
if entailment were a sufficient condition for the emergence of the 
conclusion then our thoughts would be rather overloaded^ The reason 
is, a proposition does not entail only one other proposition, but 
in fact many propositions. So if entailment were a sufficient 
condition, then several thoughts would appear in our mind the 
moment we think of one premise.
Blanshard is arguing all the time that entailment is one of 
the causes that makes us accept one conclusion rather than another.
But proving that entailment is one of the causes of inferring is 
different from proving that, there is a logically necessary connection 
between the emergence of the conclusion in the mind of the person 
inferring and the causes of that emergence. And unless Blanshard 
can prove the second thesis he cannot hope to demonstrate that there 
is a logically necessary connection between the cause and the effect.
(b) According to Blanshard, the presence of logical necessity 
can be traced, besides inference, . in other spheres of
mental causation as well. But the necessity present in these spheres 
is, according to him, not absolute, but tinged with an element of 
contingency as well. Some of us will undoubtedly be very surprised
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at such a comment. Surely, necessity admits of no degree!
Yet we find Blanshard saying, "necessity, whatever our first
impressions, is^matter of more and less, and that between a complete
demonstration and a mere accidental conjunction it may be present in
very many degrees." ^ By examining Blanshard»s further comments on
this point we can see that he is here interpreting the term‘logically
necessary' in a way different from that in which it is normally
understood. He is thinking that the proposition, 'X is logically
necessary' means the same sort of thing as 'there is a cause or reason 
for X'.
He writes, "a painter is painting a landscape that is half
completed, and he finds himself moved to put a tree in the foreground.
Is such a development normally quite unintelligible? Certainly most
painters would not say so. Is it then a/^  .example of pure necessity ?
No again; it clearly falls somewhere between'.^ Clearly, Blanshard
is taking 'intelligibility' to mean tha^ there is a cause why something
f")
happened in a particular way, and 'unintelligibility' to mean that^an 
occurrence is accidental.
However, when we grasp why an event is like that and not 
otherwise, we can at most claim that there is some cause for its being
1. The Nature of Thought, II, p. 499»
2. The Nature of Thought, II, p. 499-500.
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so. But it is a far cry to say that intelligibility is the criterion 
of logical necessity. Yet Blanshard's remarks on page 500 of 
The Nature of Thought, II, do give us the impression that he is 
claiming so; "Does the ... premise here, 'All who think lightly of 
their own deserts are grateful', express a causal or a logical 
connection? We suggest that it expresses both. If a man whom we 
know to think little of himself proves grateful for another's 
esteem, is that, apart from inductions made on such people in the 
past, ... as unpredictable and unintelligible, as if he had begun 
talking in a Sumerian tongue?"
Blanshard is trying to establish that there is both a causal 
and a logical connection between somebody's having low self-esteem 
and his being grateful for another's pr^pses • He wants to say 
that the proposition, 'low self-esteem always causes people to feel 
grateful for others' praises', is analytic.
Now of course this proposition expresses a causal connection.
And it is extremely ambiguous to say that a proposition stating such 
a connection is at the same an analytic one. The reason is, if 
two things are causally related then there must be a way of 
identifying the cause which does not entail any reference to the 
effect being caused by it. A proposition about a causal connection 
must therefore be synthetic. Hence it would be highly ambiguous to 
suggest that such a causal proposition is analytic. Such a 
proposition would then have to be both analytic and synthetic at
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the same time! A proposition could at most be said to be partly 
analytic and partly synthetic. But to claim that it is at one 
and the same time full-blooded analytic and full-blooded synthetic 
is highly unintelligible,
(c) Next we shall deal with Blanshard's arguments for 
proving the necessity of causation in physical nature. And these 
undoutedly constitute the most important part of his defence of the 
necessity of causation,
Blanshard says that when we nake successful predictions concerning 
the future occurrence of events, on the basis of past experience, 
we rely on the argument that 'becflw^b has followed a in the past, 
it will continue to do so.' It is often argued that such arguments 
are valid because they are based on the principle of the uniformity 
of nature, according to which, 'the same cause produces the same 
effect. ' Mow if the principle of the uniformity of nature is to 
justify the argument quoted above, it must itself state an intrinsic 
connection between the characters of the thing called 'cause' and 
those of the thing called effect'.^ Hence the connection between 
the cause and the effect, which is the basis of our prediction of 
their future connection, should be intrinsic, necessary.
What justifies the principle, 'same cause, same effect',
Blanshard maintains, is our realization that when something produces 
something else, it does so by virtue of its special nature. The
1. See The Nature of Thought, II, p.
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special nature of a cause must have something to do with the 
production of the effect. Otherwise, why say produces something? 
"To say that a produces X in virtue of being a and yet that, given 
a, X might not follow, is inconsistent with the laws of identity and 
contradiction." For "a's behaviour is the outgrowth or expression 
of a's nature. And to assert that a's' behaviour: could be different
while a was the same would be to assert that something both did and 
did not issue from the nature of a. And that is self-contradiction. 
The statement would also ... conflict with the law of identity. It 
implies that a thing may remain itself when you have stripped from 
it everything which it is such as to be and to do. To strip it of 
these things would be to strip it, so to speak, of the suchness that 
makes it what it is, i.e., to say that it is other than it is." ^
Let us try to analyse the implications of Blanshard's claim 
with the help of an example. Othello strangled Desdemona. According 
to Blanshard, Othello's strangling was the outgrowth of Othello's 
special nature. To imagine that he did not strangle would be to 
strip him of the suchness that made him what he was. Since Othello's 
behaviour is an 'outgrowth' of Othello's nature, in the absence of 
his act of strangling, his nature must logically be admitted to be 
different.
What then is Othello's special nature? Blanshard says that he 
1. The Nature of Thought, II, pp. 513-14.
means by the nature of a non-relational thing its properties.^
What properties of Othello would then be different if Othello did 
not kill Desdemona? It is extremely difficult to point out any such 
property. But of course Othello would no longer possess the 
relational property of being the killer of Desdemona. And the 
absence of such property may be said to imply the alteration of 
Othello's nature if and only if Othello's nature is made identical 
with the total set of attributes that may be truly predicated of 
him. But then the argument will amount to a tautology. If we 
already define X's nature as 'the total set attributes that are truly 
predicable of him', then if any of the truly predicable attributes 
is missing from the totality, we would obviously say that X's nature 
is changed.
Blanshard makes some fresh attempts to prove his case in
Reason and Analysis. He remarks that what he says is certainly true
if the causal properties of a thing are introduced into its
definition. If gold did not dissolve in aqua regia we should not
call it gold; since gold is that which is soluble in aqua regia.
2
Bearing in mind Stebbing's comment, that we do not include all the 
causal properties of a thing in its nature, he says that including a
1. The Nature of Thought, II, p • ,'478.
2, Stebbing, A Modern Introduction to Logic, pp. 285f«
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causal property in the definition of a thing is not the only way 
of arguing that its causal property is its necessary property. He 
says that, "Even if a thing ia not its behaviour, still if we say 
that it behaves in this way in virtue of having this nature,*., then 
we are saying,... that it could not lack the causal property while 
possessing this nature." ^
If we scrutinize this argument, we shall find that although 
Blanshard professes not to include the causal properties of a thing 
in its nature, yet he is virtually doing the same thing: in disguise 
by introducing the expression 'in virtue of. If we strip away the 
disguise, we shall find that this means nothing but 'in the nature 
of. And if it is in the nature of a thing to behave in a particular 
way, then obviously 'it could not lack that behavioural property while 
possessing this virtue.' Blanshard would obviously claim that 
a proposition like 'food must-nourish' is a necessary statement. If 
anything is food, the^t must nourish. Yet we can conceive of many 
conditions under which food does not nourish. Blanshard would 
probably say then that it is wrong to call something 'food' if it 
does not nourish. 'Food' means that which nourishes. But it is 
needless to point out that his argument is then reduced to a mere 
tautology. Blanshard wants to say that the reason why a certain thing 
produces something else is because there is a logically necessary 
connection between the thing's being what it is and its producing the
1. Blanshard, Reason„and Analysis, p. 4?1. Italics as in the ongnoi,
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other thing. However, we would like to point out that there is 
no such connection, Blanshard may ask then, why does the thing act 
in that particular way in that case? We could answer that question 
with the help of the concept of probability. We could say that the 
reason why, for example, a kettle boils when placed on fire is that 
atomic configurations of a kettle of water makes it more probablç 
that it should boil when put on fire than assume any other state.
But the question may still be asked, why should the atomic 
configurations mal-ce it so probable? We may answer by saying that 
the world of nature is at/is - the laws of nature are as they are.
If the kettle of water behaved in a different way when put on fire, 
e.g., if it froze,.then only we could have asked the question why.
There is one chance in a million, so to speak, of the kettle's 
freezing when put on fire. If it did freeze inspite of this, we 
could have asked, why was that probability realised? On the contrary, 
the chances of the kettle's boiling overweighs the probability of 
its freezing. Therefore, the question cannot ^e^asked, why do the 
atomic configurations of water rasike it probable that water boils 
when put on fire.^
Another recent phase of the battle for and against 'causal
1. Of course, these questions can be answered pro^^r^ only by 
a physicist. And we should not trespass into the"territory 
about which we know so little. Whatever comments we have made 
so far have really been made from a layman's point of view.
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necessity* is traceable in the writings of philosophers like 
Popper and PCneale,
However, the issue of causal necessity is, in their 
writings, couched in slightly different terms than vdiat we have so 
far considered. There is, obviously, a close cohnection between 
statements expressing causal connections and those expressing laws 
of nature. It is possible to explain a statement expressing a 
causal connection in terras of a statement expressing a law of nature. 
Take for example, a proposition like 'This kettle of water was 
caused to boil by being heated.' One can, if one so wishes, explain 
it with the help of a statement about a corresponding law of 
nature, in the following way: 'This kettle of water was heated, and
it boiled. And there is a law of nature of the form, water heated
- 1
at lOOG at sea level always boils, from which it can be deduced
that, whenever a kettle of water was heated at 100*0.,^ it boiled.'
Such a conception of a law of nature can easily be 
interpreted as conveying the notion of a necessary connection between 
cause and effect. Kneale has in fact argued that the laws of nature 
are logically necessary laws in an article titled, 'Universality and 
Necessity' which was published in The British Journal for the
1. Some philosophers, e.g. Kneale, would like to interpret the words 
'always boils' as 'must boil'.
2. And presuming some other negative conditions which are understood 
here.
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Philosophy of Science. A diametrically opposite view is held 
by Popper, who thinks that the words like 'must' and 'necessary:' 
which we use in connection with laws of nature do not stand for 
'logical must' or 'logically necessary'. In fact he says that,
"I regard, unlike Kneale, 'necessary' as a mere word, as a label 
for distinguishing the universality of laws from 'accidental 
universality'.,* I largely agree with the spirit of Wittgenstein's 
paraphrase of Hume: ■ A necessity for one thing to happen because
another has happened does not exist. There is only logical
% 2
necessity'. [Tractatus, 6. 37*]- Only in one way is a"ÿib
connected with logical necessity: the necessary link between a and 
b is neither to be found in a nor in b, but in th^act that the 
corresponding ordinary conditional (or material implication', a%i^ b ^ 
without 'N'; follows v/ith logical necessity from a law of nature." ^
Hov/ does Professor Popper explain then the word 'necessary' 
which, when applied to the laws of nature, serves to distinguish 
them from 'accidental universality'? ^ He says."A statement may be
1. Vol. XII, pp. 69-102.
2. i.e. 'if a then necessarily b'.
3. i.e. 'if a then b'.
Ij., Logic of Scientific Discovery, p. 438. Italics as in the original.
3« An example of accidental universality is the fact that, All
mountains in the United Kingdom are less than 3*000 ft. in height.
^  C ^ .  a  d i f f e r e n t  t r a m k l t c n  P e a r S  2 . N n c c j u i n n e ^ s O ^ ^ ^ )  y ( P d ^ 3 ,
355
said__^ .lpe naturally or physically necessary if, and only if, it 
deducihle from a statement function which is satisfied in all 
worlds that differ from our world, if at all, only with respect 
to—initial—conditions." Kneale interprets the above definition
of 'physical necessity' to be really a definition of 'logical 
necessity' in disguise. He says that, saying that a statement 
function is satisfied in all worlds that differ from the actual 
world, if at all, only with respect to initial conditions,is 
saying in effect th^t it holds for all possible worlds. And he 
claims that what holds for all possible worlds is obviously
3necessary.
But a reflection on what Popper means by the phrase 'all 
worlds which differ from our world with respect to initial 
conditions' will reveal that Popper cannot be charged with 
presenting a definition of 'logical necessity' in the disguise of 
'natural necessity'. He means by it 'all worlds which have the
4
same structure - or the same natural laws - as our own world, '
The 'initial conditions' here stand for things like the distance
1. Logic of Scientific Discovery, p. 433. Italics as in the original.
2. Kneale, 'Universality and Necessity’, British Journal for the
Philosophy of Science, vol. XII, p. 99« Popper does grant that 
such a statement function holds for all possible worlds, but he 
would add that the word 'possible' stands here for 'physically 
possible.'
3. Kneale, op. cit., p. 99*
4. Popper, Logic of Scientific Discovery, p. 435.
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of the planets, their masses, and the mass of the sun. ^ If 
a statement is logically necessary then it will have to be true 
in all possible worlds - both physically and logically possible 
worlds* And a logically possible world need not only be a world 
with the same natural laws as ours but different initial 
conditions. A logically possible world may not have the same 
natural laws which govern our planet. We can easily imagine ^ 
a world where fire freezes water, and unsupported bodies (near the 
surface of the earth) go up in the sky. Thus what holds true for 
'all worlds having the same natural laws, but only different 
initial conditions' is not the same as «hat is logically necessary*
In fact, Popper defined 'logical necessity' in the following way;
"a statement may be said to be logically necessary if and only if 
it is deducible (for example, by particularization) from a 
'universally valid' statement function which is satisfied by 
every model. (This means, true in all possible worlds )" ^ While 
the above (i.e. Popper's) definition of 'physical necessity' will 
help us to distinguish laws of nature from 'accidental generalizations'
1, Popper, Logic of Scientific Discovery, p. 4-35.
2, As is obvious from fairy tales.
3, Popper, Logic of SciÆific Discovery, p. 432. Popper possibly
means by'all possible worlds' - 'all physically and logically 
possible worlds.'
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(since in different initial conditions, the statement 'all 
mountains in the U.K. are less than 5,000 ft. in height' may 
not be true); it will, at the same time, show that a law of 
nature is not a logically necessary law.
But we must point out that although Popper succeeds in 
showing that laws of nature are not logically necessary laws, yet 
his treatment of laws of nature as laws having 'physical necessity' 
leaves us extremely unhappy.
According to Popper laws of nature have some sort of 
'physical necessity or invariability. They do not only refer to 
what happens as a matter of fact. Yet what sort of necessity do 
they possess? It is obviously not logical necessity. A statement 
of a law is necessary in the sense that 'it can be deduced from 
a statement function which is satisfied in all worlds' that have 
initial conditions' different from those of our world. Yet a 
deeper scrutiny will renew that Popper is really explaining this 
'invariability' as 'that which always happens with the same laws 
of nature as ours.' The reason is. Popper means by 'all worlds 
which differ from our world with respect to initial conditions', 
'all worlds which have the same natural laws as our actual world.' 
Hence Popper is really explaining 'invariable' in this context as
'that which happens in accordance with our laws of nature*. Yet 
Popper professed to explain the difference between natural laws 
and 'accidental universality' by showing that natural laws are
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those which hold good invariably’ I He is thus arguing in 
a circle.
Popper was probably led into this unhappy position because he 
wanted to say that statements of laws of nature are different 
from statements of what heppens as a matter of fact. Hence he 
claimed that they have soge sort of necessity. Yet he found it 
difficult to explain what sort of necessity it is. He said that 
a natural law is invariable because it is not confined to the 
actual world, but would in fact be true in all worlds which only 
have 'different initial conditions.* But is it not possible 
that even the laws, as we know them, would be different with 
different conditions'? He ruled out such a possibility. A law 
would not be a law if it did not hold good in conditions different 
from the actual onesi A law of nature is thus, strangely enough, 
a law which holds good even with different 'initial conditions', 
as long as the laws of nature remain the same! But the circular 
reasoning is hidden from our view by Popper's intricate 
explanation of 'physically necessary' in terms of 'all worlds 
which differ from.... to initial conditions'. (See p.35'5).
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